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Abstract
Fraud is an increasing phenomenon as shown in many surveys carried out
by leading international consulting companies in the last years. Despite
the evolution of electronic payments and hacking techniques there is still a
strong human component in fraud schemes.
Conflict of interest in particular is the main contributing factor to the
success of internal fraud.
In such cases anomaly detection tools are not always the best instru-
ments, since the fraud schemes are based on faking documents in a context
dominated by lack of controls, and the perpetrators are those ones who
should control possible irregularities.
In the banking sector audit team experts can count only on their expe-
rience, whistle blowing and the reports sent by their inspectors.
The Fraud Interactive Decision Expert System (FIDES), which is the
core of this research, is a multi-agent system built to support auditors in
evaluating suspicious behaviours and to speed up the evaluation process in
order to detect or prevent fraud schemes. The system combines Think-map,
Delphi method and Attack trees and it has been built around audit team
experts and their needs.
The output of FIDES is an attack tree, a tree-based diagram to ”system-
atically categorize the different ways in which a system can be attacked”.
Once the attack tree is built, auditors can choose the path they perceive as
more suitable and decide whether or not to start the investigation.
The system is meant for use in the future to retrieve old cases in order
to match them with new ones and find similarities.
The retrieving features of the system will be useful to simplify the risk
management phase, since similar countermeasures adopted for past cases
might be useful for present ones.
Even though FIDES has been built with the banking sector in mind, it
can be applied in all those organisations, like insurance companies or public
organizations, where anti-fraud activity is based on a central anti-fraud unit
and a reporting system.
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Sammanfattning
Bedra¨gerier o¨kar i antal och f˚ar alltmer avancerade former vilket ett fler-
tal studier visar som genomfo¨rts och rapporterats av internationella kon-
sultbyr˚aer. Man kunde tro att den avgo¨rande faktorn a¨r den o¨kande dig-
italiseringen av betalningssystem och de alltmer avancerade programmer-
ingslo¨sningar som spritts bland dem som beg˚ar brott inom cyberrymden
(”hackers”, ”crackers” och nyare kategorier av brottslingar). Likva¨l har det
visat sig att det fortfarande finns ett stort och betydande inslag av den
ma¨nskliga komponenten i de flesta bedra¨ gerischeman.
Intressekonflikter a¨r en central faktor i de flesta fall d˚a n˚agon genomfo¨rt
ett framg˚angsrikt bedra¨geri.
De publicerade studierna visar ocks˚a att automatiserade verktyg fo¨r att
sp˚ara anomalier i betalningsprocesser inte alltid a¨r anva¨ndbara na¨r det
a¨r fr˚aga om brottslingar som befinner sig i en s˚adan position i organisa-
tionen att de kan fo¨lja med hur sa¨kerhetsrutinerna sa¨tts upp och admin-
istreras; i vissa fall a¨r de t.o.m. ansvariga fo¨r sa¨kerhetssystemen. Om
sa¨kerhetsrutinerna bygger p˚a kontroll av betalningstrafiken genom att fo¨lja
upp anomalier i dokumentationen kan de enkelt sa¨ttas ur spel om t.ex.
dokumenten fo¨rfalskas p˚ara¨tt sa¨tt.
Inom banksektorn a¨r de bankens interna revisorer som har ansvar fo¨r att
uppdaga interna bedra¨gerier. Ofta kan dessa experter inte lita till annat a¨n
sin erfarenhet, tips fr˚an missta¨nksamma medarbetare eller rapporter o¨ver
transaktioner som haft n˚agon form av fel.
Det finns da¨rfo¨r ett behov av sto¨dsystem som kunde go¨ra internrevi-
sorernas arbete mera systematiskt och ge dem en ba¨ttre chans att komma
bedra¨gerier p˚a sp˚aret (eller snabbt kunna avfa¨rda misstankar som riktats
mot n˚agon medarbetare i banken).
I avhandlingsarbetet har jag utvecklat ett sto¨dsystem fo¨r internrevisorer
inom banksektorn kallat FIDES [Fraud Interactive Decision Expert System]
vilket a¨r ett fleragentsystem som utvecklats fo¨r att hja¨lpa internrevisorerna
med att arbeta igenom missta¨nkta betalnings-processer som kan ha upp-
kommit genom bedra¨geri eller i ba¨sta fall komma ett p˚ag˚aende bedra¨geri
p˚a sp˚aren och kunna avstyra det innan det kunnat genomfo¨ras. FIDES
kombinerar flera olika metoder: think maps, Delphi och attack trees som
iii
samtliga utformats s˚aatt de fo¨ljer och sto¨der de olika faserna i internrevisor-
ernas arbete. Ansatsen med ett sto¨dsystem fo¨r experter kan anpassas och
anva¨ndas inom andra sektorer s˚asom fo¨rsa¨kringssektorn och den offentliga
fo¨rvaltningen.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Those who have already tried
nettles recognize silk
Cristina Dona`
My research path started with money laundering and the complexity of
the phenomenon was clear from the beginning.
“Money Laundering is the process by which criminals attempt to conceal
the true origin and ownership of the proceeds of criminal activities1”. If
successful, money can lose its criminal identity and appear legitimate. The
main difficulty in detecting money laundering schemes is due to the fact
that money launderers operate both in legal and illegal business, often using
conventional techniques to move money from one place to another. A typical
example is when smugglers carry cash on their person to open bank accounts
abroad in tax heaven. It is clear that these kinds of operations cannot be
traced using artificial intelligence techniques. The lack of data concerning
money laundering is another limitation on research in this area.
All these limitations and the opportunity to visit the audit team of an
important European bank convinced me to focus my research on fraud de-
tection.
The lesson one can learn from money laundering is that there is a gap
between the literature and reality in creating money laundering detection
tools.
In reality money launderers are not convicted by using state of the art
AI tools against their principal crimes, but for tax evasion.
Being aware of these aspects is essential before studying fraud detection.
In the literature one can find a lot of evidence concerning the prevalence
of human-based fraud. It is no a surprise that the main fraud scheme is
1http://www.fsc.gov.im/aml/
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identity fraud and basically all the fraud schemes can be considered as vari-
ations on the identity fraud theme. Hackers often check the garbage bins of
employees to find codes and relevant information in the mail sent from the in-
stitution. External fraud can often be considered as internal since criminals
use employees as Trojan horses to gather useful information about breaking
into the system (rather than performing sophisticated cyber-attacks).
The episode that provided the main motivation for the present research
was a meeting with employees of one of the most important European banks.
This meeting offered the unique opportunity to interview the members of
the audit-team, in particular the head of the risk management department
and one member of the security department. The employees of the bank
confirmed my hypothesis that identity fraud is the principal type of fraud
scheme adopted and that the real cause of fraud is mainly conflict of inter-
est. They also described their anti-fraud methodology: the main issue they
emphasised was that their fraud detection strategy follows the economic im-
perative. This means that the bank does not attempt to prosecute fraud
when the cost of prosecution is higher than the economic loss it can provoke.
Although fraudsters often use human-based techniques, fraud detection
is still dominated by paper-based schemes and traditional statistical tech-
niques. Based on the risk indicators they developed, auditors can make the
decision to send inspectors to the bank’s branches. The output of the in-
spections is a report that must be evaluated by auditors. As specified by
the experts in the meeting, the key factor in detecting fraud is improvement
of the interaction between inspectors and auditors. Given these inputs the
challenge of my research is to build a multi-agent system to support the
audit team in detecting fraud, based on their suggestions and their needs.
1.1 Fraud in the banking sector
In recent years, the amount of fraud cases has significantly increased as a
consequence of the rapid development in Information and Communication
Technology (ICT). Although the prevention measures adopted have also
progressed, fraudsters have adapted their capabilities by developing new
strategies. According to Acfe (2008), in the United States organisations lose
on average 7 % of their revenues in fraudulent activities and corruption is
the most common factor in 27 % of the cases.
The main industries considered in the study are: banking and financial
services (15% of cases), government (12%) and healthcare (8%). Regarding
how the cases have been detected, a tip is the most common way in 46 %
of the cases, as shown in Fig. 1.1. The tip can be attributed to employ-
ees (57.7 %), customers (17.6 %) or vendors (12.3 %). Table 1.1 presents
the percentage of reduction in fraud when controls have been implemented.
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Figure 1.1: Initial Detection on Occupational Fraud (Acfe, 2008)
The two most effective controls adopted clearly suggest the importance of
environmental factors in fraud. The presence of a hotline (a channel for
people to describe unusual behaviours and/or suspicious activities of their
colleagues) results in a significant reduction in fraud.
Control % of cases
implemented
Yes No %
Reduction
Surprising Audit 25 % $ 70000 $ 207000 66.2 %
Job rotation/
Mandatory Vacation
12.3 % $ 640000 $ 164000 61.0 %
Hotline 43.5 % $ 100000 $ 250000 60.0 %
Table 1.1: Median Loss Based on Presence of Anti-fraud Controls (Acfe,
2008)
As can be observed in the KPMG (2003) figures, the most frequent type
of fraud experienced by auditors and fraud experts interviewed is employee
fraud. (PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011) confirms the high rate of human
related fraud in organisations). There is a clear prevalence of human related
fraud over computer based fraud (see Fig.1.2).
Figure 1.3 demonstrates that Collusion between employees and third
parties and Inadequate Internal Controls are the most common factors con-
tributing to fraud in organisations. This indicates that employees, working
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Figure 1.2: Type of Fraud Experienced During the Prior 12 Months (per-
centages) (KPMG, 2003)
for third parties as Trojan horses inside the institution, can mask irregular-
ities that could be detected by internal security systems. It is interesting to
observe the significant reduction of fraud cases from years 1994 and 1998 to
2003 in the category inadequate internal controls. This proves that improv-
ing internal control procedures can be a successful way of reducing fraud.
Figure 1.3: Factors contributing to fraud in Organisations (Percentages)
(KPMG, 2003)
According to KPMG (2007) the profile of a fraudster is the following:
• 36-55 years old (70% of the cases)
• male (85%)
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Figure 1.4: Time at the organisation (KPMG, 2011)
• acting independently (68%)
• defrauding his own employer (89%)
• someone who had been working in the institution for 2-5 years before
committing fraud (36%)
The emerging picture is: a senior manager with deep knowledge of inter-
nal weaknesses and procedures, acting out of greed (73 %) and performing
multiple fraudulent transactions for a relatively long period of time.
KPMG (2011) confirms the same profile and features of the typical fraud-
ster. Additionally the survey points out that many of the fraudsters work
several years in the institution before committing fraud although they are
considered greedy and deceitful by nature. This implies that other factors
such as financial worries, job dissatisfaction and aggressive targets, play an
important role in the decision to commit fraud, even after the perpetrator
acquired knowledge of the institution and gained the trust and respect of
colleagues. The survey in Fig. 1.4 indeed reveals that there was an increase
in the detection of fraud among long-term employees in 2011. In particular,
60% of fraudsters had worked at the company for more than 5 years before
the fraud was detected, while 33 % of fraudsters had been employed there
for more than 10 years.
Another strong motivation to commit fraud underlined in the survey
is the need to hide losses or poor performance in order to earn bonuses.
Authors observe the low number of fraud in companies that set achievable
and realistic targets for their employees. The amount of fraud resulting from
weak internal controls increased from 49 % in 2007 to 74 % in 2011 (see Fig.
1.5).
7
Figure 1.5: Methods used to override controls (KPMG, 2011)
In 2007, one-quarter of the fraud cases were discovered through whistle-
blowers; in 2011 whistle-blower reports were used in uncovering 14 % of
fraud. In 2007, 8 % of fraud were discovered by accident; this number
increased to 13 % in 2011. After combining these numbers, one can observe
that these informal methods of detecting fraud cover over half of the cases
in the 2011 survey. These figures show how the fate of a company depends
increasingly on the good conscience of employees and their motivation to
act in the interest of the institution they work for.
Governments are making significant efforts to promote whistle-blowing.
In the US, the Dodd-Franck Act (2010) intends to award whistle-blowers;
in UK, the Public Interest Disclosure Act (1998) protects workers who are
willing to cooperate, once there is good evidence of the truthfulness of their
information.
Richard Powell, lead investigator of KMPG in the EMEA (Europe,
Middle-East, Asia) area, notes that ”Many of the fraud I’ve investigated
in the past few years have come to light due to formal or informal whistle-
blowing reports. Very few, by contrast, are discovered as a direct conse-
quence of management, internal or external audit review”.
The interviews I conducted with the members of the audit team and
a member of the Computer Security Department supported these observa-
tions. The first thing they pointed out was the lack of information systems
implemented in their organisation: they follow human based approaches and
traditional statistical methods. The second important element they under-
lined is priority of economic imperative in investigating fraud cases. This
tendency is also confirmed in (KPMG, 2011): in 60 % of the cases, compa-
nies recover losses in excess of $ 25,000. This percentage rises to more than
two thirds of the cases when the loss exceeded $ 50,000.
The decision to prosecute a specific fraud case is made after an accurate
cost-benefit analysis: only the fraud cases whose costs in prosecution are
less than the suffered loss are prosecuted.
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The analysis of the auditors involves a short description of the case, possi-
ble scenarios and identification of dangerous schemes. Experts also develop
risk indicators related to different areas, to enhance their effort in cases
where the possibilities of success are higher. The Computer Security De-
partment of the Bank, follows the ”know your customer” (KYC) principle,
develops class risks and monitors the frequency of fraud on the total num-
ber of transactions, performs cash flow and customer profile analysis. The
representative of this department pointed out that cause/effect relations be-
tween suspicious behaviours and fraudulent transactions are sometimes less
important than temporal analysis in order to detect the perpetrators.
Another important aspect to consider in fraud detection is semantic
analysis: the creation of a well structured scheme where the offender-crime-
victim links are clear and detailed. In many cases, it can be also problematic
for an audit team to interpret different suspect behaviours coming from dif-
ferent branches located in different European countries. In this situation,
the problem is not only linguistic, but also semantic given the cultural dif-
ferences between different auditors. The expert mentioned in the interview
that the most common type of fraud encountered in his career is identity
fraud. Other common fraud types include:
• Unauthorized transfers
• Loans to nonexistent customers
• Real estate (overpaid assessor)
• Same IP address operating in different bank accounts for a particular
period of time
• Bank accounts opened with stolen cheques
• False ID (loan fraud)
• Accounting fraud
• Phishing/spyware
The expert also confirmed that the reason for the prevalence of human-
based fraud is the presence of conflict of interest, which neutralises the efforts
in implementing control procedures.
He also admitted the limitations of even the most advanced software in
performing such complex tasks as mapping unusual behaviours.
The audit team also performs a continuous monitoring of the activities
in the different areas in order to discover unusual phenomena and suspicious
transactions in the normal routines of the bank.
9
WHEN? WHAT?
EX-ANTE
• Systematic and effective mapping of the
risks
• Consulting on new procedures
• Support on new risk areas
EX-POST
• Investigations in the branches
• Support the evaluation of risk and fraud
management
Table 1.2: Ex ante and ex post anti-fraud actions
The activities of the audit team can also be classified into two groups
based on the fraud detection process: ex-ante and ex-post ( see Table 1.2).
In order to prevent fraud the audit team, ex-ante, monitors all the activ-
ities in different branches of the Bank, offers consulting on new procedures
to the directors of the branches and supports them once new risk areas
are discovered. The ex-post activity consists of sending inspectors to the
branches where fraud has been perpetrated and once they receive reports
from the inspectors, they can perform the risk evaluation and fraud man-
agement procedures (see table 1.3) .
As shown in Table 1.4 there are two types of inspections: ordinary and
targeted. Ordinary inspections involve: a, the control of the application
of anti-fraud procedures and b, targeted inspections specifically directed
towards single suspected operations, a particular customer or a specific risk
area.
WHERE? WHAT?
Procedures Interview with the manager responsible of that
procedure
AUDIT TEAM Analysis of the reports, strategy development
Table 1.3: Anti-fraud procedures
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WHERE? WHAT?
Retail Banking Ordinary Inspection:applications of anti-
fraud procedures, reports
Targeted inspections: on specific opera-
tion/customer/risk areas
Table 1.4: Anti-fraud procedures
The inspection also involves an interview with the managers of the
branch in order to verify that all the procedures are followed. Finally the
audit team starts to develop the anti-fraud strategy and the risk estimation
based on the analysed reports (see Table 1.4). Table 1.5 shows an example
of a report form used by inspectors after the inspection of a branch of the
Bank.
Objective a short description of the problem, objectives
and limits of the inspections
Results a description of the inspections and results, ex-
planations of the causes, people involved
Responsibilities the names of people directly involved in the op-
eration
Conclusions the names of people directly involved in the op-
eration
Suggestions a list of useful details about the inspections and
personal suggestions
Table 1.5: Report of the inspectors
Table 1.6 highlights the rating system used by the audit team. Risk is
calculated in 3 different areas: Credit, Investment and Finance. Priorities
of the investigation are decided according to the total score obtained in each
branch of the Bank: the branch with the highest score is scheduled to be
inspected first.
The KPMG figures and the description of the methodology used by the
audit team members indicate that human aspects play an important role in
fraud. The human factor has great importance in fraud (collusion between
parties, conflict of interest), but also in the detection and prevention of it:
the activities of audit teams benefit from experience, intuition and the ability
of the auditors to create unusual paths. Auditors have deep knowledge
of the processes carried out inside the departments and they can figure
11
WHAT? ADVANTAGES
Rating System Risk Measurement in the 3 main different
business areas: Credit, Investment and Finance
Continous Auditing Analyze unusual phenomena and transaction
in the 3 main different business areas
Table 1.6: Rating System
out possible schemes using their expertise and/or the information gathered
through whistle-blowers. Using a cognitive approach Grazioli et al. (2006)
examine the evaluation process of auditors in fraud detections, exploring the
reasons for their success and failure. The authors claim that errors constitute
an important issue in detecting fraud. They point out that errors are not
necessarily the result of ignorance or lack of accuracy in a detection process.
Errors of interpretation, for instance, can be caused by the unwillingness
to criticize the opinion of a colleague or the concern of running into a false
positive. In some cases, success in fraud detection is the result of interaction
between different errors: the achievement of a right outcome for the wrong
reasons. This suggests that auditors often follow unusual paths of reasoning.
Grazioli et al. (2006) did not observe any fatal error in the evaluation of the
fraud cases. Their explanation is that ”fraud detection success and failure
probably depends on a pattern of errors, rather than the presence of any
one specific error”.
Bazerman et al. (2007) point out how the interpretation of facts suffers
from ambiguity. In their study, they underline how ”people tend to reach
self-serving conclusions whenever ambiguity surrounds a piece of evidence”.
Another element of bias they point out is ”the threat of being fired for
delivering an unfavourable audit”. To remove this bias a tool to support
an audit team should possess the possibility of being anonymous and ”help
auditors understand the unconscious errors they make and the reasons they
make them”. In general conflict of interest is one of the main causes of fraud
in the organisations (and in particular in the banking sector), since senior
managers can limit the control procedures and escape controls. Often they
can themselves be in charge of these procedures. Fraud are not perpetrated
by senior managers only for greed, but also to improve their social image
(cars, watches, life style) or to fake the budget to gain a promotion. In a
similar way, sales managers can establish a friendly relationship with naive
customers, who entrust money to them. All these behaviours can hardly
be detected using data mining techniques or only when it is too late, the
perpetrator is gone or has already transferred the money to a secret account.
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In order to prevent this kind of fraud, (when normal procedures cannot work
due to the conflict of interest), auditors should focus on discovering unusual
behaviours, for instance a sudden change in the lifestyle of their employees.
The activities of the audit team are based on interpretation of observations,
and in particular auditors have to link suspect behaviours, information and
rumours with a specific loss. The risk of a wrong audit is that it can have
dangerous effects on the image of the bank; a new investigation can stop the
activity of a branch even for weeks. The interpretation of a fact depends on
the cultural background and the experience of the auditor and on the context
where he/she works. An example that can very well describe this issue is
the fact that in the South of Italy most of the external fraud loss is a result
of robbery. An expert auditor has to take into consideration these cultural
differences in order to suggest the right countermeasures and instruments.
In other words to fight robbery you need to invest in bulletproof glass and
not in the latest anti-hacking software.
In light of these considerations fraud detection benefits from the be-
havioural intelligence of the auditors, their experience and knowledge of the
context. For example the real estate market offers many opportunities for
different kinds of crime, from money laundering and tax evasion to identity
fraud and everything concerning mortgage fraud schemes. In order to de-
tect a potential fraudster or money launderer it is not sufficient to have a
good KYC policy: auditors need to acquire knowledge concerning the local
context, rumours about business men involved in the real estate market,
their relationship with politicians, their social relations, their lifestyle and
the places they frequently visit, in other words ”what people think and say
about them”.
The representation of these behaviours and decision-making dynamics
constitutes a big challenge for a decision support system developer. Once
the database is populated with potential and/or real fraudulent attacks au-
ditors can easily retrieve past cases, analyse the countermeasures adopted
for similar cases, play ”what-if” games. Presently such tasks are performed
manually by auditors. They analyse data and develop risk indicators using
traditional statistical methods. A Decision Support System (DSS) for an
audit team should perform more sophisticated analysis to improve the in-
teraction between inspectors, auditors and the reporting system by taking
into consideration all the aspects described in this section.
1.2 Basel II and III accord
The scandals that shook the banking community drove the Basel Committee
on Bank Supervision to issue the 2001 Basel accord. This accord focuses
on operational risk, which is defined as ”the risk of direct or indirect loss
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resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems,
and from external events”.
According to the Basel II Accord (Basel Committee, 2001), banks are
encouraged to develop sophisticated methodologies to calculate operational
risk, monitor bank activities, and reinforce internal control structure and au-
diting in order to preserve the integrity of the managerial processes. These
systems also include the use of internal and external data, scenario analysis,
control factors and an accurate reporting system based on key risk indica-
tors. Operational risk includes all non-credit and market risks (Tinca, 2007),
which touch on a wide range of topics such as internal and external fraud,
employment practices, work safety and management risk.
Operational risk calculation
The accord suggests three methodologies for calculating operational risk:
1. The basic indicator approach allows a bank to use a single indi-
cator to determine its capital charge (20% of its average annual gross
income).
2. The standardized approach. Banks adopting this approach must
calculate a capital requirement using a different risk indicator for each
one of their business lines. In order to implement this approach banks
must meet certain criteria such as: demonstrate to have an operational
risk management in place, systematically track relevant operational
risk data, regularly report to business unit management operational
risk exposures, have in place an operational management system and
subject their operational management process to an independent re-
view.
3. The Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA). As specified in
Basel II in the AMA, banks may use their own method for assessing
their exposure to operational risk, so long as it is sufficiently compre-
hensive and systematic. AMA gives more flexibility to the banks as
long as they demonstrate to the regulators that they have adequate
protection against risks. These procedures, including state of the art
of anti-fraud and day-to-day reporting systems, are more expensive to
implement, but they give the banks the opportunity to reduce capital
reserves.
The G20 November 2010 summit in Seoul endorsed Basel III in response
to the lack of regulation in the financial systems amplified by the late 2000s
financial crisis. According to KPMG (2010), the Basel III accord has two
main objectives:
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• To strengthen global capital and liquidity regulations with the goal of
promoting a more resilient banking sector; and
• To improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from
financial and economic stress.
The instruments to achieve these objectives address three main areas:
• Capital reform (including quality and quantity of capital, complete risk
coverage, leverage ratio and the introduction of capital conservation
buffers and a counter-cyclical capital buffer);
• Liquidity reform (short term and long term ratios); and
• Other elements relating to general improvements to the stability of the
financial system.
1.3 Why do people commit fraud?
Fraudulent behaviour is often associated with personal greed and environ-
mental factors.
In other words individuals can become fraudsters once they understand
the weakness of the system and use it for their own advantage. The sim-
plified picture emerging from this view is that of ”a few rotten apples in
the barrel”. The mathematical model to describe this approach is based on
outliers (transactions/behaviours deviating from the usual path).
This approach assumes that there is a scientific way to discriminate
between ”good” and ”bad” acts in an organisation and that people are
rationally aware of the consequences of their choices. The countermeasures
often suggested to prevent and discourage these activities are devoted to
improving internal controls and codes of conduct. Unfortunately, reality is
more complex. An interesting point of view and a valid counterargument is
offered by Kim (2005), who introduces the venality vs. banality hypothesis.
The idea is that greed (venality hypothesis) is not a sufficient motiva-
tion to explain fraud. In fact, this approach ignores how individual decisions
change dramatically in an organisational setting under ideological and psy-
chological pressures. The banality hypothesis offers an alternative and more
realistic explanation of fraud. The author illustrates the banality hypothesis
with the example of the tendency to listen to the superiors in an uncritical
”banal way”.
Miller (1986) argues that there is a propensity for people to accept defi-
nitions of actions provided by legitimate authority.
For example the order to falsify a document is perceived as right when it
is ordered by the employer since there must be a reason why he has decided
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to do it. Another justification for such behaviour is not having trouble
with the superiors, not necessarily because people fear the revenge of their
superiors, but simply to have an easy job-life.
The easiest way of avoiding trouble is to follow the job description, which
means working in an efficient way according to the boss’ requests.
The efficiency principle in the job environment, as a side effect, brings
social irresponsibility to the actors involved in the process. If the goal of the
director of a bank is to respect the budget to get a promotion and the goal of
the clerk is to follow the job description of the superior in the shortest time
with the minimum effort, a fraud scheme can be seen as the most efficient
way to maximize the utility of the agents involved in the process.
Inside lawyers, involved in fraud, according to Suchman (1998), show
an ”agnostic” ethical behaviour. If the measure of quality is efficiency and
therefore it can be expressed only in quantitative terms, a ”good” lawyer
is the one who ”provides a cost-effective vehicle for his/her client’s specific
interest, and in doing so, he or she also facilitates the efficient functioning
of the economy as a whole”. It is interesting to observe that the paradigm
of efficiency does not ignore the ethical issues for lack of morality, but for
lack of instruments to award a goal achieved ethically.
Rosen (2002), based on empirical findings, observes that the agnostic
view of law, focusing on ”adding value” has become the dominant ideology
for inside counsel in the twenty-first century and it is part of the rhetoric of
most business management.
In this light, KPMG’s recommendation of setting up realistic targets for
the employees is definitely clearer.
The importance of protecting and giving incentives to whistle-blowers is
becoming a common issue also on the institutional level, but what is the real
opinion of whistle-blowing amongst the members of the organisations? In
most cases they are considered dissidents (Near and Miceli, 1987), deviants
or traitors (Greenberger et al., 1987).
A study (Milliken, 2003) offers four reasons why people are so reluctant
to be whistle-blowers. The first reason is the fear of being labelled as a
”troublemaker” or ”tattle-tale”. The second reason is the damage to the
relations with colleagues. The third one is futility, the feeling that their
confessions cannot have any effects on the case since they perceive themselves
as outsiders in the institution. The fourth reason is the fear of getting
punished or not having a promotion.
The venality hypothesis suggests that people act autonomously having a
clear distinction between what is good and what is not and they are able to
calculate the risk of committing fraud. The banality hypothesis shows how
much more complex reality is.
During the interview granted by the head of the risk management de-
partment of an important European bank he expressed a strong agreement
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with the venality vs banality hypothesis.
An important distinction he suggested was between fraud perpetrated
for personal enrichment (a clerk stealing money from his/her cashier’s desk)
and fraud committed to increase personal reputation, for instance a bank
director who fakes reports in order to obtain a promotion.
In the first case, the entity of fraud is not so relevant, considering also the
insurance of the bank, but clerks also have insurance for their mistakes. In
the second case, the entity is more important. The common feature in both
cases is that the real reason behind the act is not greed or reputation, but
the fact that these people are working for criminal organisations to obtain
loans or other kinds of benefits. This means that they are victims as well.
Ten years ago an improvement in the life-style of employees was per-
ceived by auditors as a red-flag. Nowadays however auditors are monitoring
employees who are in critical financial situation, since they can be targeted
by criminal organisations.
The head of risk management has also pointed out the difference between
external and internal fraud and their relation. Internal fraud is characterized
by low frequency (10-20 cases per year) and high damage. The amount
differs from year to year. It was 4-5 million in 2011 and 20-30 million in
other years in the bank.
External fraud like theft of information and a hacking attack, on the
other hand is characterized by high frequency and low damage. He empha-
sized how external fraud are always performed with the support of at least
one bank employee. In this sense there are no pure hacking attacks and for
this reason, very often external fraud are classified as internal.
A tendency he noticed in the last ten years is the increase of awareness
in treating the fraud problem in the Bank. In particular, the most effective
controls have been performed on suspense accounts. Suspense accounts are
used to temporarily place transactions which have uncertain classification.
Once they have been classified or formal mistakes are corrected they are
moved to the account they belong to. Suspense accounts can be easily used
by a bank director to hide illegal operations or simply for faking the budget
in order to show good financial performance. Monitoring these accounts is
a very effective way of preventing fraud. This type of control, which can be
done remotely, must be supported by employees who can directly observe
suspicious activities in the job environment.
Another important red flag is the sudden change of lifestyle of employees.
Often this can be the only clue to start an investigation. The head of
risk management department underlined many times how direct observation
of the colleagues working with the potential fraudster is fundamental in
stopping him/her. Concerning the future of fraud in terms of prevention for
the bank and in relation to the evolution of fraudster strategies, he believes
that : a, robberies will be less and less relevant since security systems have
17
reached a very high level of trustworthiness, b, the technological level of
the bank is superior to that of hackers, the main concern is the economic
crisis as a driving force for fraud activities and cooperation with criminal
organisations.
In light of what has been said in this paragraph, understanding the rea-
sons why people commit fraud is an important key in stopping them. The
venality hypothesis is not only a trivial explanation, but also a method-
ological short-cut. On the other hand the banality hypothesis, supported by
bank experts, takes into consideration social, psychological and environmen-
tal aspects and provides a better interpretative instrument for developing
counter strategies to detect and prevent fraud.
In particular, the most effective countermeasures include the improve-
ment of first level controls and the implementation of systems which are
able to move the information quickly from whistle-blowers to the auditors
of the risk management department. In order to facilitate this process an
adequate program of protection for whistle-blowing must be implemented.
Finally, in order to make anti-fraud operators and public opinion more
aware of the gravity of the problem, fraud should not be introduced only
as an economic problem, but as a social one, since (as shown in this sec-
tion) fraud operations might be only the tip of the iceberg of more complex
activities related to criminal organisations.
1.4 Methodology
There are no moral phenomena,
only a moral interpretation of
phenomena.
F.W.Nietzsche
Since the focus of my research is to design a multi-agent system for
fraud detection and a key factor in detecting fraud is the interaction between
fraud experts, the methodology I followed in this research is based on design
science and constructivism.
Design-science, as conceptualized by Simon (1996), supports a pragmatic
research paradigm that calls for the creation of innovative artifacts to solve
real-world problems. Thus, design-science research involves focus on the IT
artifact with a high priority on application domain relevance.
Constructivist theories of learning state that the learner in not a passive
recipient of knowledge, but has an active role in creating knowledge, based
on the ”learning by doing” approach. Learners construct their knowledge
based on their experience and relationship with concepts (Oxman, 2004).
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The fraud detection process, is seen in this thesis as a product of the
interaction between agents. The construction and interpretation of reality
happens through many stages. Auditors can decide to send inspectors to
the branches of the Bank to verify whether the whistles they received are
genuine or not. At this stage inspectors have to interpret the facts and
report all the information to the auditors. Finally auditors, on the basis of
the facts or simply suspicious behaviours described by the inspectors, can
decide whether or not to start the evaluation process. In the case that they
decide to examine the information collected by the inspectors, they have to
interpret all these facts as well. Finally, they need to find an agreement
on the counter strategy to adopt, which is a shared interpretation of their
individual interpretations.
There is also the possibility of finding the truth (fraud) but deciding not
to prosecute it. This is the case when the economic imperative has to be
dealt with, which obliges the auditors not to prosecute a fraud if the costs
of prosecutions are higher than the amount of the fraud itself.
Hevner er al. (2004) defines 7 guidelines for Design Science in Information
Systems Research. In the following section I will discuss how my research can
be anchored to these guidelines and the process of verification and evaluation
of the proposed multi-agent system.
Guideline 1: Design as an Artifact
The aim of design science research is to build an IT artifact to address
an organisational problem. The artifact is not independent of the
users and the social context and it has to meet their needs according
to the environment where they operate. The multi-agent system to
be introduced in the next chapters has been built around the needs of
audit team with the aim of improving interaction between inspectors
and auditors. Based on this observation, we can claim that the artifact
described in the thesis is very context sensitive. At the same time it can
adapt to other contexts such as the insurance or public sector, where
there is need for interaction between a risk management unit (which
has to analyse facts and behaviours sent by external operators) and
the employees who have the duty to verify and check these suspects in
the field.
Guideline 2: Problem Relevance
The goal of IS research is to acquire knowledge and implement it to
solve relevant business problems. Business organisations, on the other
hand, are devoted to the maximization of the profits. Design science
artifacts aim to solve problems and improve business performance.
The relevance of a design science artifact is its ability to follow the
needs of a constituent community that works to achieve certain goals.
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The constituent community addressed in this thesis, is the community
of experts, who can better rich their goals (detecting fraud) using the
multi-agent systems developed here.
Guideline 3: Design Evaluation
A design artifact must be evaluated and rigorously demonstrated re-
garding its utility, quality and efficacy using specific evaluation meth-
ods. The design science process is an iterative process where the eval-
uation of the artifact relies on a continuous feedback from the experts
in the field. The feedback provides the basis to improve the system
and satisfy the requirements of the experts.
Hevner er al. (2004) suggest different methodologies for the design-
science evaluation. Discussing the descriptive approach, the authors
suggest how descriptive methods of evaluation should only be used for
especially innovative artifacts for which other forms of evaluation may
not be feasible. The thesis is mainly concerned with internal fraud
which are characterized by low frequency and high damage: the phe-
nomenon is not easy to observe and therefore an anti-fraud system
cannot be tested by repeating the same experiment. For this reason
other forms of evaluation than the descriptive one are not feasible. ”In-
formed argument” and ”Scenarios” are two elements of the descriptive
approach for evaluating a design science artifact.
Informed Argument: Use information from the knowledge base
(e.g.,relevant research) to build a convincing argument for utility of
the artifact.
In this dissertation relevant research in the field will be matched to
prove the utility of the designed multi-agent system.
Scenarios: Construct detailed scenarios around the artifact to demon-
strate its utility.
The description of the multi-agent system and its components, as de-
scribed in the original publications, is enriched by practical examples
and scenarios where the system can be applied. These scenarios are
plausible as they are based on the literature and interviews with fraud
experts who provided a narration of the most frequent schemes they
have encountered.
Guideline 4: Research Contributions
The effectiveness of design-science research manifests itself in provid-
ing a clear contribution to the research field where the artifact is go-
ing to be applied. The artifact must provide solutions to unresolved
problems and/or extend or apply existing knowledge base in new and
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innovative ways. The main contributions of the multi-agent system
will be underlined in the following chapters. The flexibility of the sys-
tem is shown in describing possible applications outside the banking
sectors.
Guideline 5: Research rigor
Evaluation and construction of artifacts require rigour. The principal
aim in design-science evaluation is to determine how well an artifact
works and not to theorize or prove why the artifact works.
This is an important aspect to consider for the peculiarity of fraud
detection. A senior anti-fraud expert can observe in his/her career
(20-30 years) only few relevant fraud. It is clear that to justify and
understand the reasons why a system works would require an unac-
ceptable lapse of time. It is more important to provide arguments and
show clear contributions regarding the implementation of artifact.
Guideline 6: Design as research process
Design science is an iterative process based on the continuous inter-
action and feedback from the final users and/or experts in the field.
Given this approach, looking for the best or optimal solution is not
a realistic aim. Heuristic strategies, on the other hand, can provide
realistic solutions and methodologies that can be implemented in the
business world. Simon (1996), in order to express this concept uses
the expression satisficing solution: a solution that works well for the
specified class of problems. The building process of the multi-agent
system follows this principle, as it offers the fraud experts a GDSS to
provide realistic solutions to fraud problems.
Guideline 7: Communication of research
A key concept in design-science is that the artifact must be presented
both to technology-oriented as well as management oriented audiences.
Technology-oriented audiences are interested in the implementation of
the system and a description of the use.
Zmud (1997) suggests that the presentation of design-research to a
management oriented audience needs to put the emphasis on the knowl-
edge required to effectively apply the artifact ”within specific contexts
for individual or organisational gain” (and not on the description of
the artifact itself).
In this thesis both aspects have been taken into consideration in order
to be suitable for both types of audience. The interaction process
between inspectors and auditors is described by a mathematical model
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and the role of the actors involved in the process and the knowledge
they need to use the system are also underlined.
1.5 Research questions, contributions
In this section the research questions and the main contribution of the dis-
sertation are introduced.
Research questions
Fraud is a serious economic problem with social consequences which
are often graver than the economic loss itself. The literature and common
understanding of fraud business are influenced by a fictional view of the
phenomenon. Both fraud activity and its detection are represented as a
battle between hackers and cyber-detectives supported by advanced data-
mining techniques and the most advanced anti-hacking software.
RQ1: Does the (fictional) description of fraud given in the literature
provide a truthful representation?
This research question deeply influenced the whole research process. The
main goal of this research has been to build a multi-agent system to support
an audit team in fraud detection. Who are then the actors/users of the
system? It has been built around the needs of the bank’s audit team and
the inspectors of the bank.
RQ2: What are the needs of audit team inspectors involved in the fraud
detection process and why is it important to build a system meeting these
needs?
The main problem for an audit team is to build a database where fraud
cases and suspicious behaviours are stored in order to be used in the future
to facilitate the detection process, comparing the new cases with the old
ones. In order to perform the retrieving process, experts also require a sys-
tem that is able to link semantically suspect behaviour, people suspected of
being involved in the fraud schemes and eventually the money stolen from a
specific bank account. The two processes are carried out together since once
a case is solved or analysed it can be stored in the database for the future.
Internal fraud can be characterized by conflict of interest, collusion between
employees and falsification of documents. These operations are often per-
formed manually, therefore it is very difficult to detect them, but most of
all it is hard to represent them in a user-friendly way. After the interviews
with the employees of the bank, the lesson I learned was to improve the
interaction between auditors and inspectors.
RQ3: How can a multi-agent system improve the interaction between
auditors and inspectors?
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Contributions
The research questions have been developed in an iterative process as
a result of the continuous improvement of the main achievement of the
thesis: a novel multi-agent systems for fraud detection. The opportunity to
interview one of the most important European Banks helped me improve
the features of FIDES. Another important support received from the bank’s
experts was the confirmation of the initial hypothesis, stating that there is
a gap between the common representation of fraud and their real impact,
features and importance.
All the hypotheses and considerations in this thesis rely on a continuous
process of verification moving between the literature and the bank world.
The novelty of the system is achieved by combining three different methods:
Think-map, Delphi method and attack tree. In particular, the procedure of
building the attack tree has been improved and mathematically well founded
using fuzzy logic in the Delphi process.
According to Schneier (1999), who first introduced attack-trees, the cre-
ation of the attack tree requires the following steps:
1. Identify possible attack goals
2. Try to think of all possible attacks against each goal
3. Add them to the tree
4. Repeat this process down the tree until you are finished
5. Give the tree to someone else and have him think about the process
and add any nodes he thinks of
6. Repeat as necessary, possibly over the course of several months.
The procedure suggested by Schneier does not include a decision support
system to create the attack tree. These 6 steps can be useful for didactic
purpose to conduct an experiment or as a general guideline, but step 6
especially is not acceptable in the real world.
Although a fraud scheme can be perpetrated over a long period of time
and clues and information about a potential fraud case are few in the short
run, in order to prevent fraud sometimes it might be appropriate to start
the evaluation process on an incomplete tree rather than wait ”until you are
done”. At that stage it would be too late and the fraudster could be gone
already or he could have sent the money to a secret account.
Modern audit procedures follow the continuous auditing principle and
auditors prefer to prevent rather than knowing everything about fraud once
they are perpetrated. The key factor to prevent and detect fraud indeed
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is to improve the interaction between auditors and inspectors in order to
process the information as quickly as possible.
In this sense the output of FIDES, which is an attack-tree, offers the
auditors an hypothesis of the attack. In this hypothesis, auditors can per-
form the risk analysis and decide whether to start the investigation or not.
The time required for the information to reach the audit team is reduced
(and consequently the response of the auditors). Even when the response is
negative and/or the auditors decide that there is no evidence or economic
convenience to start the investigation the case can be stored and retrieved
in the future. Past cases can be useful for evaluating new cases, but also
to retrieve sub-trees and elementary operations, which might look similar.
The use of FIDES as an instrument to build up a structured data-base is an
important and innovative feature of the system. Another important contri-
bution of FIDES is its flexibility since it can be applied in all the contexts
where an interaction between external inspectors and a central risk manage-
ment unit plays a fundamental role.
1.6 Overview of the thesis
The dissertation is organized in the following way. In the second chapter the
state of the art of AI methodologies developed to support auditing will be
discussed. In the third chapter FIDES and its components will be described
in detail. The description of FIDES and how it can perform the anti-fraud
detection process will follow the storyline of the original publications. The
evolution of FIDES discussed in section 3.4 respects the chronological order
of the publication of the articles. The first version of FIDES in figure 3.14
is described in Buoni (2010). Figure 3.17 is the latest version of FIDES
introduced in Buoni et al. (2010) and Buoni et al. (2011) . The evolution of
FIDES is the result of the meeting with the audit team of the bank, which
provided valuable information to create a more detailed architecture com-
pared to Buoni (2010). The fuzzy mechanism was introduced in Buoni et
al. (2010) and Buoni et al. (2011). The application of cosine similarity to
compare attack trees was introduced in Buoni et al. (2011).Finally, the con-
sensual modelling of the attack tree and the Choquet-based evaluation are
described as the main contributions of Buoni and Fedrizzi (2012). Chapter
4 describes ICT-based and human factors based fraud. The importance of
this distinction will be underlined in order to better understand the fraud
phenomenon.Chapter 5 provides an overview of fraud in other sectors (In-
surance, European Union and public sector, Money Laundering).The last
paragraph of the chapter illustrates how FIDES can be applied in these
other sectors. Summary, Conclusions and Future research are given in the
6th and last chapter.
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Chapter 2
Audit team methodology in
the ICT era
The adoption of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) changed
the way of exchanging information. Documents and reports can be sent
in electronic format. This change is driving audit methodology to a new
paradigm termed ”continuous auditing”. In this context, auditing becomes
a process conducted in real time in order to adapt as fast as possible to the
events connected to the business activity.
According to Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) and
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), continuous
Auditing is defined as ”a methodology that enables independent auditors
(both internal and external) to provide written assurance on a subject matter
using a series of auditors reports issued simultaneously with, or a short
period of time after, the occurrence of events underlying the subject matter”
(Searcy DeWayne and Woodroof, 2003).
The evolution of financial products increases the possibility for fraudsters
to develop more sophisticated fraud scheme.
Kuhn and Sutton (2006) show that early fraud detection can be improved
by integrating a continuous audit model in SAP and this practice could be
a valid instrument to prevent fraud. In the literature one can find different
solutions to support audit teams in fraud detection and auditing in general.
Chou et al. (2007) propose an agent-based system for continuous audit-
ing termed as the agent-based continuous audit model (ABCAM). The main
features of the system include continuous inspection features and providing
daily or weekly reports to human auditors. Agents validate the data by
comparing it to supporting data sources. For instance, data in ledgers and
journals is compared to financial reports and documents are matched with
informative documents such as check-lists and invoices. Documents and ob-
servations with errors or showing unusual behaviours can be easily analysed
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by auditors.
Wang et al. (2008), aware of the limitations of traditional statistics anal-
ysis and data mining techniques, which can only detect attacks that share
a common feature with at least one past observation, introduce an immune
multi-agent system for network intrusion detection. The system is based on
self-learning features and inspired by the biological immune system. The ar-
chitecture consists of a multi-layer intelligent security system, which is able
to detect intrusions and find new attacks through learning and memory fea-
tures. Two main procedures characterize the system following the biological
model: the detection of antigens and the generation of immune antibodies.
These two features permit the detection of intrusion and create antibodies
for new attacks with similar features.
Zhang et al. (2008) propose a fuzzy integrated method based on man-
computer combined data and fuzzy expert evaluation using Delphi method.
The evaluation is performed by experts and based on pre-defined risk factors.
The security evaluation of the embedded system is a process in which the
risk factors of the system are analysed and explained. The basic goal of
this evaluation is to control the risk, once a satisfactory level of assurance is
reached. In order to achieve consistent opinions and the consensus among
the experts, the Delphi method is performed to adjust the fuzzy evaluation
of each expert.
The target groups of the systems described so far are auditors and in
general anti-fraud experts. The attacks are electronic based and the aim of
these intrusions is to break into the security system in order to steal infor-
mation and/or money. Implementing continuous auditing presents different
pros and cons.
Singleton and Singleton (2005) analyse the benefits and limitations of
implementing a continuous audit system. Advantages of the system include
mitigating the risk, facilitating internal controls objectives and having in-
stant access to information. The disadvantages are related to the structure
of the company. Large companies can benefit more from continuous audit-
ing since they can support the high cost required for implementing these
systems; they have complex security issues that can justify such complex
architecture and good infrastructure.
In the next sections detection methods will be classified into four groups:
anomaly detection tools, fuzzy reasoning systems, tree-based detection mod-
elling and knowledge-based architectures. The classification follows the com-
plexity of the task to be performed.
Anomaly detection tools include the techniques which are able to gener-
ate alarms, acting as sentinels of the system.
Fuzzy reasoning systems rely on the evaluation of the risk performed by
experts, using linguistic labels.
Tree-based detection modelling offers an appealing representation of
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fraud for users (fraud experts) in order to profile potential fraudster be-
haviour.
Knowledge-based architectures are implemented to solve complex tasks
and use a mix of computational intelligence techniques such as neural net-
works, genetic algorithms, fuzzy logic and heuristic rules.
In the last section data-mining approach in fraud detection and its lim-
itations will be introduced.
2.1 Anomaly detection tools
This group of methods includes those ones that are able to generate alarms
on the basis of recognition of anomalies, unusual behaviour and paths. These
tools are particularly useful in managing massive amounts of data and reduc-
ing the searching space quickly. Bedford’s and Zipf’s laws can be considered
as meta-rules. These rules can be positioned as sentinels like a first wall of
defence for the systems, a sort of pre-filtering mechanism.
Bedford’s law states that ”the distribution of the first significant digits
of numbers drawn from a wide variety of random distributions will have
(asymptotically) a certain form.” Huang et al. (2008) offer an interesting
approach based on Zipf’s Law. The basic idea of Zipf’s Law is that ”the
product of frequency of the use of a word, f, and the rank order, r, is ap-
proximately constant” (see Fig. 2.1).
This means that a small number of keywords can characterize the con-
tent of a document. The same principle can be used in fraud detection.
In Figure 2.2 , the pattern generation for Zipf Analysis is described. Zipf
Analysis is very suitable for detecting attacks with frequent sequential pat-
terns. For future research Huang et al. (2008) suggest an evaluation of the
fraud detection performance of Zipf’s law by comparing Zipf analysis with
other clustering algorithms, like K-means, Self-Organizing Maps and Digital
Analysis.
Beford’s and Zip’s law can assist auditors in detecting anomalies in doc-
uments and in general in all kinds of digital analysis.
Fugate and Gattiger (2003) benchmark different computer intrusion de-
tection methods like Mahalanobis distance and One-class Support Vector
Machines.
Bolton and Hand (2002) provide an important distinction between fraud
prevention and fraud detection. Fraud prevention includes several measures
used to stop fraud from occurring in the first place. Examples of these
measures can be personal identification numbers, security payment systems
or SIM cards for mobile phones. On the other hand, fraud detection in-
volves identifying fraud as quickly as possible once it has been perpetrated.
Statistical methods are widely used for addressing this issue, combining su-
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Figure 2.1: Patterns Generation for Zipf Analysis (Huang et al., 2008)
Figure 2.2: Patterns Generation (Huang et al., 2008)
pervised and unsupervised approaches. Supervised methods are introduced
to classify new observations by comparing with the old ones. In unsuper-
vised methods the goal is to find unusual and unknown patterns. The main
goal of a statistical analysis is to create a suspicion score in order to rank
all the suspicious activities, in a cost effective way, given the many different
techniques to perpetrate fraud and the ability of the fraudsters to adapt
their strategies.
Among supervised methods we can mention the traditional statistical
classification approaches (Hand, 1981; Huang et al., 2008), but also more
powerful methods like neural networks (Ripley, 1996; Hand, 1997; Webb,
1999).
Neural networks have been used in fraud detection for their capacity to
adapt, to learn from standard behaviour and to discover new behaviour, to
detect and block transactions immediately and for their ability to generalize
and learn from paths. Knowledge based systems as well have been used to
classify and detect suspicious transactions. The limitation of these systems
is the fact that they only perform well when the behaviours cover a well
structured domain, but it is well known that most of business activities are
unstructured. In such situations, with interdependent and also noisy and
incomplete data, neural networks can excel (KDD Cup, 1999).
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Malek et al. (2008) discuss an artificial neural network (ANN) for the
detection of fraud in Smart Card. The proposed fraud engine is based on
a back propagation algorithm. Clusters of similar transactions are grouped
into a small number of clusters. If a transaction does not fit into any cluster,
it can be classified as an anomaly. The user then will be asked to authenti-
cate himself/herself, for instance, by answering a random question. In case
of a right answer the system simply allows the user to proceed, otherwise it
can block him/her and suggest further investigations to the security unit.
Carpinteiro et al. (2006) propose a multilayer perceptron model for de-
tecting attack patterns in computer networks. The input data, representing
normal and attack patterns, is extracted from the files of the Third Inter-
national Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition KDD
Cup (1999). The system has been built to classify novel normal patterns
and novel categories of attack patterns.
2.2 Fuzzy reasoning systems
A complex hybrid system based on different artificial intelligence techniques
can be useful in recognizing hidden paths, but its power is very limited
in dealing with fraud caused, for instance, by collusion between employees
and third parties and lack of internal controls. In this case it might be
more useful to rely on the opinions of experts, who can recognize or at least
describe suspect behaviours. A team of experts or members of an anti-fraud
task force could be asked to evaluate anomalies, unusual behaviours out of
the ordinary routine, and produce a ranking based on specific indexes or
red flags. The aggregation process and the resulting ranking based on crisp
numbers could produce poor results. Fuzzy logic provides an appropriate
tool to perform this task as it has the ability of dealing with imprecise
information.
Deshmuk and Talluru (1997) show a rule based fuzzy reasoning system
to assess the risk of management fraud using a novel measure of belief. This
measure expresses the belief of the auditors in find material irregularities
in the management activities. The arguments contributing to this measure
are the measure of the material conditions (C) that have made the fraud
possible, the motivations or the reasons (M) that pushed the fraudsters to
commit the fraud and the attitude, (A) which describes the set of (un)ethical
values which have inspired the fraudsters. Each argument is defined through
red flags, chosen according to statistically significant factors. In Table 2.1
the argument ”attitude” is defined.
Three categories are associated to each red flag: low, medium and high.
Each user/expert can assign a numerical value to each red flag associated
with each category/linguistic label. Based on these values, a membership
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Attitude
CO - Collusion with outsiders MRA - Managements risk
taking attitude
NCI - Need to cover up an
illegal act
MD-Management dishonesty
SPA - Strong personality
anomalies
ME - Management evasive-
ness
DRA - Disrespect for regula-
tory authorities
UEE - Undue emphasis on
earnings
MPP - Misstatements in
prior period
AA - Aggressive attitude to-
ward financial reporting
Table 2.1: Red flags used to measure the argument Attitude (Deshmuk and
Talluru, 1997)
function is built for each argument. After the three membership functions
are constructed the risk of management fraud (RMF) is measured through
an inference process as follows: If C is X and M is Y and A is Z then RMF
is W.
A similar approach has been adopted by Bordoni and Facchinetti (2001)
who developed a fuzzy expert system for insurance fraud evaluation. They
reason that the main requirement of the companies is a system able to filter
and split unsuspicious from suspicious claims in a automatic and fast way.
The two problems can be addressed by employing a call center and fraud
experts respectively. In this paper the authors illustrate the use of a Fuzzy
Logic Control (FLC) model to evaluate each claim by applying an index of
suspicion. The system is built using 350 rules and 69 inputs variables. The 4
output variables are the following: 1) Suspect Index: this is the main index
indicating the level of suspicion of the claim 2) Element of suspect: helps
the expert to detect the most suspicious areas of the claim 3) Competence:
the software indicates inconsistent results 4) Body injuries: an index dealing
with body injuries of the claimant.
The risk evaluation gives the opportunity to perform an accurate selec-
tion of suspect cases producing a ranking of the most important risk factors.
The system, tested with the collaboration of 90 Italian insurance companies,
has demonstrated effectiveness as a tool and a fast method that helps the
call centers to pay unsuspicious claims immediately and filter real suspicious
cases, improving the work efficiency.
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2.3 Tree-based detection modelling
Trees are effective tools for systematically classifying the components of a
fraudulent attack in different contexts. The graphical tree representation
is appealing to users, flexible enough to be equipped with several types
of information, and easily automated. Behavioural profiling consists of
analysing the customer’s recent activities in order to profile their normal
behaviour. The following example of tree-based detection modelling refers
to e-commerce fraud.
Xu et al. (2006) use the FP-tree (Frequent pattern tree) to represent rela-
tions between transactions. The aim of this research is to build a system able
to detect fraud and adaptive to the dynamic behaviour patterns. Mukka-
mala et al (2006) present three tree-based models: FP-tree, classification
regression tree (CART) and TreeNet. The FP-tree is based on a transaction
database of purchased products. An initial scanning is performed in order
to create an empty root. In the second stage of the process, items are placed
in the tree in decreasing order of their price. Each transaction contains the
class of the purchased product: daypart, grouped IP address and grouped
purchased amount. Figure 2.3 shows an example of an FP-tree.
Figure 2.3: An example of an FP-tree construction (Mukkamala et al., 2006)
The external leaves of the tree suggest unusual patterns and the root
nodes describe the frequency of each class. At this stage it is possible to
follow all the links and obtain all the association rules. The expert/user
for instance could be interested in knowing how many items have been pur-
chased on Sunday from that IP.
CART builds classification and regression trees for predicting continuous
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Figure 2.4: Logic Attack Graph generator (Ou et al., 2006)
dependent variables (regression) and categorical predictor variables (classi-
fication). The tree is constructed continuously until there is no significant
decrease in the measure of the impurity.
TreeNet is another classification model built up through a collection of
small trees with each tree improving on its predecessors through an error-
correcting strategy.
Ou et al. (2006) point out the importance of taking into consideration
multi-stage and multi-host attacks: an attacker could jump from one ma-
chine to another to perform different attacks. Using a logical attack, it is
possible to enumerate all possible attack scenarios by depth-first travers-
ing. In their approach they represent relations with logical expression, and
generate attack graphs through automatic logic deduction, as opposed to a
custom-designed graph search algorithm.
The output of a Logical Attack Graph is shown in Fig. 2.4. This attack
generation tool is built upon MuIVAL, a network security analyser based on
logical programming, in order to improve the security of complex network
based systems.
The advantage of the logical attack graph is the improvement in under-
standing the causal relationship between system configuration and a suc-
cessful attack.
2.4 Knowledge-based architectures
Multi-agent systems can be used to solve complex tasks involving large
amounts of data using a combination of computational intelligence tech-
niques such as neural networks, genetic algorithms, fuzzy logic and heuristic
rules.
Ohsuga et al. (2001) describe three main phases in which an artificial
intelligence based system is able to solve a large-scale problem: deconstruct
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the problem into small sub-problems, distribute the problems to different
agents, and integrate their results.
Major and Redinger (2008) develop a hybrid knowledge/statistical based
system for the detection of fraud. In particular the system has been used
in the healthcare fraud detection as a pre-investigative analysis tool. The
proposed Electronic Fraud Detection (EFD) ”integrates expert knowledge
with statistical information assessment to identify cases of unusual provider
behaviour. The heart of EFD is 27 behavioural heuristics, knowledge-based
ways of viewing and measuring provider behaviour.” The system identifies
suspicious behaviours that need to be investigated. The operational cycle
consists of 3 steps: 1) measure each provider’s behaviour; 2) compare it with
his peers; 3) refer the unusual behaviour to the Security Unit.
A machine-learning tool can also be used to create new rules and improve
the detection process.
Martignoni et al. (2002) evaluate a behaviour-based malware detector.
They try to correct the asymmetry present in syntax-based approaches for
malware detection, defining semantic gap as ”disconnect between a volu-
minous stream of low-level events and any understanding of the aggregate
effect of those events”. Behaviour graphs are used to describe a correlated
sequence of events that have some particular semantic effect. In order to
recognize complex behaviour they compose graphs hierarchically assuming
that ”a behaviour graph generates an event that can be used as a compo-
nent within another graph.” The robustness of the system is underlined by
its capacity to detect different variants of malware. Given a well defined se-
mantic structure, the system is still able to recognize variations of the same
malware typology.
Flegel et al. (2008) distinguish between generic, specialized and custom-
built fraud detection tools. The authors point out that most of the systems
are custom-built for commercial purpose. They also argue that a different
perspective is needed in detecting intrusion at host or network level. The
novel concept of syntactic gap is introduced, which can be defined as the
existing gap between real fraud, detected in the real world, and existing
fraud models. An ad hoc ontology is required in order to improve the current
models in terms of adaptivity and flexibility.
Sterne et al. (2005) develop a general cooperative intrusion detection
architecture supporting activities in mobile ad hoc network (MANET). The
model has been designed for military applications. The network discussed
in this paper involves a mix of mobile systems, PDAs, laptops, which can
be located on different kinds of vehicles. The presented model is an organ-
isational model based on a dynamic hierarchy. The links in the model are
dynamic since nodes can quickly activate or lose connection with their neigh-
bours. Every node is responsible for protecting itself using its own detection
system. Figure 2.5 presents an intrusion detection system (IDS) from the
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Figure 2.5: Logical IDS architecture components within each node (Sterne
et al., 2005)
perspective of a single node. The grey rectangle represents the core agent
of each node. Its function is to perform sensor-dependent processing and
communication; circles are relevant logical processes and cylinders represent
storage information units.
Figure 2.6 depicts how dynamic hierarchy works with the arrows rep-
resenting hierarchical relationships. Nodes U, V, and B are children of C.
In this scenario, X represents the potential attacker. The approach shown
in the figure is based on link-layer monitoring and accumulation of packet
counts. This means that information gathered from all neighbouring nodes
is aggregated and compared. Inputs and outputs packets are monitored by
neighbouring nodes. In this example, given that X is the attacker, nodes
C, Z, W and B monitor the packets of X. In this way X can improve his
position in the hierarchy. N, being in a lower level of the hierarchy, is in the
best position to monitor X. The principle used is that intrusion detection
and correlation should occur at the lowest level in the hierarchy at which the
aggregated data is sufficient to enable an accurate detection or correlation
decision.
Anomaly detection tools, discussed in this chapter, generate alarms and
can be used by auditors to support their investigations. These systems are
often introduced as exhaustive instruments to detect fraud. In the real world
the number of false positives is very high and all the generated false alarms
need to be evaluated and pruned by human experts.
These tools can be useful instruments to support human decisions, but
they need to be constantly refined and considered for their intended purpose:
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Figure 2.6: Dynamic Hierarchy scheme (Sterne et al., 2005)
algorithms that follow heuristic rules implemented by humans.
These systems must be integrated with DSS to be useful; the main con-
cerns are the management of all these alarms and the transformation of the
produced information into knowledge to detect real or potentially dangerous
cases.
Another limitation of these systems is that they cannot be used to
prevent human-based fraud, since human behaviour is not visible in any
database. Attempts of intrusion can be detected, but the path of the fraud
is visible only when it is too late and the fraud has been already perpetrated.
Fuzzy reasoning systems have the advantage of mimicking decision mak-
ing dynamics and interaction between experts. In the real world, anti-fraud
experts need to agree on their different evaluations on a real or potential
fraud case. A fuzzy reasoning system can solve the problem of aggregating
different beliefs in order to produce a shared strategy to fight against fraud.
Tree-based systems introduced in this chapter are addressed to e-commerce,
but they can be used by experts for a user friendly representation of fraud
and semantic oriented features. Trees can also be stored, retrieved and then
matched with new cases.
Knowledge-based systems for fraud detection are more suitable for com-
plex organisations and institutions, since they are able to support the costs
of implementation and maintenance. The main limitation of these systems
is the gap with the procedures applied in the real world. Audit team proce-
dures for fraud detection are still dominated by paper-based and traditional
statistical methods. Another limitation is the lack of real data about fraud
schemes and the nature of fraud data itself. Fraud cases in the real world
have a very low frequency and therefore it is a very difficult task to test
these systems. If the goal of a knowledge-based system is to be autonomous
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and self adaptive an intermediate phase is required. This phase consists in
the creation of semantically encoded data-bases using DSS which are able
to make the tacit knowledge of the experts explicit.
Once the knowledge is well structured new knowledge can be created.
In this sense, a DSS can be seen as an intermediate step in the multi-agent
system design before constructing proper knowledge-based architectures.
2.5 Data-mining approach in fraud detection
Different data-mining methods have been applied in several fields of research.
The dramatic growth in data volumes - also known as the ”big data” revolu-
tion - has made the analysis and pruning work very time consuming. At the
same time the evolution of technology, computational power and improved
computational methods have improved the capacity of analysts to interpret
and manage these large and growing amounts of data. Data-mining has
gradually evolved into the Knowledge Discovery Database (KDD) technol-
ogy.
KDD refers to all those techniques and tools that are able to support
humans in making sense of data (Fayyad et al., 1996); it appeared for the
first time in 1989 (Piatetsky-Shapiro, 1991). The KDD process involves
collection of data, finding paths in the data, algorithm selection and - most
important - the determination of what is to be considered to be knowledge
and what is not.
Phua et al. (2005) introduce a comprehensive survey of data-mining ap-
proaches in fraud detection and discuss their limitations.
The data-mining methods can utilize training/testing data with labels,
but restricted to legal examples, and no labels to predict/describe the eval-
uation data.
1. Supervised data-mining approaches on labeled data
These methods, including supervised algorithms, examine all previous
labelled transactions to mathematically determine what a standard
fraudulent transaction looks like by assigning a risk score (Sherman,
2002). Wheeler and Aitken (2000) adopted a case-based (CBR) rea-
soning approach to analyse existing methods and techniques that pro-
duced misclassified data.
2. Hybrid data-mining approaches with labeled data
Hybrid approaches combine different techniques such as neural net-
works, Bayesian networks and decision trees. Chan et al. (1999) by
combining naive Bayes, C4.5, CART and RIPPER as base classifiers,
show that there is an improvement in terms of reducing computational
costs and enhancing efficiency in credit card fraud detection.
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3. Semi-supervised data-mining approaches with only legal (non-
fraud) data
Murad and Pinkas (1999) edit profiles of phone calls from telecom-
munications accounts; common profiles are extracted and an alert is
produced once a call duration and destination exceeds the threshold
and standard deviation of the overall profiles.
4. Unsupervised data-mining approaches with unlabeled data
Dorronsoro et al. (1997) introduced a non-linear analysis algorithm
without labels to find events of credit card fraud. Since there is no
history of each credit card transaction, all the transactions are seg-
regated into different geographical locations. The authors show that
the system enhanced the detection of the false positives and improved
computational efficiency.
Phua et al. (2005) show that there are limitations to using the data-
mining approach for fraud detection. One of the limitations is to obtain
real fraud detection data. A key limitation is the emphasis on complex
algorithms such as unsupervised neural networks, which contradict the em-
pirical evidence.
Phua et al. (2005) show that less complex algorithms - such as naive
Bayes and logistic regression - can produce better results. Another criticism
is that few systems have been implemented but the most discouraging reality
is that there has not been any empirical evaluation of commercial data-
mining applications since Abbot et al. (1998).
In this thesis, data-mining techniques are used as instruments to generate
alarms that can be evaluated by experts rather than being an autonomous
system that can be used to detect fraud. This approach was chosen because
of a number of reasons. In the real world the most dangerous fraudulent
schemes are developed and run by humans and not by some kind of electronic
systems. The dominant data-mining approaches paint a world dominated by
hackers using sophisticated algorithms to attack the banking systems. This
approach ignores conflict of interest in the world of fraud, where managers
can modify documents and data to avoid controls or offer hackers all the
support they need, for instance by selling usernames and passwords. These
are clearly inexpensive and simple ways to commit fraud, which cannot be
detected using a data-mining approach. Data-mining methods are tested
on synthetic databases where the frequency of fraud usually is very high
compared to the real world. Another issue is that a fraudulent operation
can be perpetrated over a long period of time (5-10 years). A senior bank
manager could over the course of his career find a maximum of 15-20 high
impact fraudulent cases. Using a data-mining approach, the question is how
much of the developed tools and methods can be extended to new cases?
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Another fundamental problem is the time factor. In case of internal fraud,
but also other kinds of fraud, suspicious transactions can be detected too
late and when the money is already in an offshore account. Data-mining
can be a valid approach to generate alarms, to block credit-cards or online
transactions, but it has many limitations. In order to implement systems
inspired by the KDD principles it is imperative for the fraud experts to
collect a sufficient and relevant number of fraud cases, which can be done
by using an interactive Decision Support System (DSS).
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Chapter 3
FIDES and its components
Decision makers often operate in
a surveillance mode rather than
a problem-solving mode. In
contrast to a theory of
information that assumes that
information is gathered to
resolve a choice among
alternatives, decision-makers
scan their environments for
surprises and solutions. They
monitor what is going on. They
characteristically do not ”solve”
problems; they apply rules and
copy solutions from others.
James March
In this chapter the Fraud Interactive Detection Expert System (FIDES),
a multi-agent system (MAS) proposed in Buoni (2010) , and in Buoni et al.
(2010) and then extended in Buoni et al. (2011) and its components will be
introduced. FIDES is a latin word often (and wrongly) translated as ”faith”
but to the Romans it meant ”reliability”. The target groups of the system
are the auditors of the bank and inspectors. In the next paragraph the
main components of FIDES will be introduced, including Delphi method,
Think-map and Attack trees. In the last paragraph the anti-fraud procedure
carried out by the system will be described in detail.
3.1 Delphi method
The Delphi method was used for the first time in RAND (Research ANd
Development), a U.S. sponsored military project, in the 1950’s. The name
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comes from the Greek oracle of Delphi ”where necromancers foretold the
future using hallucinogenic vapors and animal entrails” (Gordon, 1994).
It was designed to stimulate a debate free of the charismatic influence
of the personalities involved in the process. The influence of oratory and
pedagogy of the influential members of the participants is removed by the
fact that extreme opinions are summarized to give equal weights to differ-
ent statements. These are indeed the most important aspects of Delphi:
anonymity and feedback. In this sense the Delphi method can be consid-
ered as a controlled debate. In the history of philosophy, one of the main
topics that challenged philosophers is reality.
Many interpretations have been offered and many different epistemolo-
gies have been suggested for developing different research methods. The one
proposed by D. Sam Scheele (Turrof, 2002) is the subjective or negotiated re-
ality. This approach suits particularly well the needs of Delphi participants.
In the Delphi method the reality is the product of interaction between ex-
perts and the output is the detection of illegal operations based on previous
experiences and the intuition of the participants.
Rowe and Wright (1999) suggest four for a good design of the Delphi
process:
1. Anonymity of Delphi participants: allows the participants to
freely express their opinions without undue social pressures to con-
form to others in the group. Decisions are evaluated on their merit,
rather than who has proposed the idea.
2. Iteration: allows the participants to refine their views in light of the
progress of the group’s work from round to round.
3. Controlled feedback: informs the participants of the other partic-
ipant’s perspectives, and provides the opportunity for Delphi partici-
pants to clarify or change their views.
4. Statistical aggregation of group response: allows for quantitative
analysis and interpretation of data.
A typical Delphi process can be described in eleven steps according to
Skulmoski et al. (2007) :
1) Develop the research question - The research question can be co-
developed by the supervisor and the participants typically through a liter-
ature review. A pilot study can also be conducted to identify the problem
and understand the relevance of the research question.
2) Design the research - In this phase, in order to help answer the research
question, different kind of methods are evaluated. Normally the survey is
most common way chosen to perform the Delphi process.
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3) Research sample - At this stage research participants are selected.
This is a critical phase since the output of Delphi is based on experts opin-
ions. Knowledge of the problem and social and communication skills are
fundamental requirements.
4) Develop Delphi round one questionnaire - In order to be sure that all
the questions will be clear to all the participants, the purpose is to have a
brainstorming session.
5) Delphi pilot study - Especially when there are inexperienced researchers,
a pilot study may be conducted to test the comprehension of the questions
and adjust them if necessary.
6) Release and analyse first round questionnaire - The questionnaires
are distributed and then analysed. It is common to represent the results
using mind maps in order to understand the logical connections, interactions,
causes and effects of the research problem.
7) Develop second round questionnaire - On the basis of the results of
the first questionnaire the questions will became more focused in order to
narrow the research topic.
8) Release and analyse second round questionnaire - The questionnaire
is distributed and then analysed as in the first round. Now the participants
have the opportunity to verify if the responses of the first round correspond
to their opinions and change or enrich them in the light of the answers of
the other participants.
9) Develop third round questionnaire - The third round is based on the
answers of the second round. New questions are added to go in deep in the
research and refine the objectives.
10) Release and analyse third round questionnaire - In the third round
the procedure is similar to the one used for the previous two rounds. Once
again participants can change their opinions, comment and share the knowl-
edge acquired during the process. At this stage if the consensus is reached
and participants are satisfied, the process can stop.
11) Verify, Generalize and document the research results - Results are
verified and a document is released to describe the research results.
The Delphi method has been used effectively in many fields of research
to handle incomplete knowledge of a problem or phenomenon and to extract
tacit knowledge by soliciting experts opinions.
Yao and Liu (2006) conduct a comparative study between conventional
Delphi and dynamic Delphi. Dynamic Delphi is based on web technology,
since survey rounds are performed online. In this version of Delphi, pan-
ellists are connected all around the world and feedback is released, only
partially or fully dynamically between rounds. Their research suggests that
dynamic Delphi survey may form a consensus quickly, since social-emotional
exchanges may facilitate the elimination of potential misunderstandings.
Delphi is best used as laying the groundwork for other methods (Franklin
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Figure 3.1: An example of mind map c©Buzan.
and Hart, 2007). This means it can be used as an instrument for setting up
other methods.
3.2 Think-map
Mind mapping is an effective way to represent knowledge and share and
organise new ideas, forcing users to focus on the logic construct, coherence in
their reasoning and improvement of the accuracy of cause-effect relationship.
According to A˚hlberg (2007) the two most important names in mapping
representation are Tony Buzan and Joseph Novak.
The concept of mapping was introduced by Buzan (1974). The main
idea of a mind map is to organise keywords into a radiant structure that
resembles a tree seen from above (A˚hlberg, 2007). In a radiant structure it
is possible to visualize the central idea, which can be expanded through a
brainstorming process adding new branches. Figure 3.1 represents a mind
map, according to the principles of Buzan (1974).
Novak and Can˜as (2008) developed the idea of concept maps defined as
”graphical tools for organising and representing knowledge”. Concept maps
(see Figure 3.2) are characterized by a hierarchical structure with the main
concept at the top of the map and the less generally developed concepts
placed below the main one. Another important feature of concept maps is
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Figure 3.2: A concept map showing the key features of concept maps (Novak
and Can˜as, 2008)
the use of cross-links, which are concept connectors that specify the relation
between labels. In Fig.3.2, cross links are ”represent” and ”includes” for
instance.
Using concept map software like CmapTools (http://cmap.ihmc.us/)
and with the support of a projector, it is possible to move concepts (labels)
around, rebuild and expand the map as it is required. Modifications can be
performed by the users in real time (synchronously) or at their convenience
(asynchronously), once maps are stored in the server. Users can interact
leaving comments in form of post-its or during the building of the map
(Can˜as et al., 2003).
Figure 3.3 depicts an example of building a concept map. A focus ques-
tion is placed on the top, with the ”parking lot” of listed concepts on the
left, which can be moved by the users to create the map. Cross-links act
as logical connectors to link concepts. In the case of particularly complex
subjects an expert can build an ”expert skeleton concept map” in order to
offer some clues to users to complete the map.
The main contribution of concept maps (and maps in general) is to
capture the tacit knowledge of the experts, forcing them to articulate their
reasoning and visions.
Amongst the mind map structures found in literature, there is one which
deserves more attention considering the nature of the research problem. This
structure is termed as Think-map and was introduced by Oxman (2004) as
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Figure 3.3: An example of expert skeleton concept map.(Novak and Can˜as,
2008)
an educational instrument to support students in learning design concepts.
Think-maps follow two main learning theories: constructivism and concept
mapping. Constructivist theories of learning (Kolb, 1984) are built on the
idea that the learner does not have a passive role in the process, but is part
of the learning process, creating himself/herself and learning new concepts.
Concept mapping in Think-maps acts as a tool for organizing and repre-
senting knowledge. This structure reinforces the key idea of constructivism,
that is ”learning by doing”. The concept map structure that makes explicit
conceptual mapping is called ICF (Issue-Concept-Form), which creates a
network of associated concepts and acts as a ”structuring ontology for the
construction of conceptual networks of design concepts” (see Figure 3.4).
The ICF structure refers to the Mediatheque of Nimes (France), designed
by Norman Foster. In the figure we can observe three main structures: ur-
ban attraction (issue), luminosity space (concept) and vertical space (form).
For instance following the double line, we can interpret the scheme in the
following way: in order to create an urban attraction (an issue), a lumi-
nosity space (a concept) was achieved by introducing a six story vertical
space (a form) as a central atrium (a form). The software developed to
create conceptual mapping and linkages between concepts is termed Web-
Pad. The system is based on the AI methodology of Case-Based Reasoning
(CBR). Web-Pad works on two levels: textual and visual. The textual level
includes a case-base of design precedents that are represented textually as
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Figure 3.4: An ICF structure of the Mediatheque designed by Norman Fos-
ter. (Oxman, 2004)
a network of concepts. The visual level consists of a graphic representation
of the cases. The system allows the user to perform a data-based search.
As the output of the search the system returns precedents containing links
to the items indicated by the user. In the CBR search the user can specify
a partial description of the case and retrieve similar cases that match the
entered description. To improve the system the user can express the de-
gree of similarity between 0 and 1 comparing a new case with an old one
he/she found during a previous search. In this way the system can improve
its accuracy. The result of the search will be a ranking of similar cases in
descending order. The following experiment was performed by a team of
design students. Students were asked to create inference between concepts
and significant relationships of ideas in museum design.
Figures 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 shows the procedure to create the three main
structures which form ICF: main issues, main concepts and main forms. The
related keywords, associated to each label, are underlined in color.
Figure 3.8 shows the Web-Pad interface in the process of creating the
issue ”contextualism”. Web-Pad creates ”concept” and ”form” labels in a
similar way. The description text box shows the text that has to be analysed.
The graphic level representation as result of the issue-concept-form link-
ing is shown in Fig.3.9.
Students in distributed environments shared their ideas and comments
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Figure 3.5: Content analysis of design issues using the ICF methodology.
(Oxman, 2004)
Figure 3.6: Content analysis of design issues using the ICF methodology.
(Oxman, 2004)
Figure 3.7: Content analysis of design issues using the ICF methodology.
(Oxman, 2004)
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Figure 3.8: Web-Pad interface for linking concepts to the issue contextual-
ism. (Oxman, 2004)
Figure 3.9: Web-Pad interface for linking concepts to the issue contextual-
ism. (Oxman, 2004)
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in real-time discussion mode. In figure 3.8, one can observe the empty field
”System Message”, that is used by students to interact. The goal of this
task is to develop a conceptual map from the knowledge extracted from the
texts. The system, once the links are created, can be browsed to perform
a semantic search by selecting one label on the map with the mouse. The
output is a description of the related linked concepts or an issue related to
a certain form.
3.3 Attack-trees
One of the most suitable tree-based models is the attack tree. The term
attack tree was introduced by Schneier (1999) to systematically categorize
the different ways in which a system can be attacked. He describes an attack
tree as an instrument to ”provide a formal, methodical way of describing
the security of systems, based on varying attacks. Basically, you represent
attacks against a system in a tree structure, with the goal as the root node
and different ways of achieving that goal as leaf nodes.”
And and or operators, in the classical framework of attack trees, relate
the subtask of a node. An and operator is used when all the features must
be present to perform a particular task; in the case that at least one of
them is necessary, an or operator will be chosen. Using this approach it is
possible to analyse the contribution of any attribute to the main goal which
is to finalize the attack. Another important feature is the opportunity to
calculate the cost of an attack as a function of the cost of subtasks, as shown
in Fig. 3.10.
At the same time it is possible to identify the path with the highest
probability of success or to study the least expensive ways available for
the fraudsters to perform an attack. Yager (2006) introduces the use of
OWA nodes in describing the required number of children for the success
of the parent. According to this approach, the contribution of the children
to the success of the parents is determined by a linguistic quantifier, Q,
expressing the (linguistically characterized) proportion of subtasks needed
for the parent node to be accomplished. If we consider an OWA node that
has n children, Q subtasks are directly responsible for the success of the
parent. Q is a monotonic linguistic quantifier expressing concepts like ”at
most” or ”at least half”.
The attack tree is a powerful tool to represent an attack through nodes,
analyse the contribution of a single attribute and calculate the cost of an
attack (the cheapest way to perform it) or the attack with the highest prob-
ability of success.
Mauw and Oostdijk (2005) introduce a generalization of Schneiders at-
tack trees. Figure 3.11 shows a generalized attack tree and its main elements:
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Figure 3.10: An example of an Attack Tree (Schneier, 1999)
nodes, bags and bundles. The power set of a set S, which is the set of the
elementary attacks, is denoted by 2S in Fedrizzi and Giove (2007). A bag
is any subset of S containing multiple copies of the same element. For in-
stance, if a and b are elements of S, B = {a, a, b} is a bag. Bag(S) is the set
of all finite and non-empty bags from S. Given a finite set S of attack com-
ponents, an attack is an element of Bag(S). An attack suite is an element
of 2(Bags(S)) .
Figure 3.11: Generalized Attack Tree
In order to form an attack, we have to consider connections from a node
to a bag of nodes. The set of multiple connections between a node and a bag
of nodes is called a bundle. Several bundles could be associated with a given
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node and the execution of any bundle of a node is sufficient to fire that node.
The attack suite defined by a node can be determined by its bundles. The
attack suite consists of the union of the attack suites defined by its bundles.
An attack in a bundle is constructed by taking an attack from each of the
nodes in the bundle and joining them together. This structure permits us to
consider the possibility that a sub-attack may occur more than once. The
design of the attack tree is based on a cooperative approach involving the
group of auditors according to the following steps:
a. identification of the attack components;
b. construction of the bundles for each node;
c. definition of the suites;
d. qualification of the attributes.
Odubiyi and O’Brien (2006) created a framework to teach students how
to develop countermeasures to the Twenty most Critical Internet Security
Vulnerabilities (SANS Institute). The task was to build up an attack-tree
forest taking into consideration these threads. The experiment simulated
the methodology followed by companies, which try to ”generalize from pre-
viously observed behaviour to recognize future behaviour, either malicious
or normal.”
Dimitriadis (2007) presents a case study suggesting how an attack tree
should be developed based on the authentication mechanism of a major
bank. In Fig.3.12 we can observe different paths to compromise a bank
account.
The attack tree describes 3 main groups of attacks: UT/U (User Ter-
minal/user) attacks, CC (Comunication Channel) attacks, IBS (Internet
Banking Server) attacks.
1) UT/U attacks - these attacks are aimed at the user equipment
(smart-cards, password generators). An example is piggy-banking, which
consists of installing a camera on the ATM in order to steal user’s credentials.
2) CC attacks - these attacks target communication links. Examples of
attacks are pharming (compromising domain name servers and connecting
the user to a fraudulent website) and sniffing (capture information of the
user).
3) IBS attacks - these are off-line attacks against the server that host the
Internet banking application. Examples include brute force attack, bank
security policy violation and web site manipulation.
Edge et al. (2007) define attack and protection trees and discuss how
they can be implemented in order to perform a correct analysis in the on line
banking security system. A protection tree ”is constructed by identifying
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Figure 3.12: Attack Tree - Bank account compromise
protections that can mitigate an attacker’s actions in the leaf nodes of the
attack tree.” It is complementary to the attack tree. Figure 3.13 shows an
example of a protection tree to protect an electronic store.
Isograph (http://www.isograph-software.com), an attack tree soft-
ware, provides the opportunity to calculate the consequences (Financial,
Reputation, Safety, Political, Operational) of an attack (HIGHCOST, LOW-
COST, SERIOUS, SLIGHT).
Moore et al. (2001) incorporate preconditions and postconditions in the
model to improve the description of the attack tree. Preconditions include
assumptions that auditors could make about the attacker and that are nec-
essary for an attack to succeed, for instance the skills, resources, access, or
knowledge that the attacker must possess, and the level of risk that he or
she is willing to take. The postconditions are the consequences of the attack,
for instance the knowledge gained by the attacker and changes to systems
once the attack has succeeded. In this case material consequences are not
as heavy as the non-material ones can be. Non-material consequences, like
the loss of image or competitive advantage as a consequence of know-how
misappropriation, can be hard to predict, but also to describe.
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Figure 3.13: Protection tree for electronic store
3.4 FIDES
The first prototype of FIDES to support an audit team of a bank in fraud
detection is shown in Figure 3.14. On the Data filtering module, we specify
a set of A1...Ak agents that can generate alarms.
Alarms can be produced by software agents (detection tools), suspicious
behaviours indicated by whistle-blowers or the results of reports filled by
inspectors of a Bank. These alarms must be evaluated by the team of
experts E1...EM , who interact performing the Delphi method in order to
select those cases and/or behaviours that can be potentially dangerous.
The output of the Delphi process is an attack tree. In the Detection
Module experts can decide which case to prosecute and then perform the
risk estimation phase. Both tasks can be performed using the attack tree
calculating for instance the least expensive, the most rational or the most
irrational path.
Attack trees can be stored in a data base. Users in this phase can retrieve
old attacks and relative paths to check the countermeasures used in the past
and gain some inspiration for evaluating the new case.
Two possible kinds of scenarios where FIDES can be applied are illus-
trated in Fig.3.15.
In the first scenario, the left path of the figure, agents generate alarms
when they discover anomalies in the data. In this case the Delphi method
works in real time. A valid instrument to group cases and alarms by typolo-
gies, is the Ishikawa or fishbone diagram, which is depicted in the pruning
box in Fig.3.15 and described in detail in figure 3.16; it has been adapted
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Figure 3.14: Fides in Buoni (2010)
from Balanced Scorecard Institute (1996).
The moderator has the duty to examine different alarms, group them
and formulate the questions. Questions Q1...Qn as shown in Fig.3.16 are
positioned on the bones of the diagram under different typologies (com-
mon false alarms, usual behaviours, typical fraud schemes, unusual fraud
schemes). Questions for instance can be formulated as ”Is this one a com-
mon false alarm?”. The output of the Ishikawa diagram is a list of fraud
cases or behaviours after the pruning process. These good cases or be-
haviours are used to create the attack tree with a higher level of accuracy.
Once the attack tree is built, auditors can decide whether or not to start an
investigation and which path is more probable.
In the second scenario, represented in the right path of figure 3.15, the
system is used in a proactive way. In this case, experts can meet to de-
velop case scenarios to prevent future fraud cases on the basis of suspi-
cions, rumours, information gathered, or confessions made by other people
in anonymity. The output of the Delphi process is again an attack tree de-
scribing possible ways that fraudsters could choose to perform attacks on
the basis of suspicions the experts have. The risk management phase con-
sists in deciding wheter to block or not certain operations or to investigate
people who could be involved in illicit activities. The system works as a
Group Decision Support System (GDSS) and it can be installed on mobile
devices like mobile phones or tablet computers. Users can meet physically
or virtually in order to respond immediately to alarms.
FIDES has been developed with the banking sector in mind, but it can
be used in other situations that require a crisis management scenario (po-
lice, fire-fighters and medical personnel) and where there is the necessity to
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Figure 3.15: Two different scenarios of FIDES (Buoni, 2010)
coordinate complex tasks in emergency situations like natural disaster.
After the meeting with the employees of one of the most important Eu-
ropean banks and the feedback received from them, the prototype of FIDES
was improved according to their needs; in particular we worked on the in-
teraction between inspectors and auditors which is a key feature in fraud
detection. The blog platform that inspectors use to interact with each other,
commenting on fraud cases, has been the starting point in improving FIDES.
An inspection can literally stop the activity of the bank for a considerable
period of time, causing extensive economic damage to the branch of the bank
where the inspection takes place. An inspection, the creation of the report
and the evaluation performed by the audit team are all time consuming
activities.
A GDSS like FIDES can dramatically reduce all these procedures. The
integration of the Think-map, the Delphi Method and the attack tree in
FIDES is not only an instrument to improve fraud detection, but an instru-
ment to collect fraud cases and the performed countermeasures which can
be adopted in the future to solve new cases.
In Fig.3.17 the FIDES architecture and its components are introduced.
The first module of FIDES is the Information Filtering Module. Inspectors
check the alarms generated by the system or evaluate information and decide
whether to report them or not to the audit team members. In case the
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Figure 3.16: Ishikawa Diagram used for pruning
suspicious events are relevant they can decide to share them with colleagues
using Web-Pad. The second module is the Attack Components Detection
Module. Inspectors interact with each other by commenting on fraud cases,
suspicions or the interview they just had with the director of the branch of
the bank. As the result of this first phase, all this information is listed in
the form of comments in a chat. As shown in Fig.3.18 messages are typed in
real time in a ”message box” and then they can remain in the ”description
box” to allow the other inspectors to read the new information. At this
stage inspectors can start to underline keywords as shown in Fig.3.19 and
to associate concepts to different labels in order to create a think-map.
In a think-map, the ICF structure is specified by linking Issue, Concept
and Form together while in FIDES we determine an ”action”, ”suspicious
behaviour” and ”suspected people”, who might be responsible for the action
on the basis of suspicious behaviour or alarms generated by the System.
Inspectors can create new labels and link them. The result is the think-map
shown in Fig.3.20.
The Think-map acts as a model to create nodes to be delivered to the
auditors.
In the Delphi Module auditors connect nodes in order to create the attack
tree.
The fuzzy mechanism
The construction of the attack-tree is performed through a fuzzy mecha-
nism. The audit team performs the Delphi process focusing on the selection
of nodes in order to form the attack tree. In the first phase the inspec-
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Figure 3.17: The architecture of FIDES
56
Figure 3.18: The Web-Pad interface
Figure 3.19: The keywords selection
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Figure 3.20: The Think-map
tors determine the possible nodes of the attack tree with the help of the
think-map. The moderator, once the nodes have been delivered by the in-
spectors, asks the experts about the possible connection of the nodes, and
aggregates the results to obtain the attack tree. The connection between
nodes is determined by a fuzzy mechanism based on fuzzy sets theory which
was introduced by Zadeh (1965) as an extension of the classical notion of
set (Chakraborty, 2010).
In classical set theory the membership of the elements of a set is ex-
pressed in binary terms, which means that an element can belong or not
to that set. A fuzzy set allows its members to have different degrees of
membership, called membership function, in the interval [0,1]. In real world
one can frequently encounter fuzziness: knowledge is imprecise, vague and
uncertain. Human thinking and reasoning often involve fuzzy information.
The use of systems based on classical set theory and two-valued logic is
problematic in dealing with opinions expressed by experts.
A concept to deal with uncertainty is soft computing. The idea of soft
computing was introduced by Zadeh (1994) as an example of a new kind of
artificial intelligence to mimic the ability of humans to adopt a way of rea-
soning that is approximate rather than exact. Humans can tolerate and deal
with imprecision and uncertainty in relation with language, sloppy handwrit-
ing, distorted speech and summarizing a text.
In hard computing the requirements are precision, certainty and rigour.
In soft computing the main idea is that since precision and certainty carry a
cost, it is necessary to exploit the trade-off between imprecision and uncer-
tainty. Soft computing, according to Zadeh (1998), is not a single method-
ology, but rather a consortium of computing methodologies, including fuzzy
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logic (FL), neurocomputing (NC), genetic computing (GC) and probabilistic
computing (PC).
The contribution of FL to Soft Computing according to Zadeh is the
fact that any theory can be fuzzified by replacing the concept of a crisp
set with that of a fuzzy set. The advantage of using fuzzy logic is a better
contact with reality, but with more computational cost compared to crisp
numbers. Zadeh’s main motivation for using FL is related to the concept
of information granulation and how humans deal with fuzzy concepts. He
stresses the fact that human concepts are fuzzy because they are the results
of clumping of points drawn together by similarity. Examples of clump
concepts are ”middle-aged” or ”partially cloudy”. Linguistic values can
be seen as a form of data compression. This form of data compression is
termed as granulation (Zadeh, 1994). Linguistic labels and variables are
described in the following way in Zadeh (1975) ”By a linguistic variable
we mean a variable whose values are words or sentences in a natural or
artificial language. For example, ”Age”, is a linguistic variable if its values
are linguistic rather than numerical i.e., young, not young, very young, quite
young, old, not very old and not very young, etc., rather than 20,21,22,23.”
The following description of the basic concepts of lnguistic computing is
based on the book by Carlsson et al. (2004) .
Definition 1. A linguistic variable is characterized by a quintuple
(x, T (x), U,G,M),
in which X is the name of the variable; T(x) is the term set of x, that
is, the set of names of linguistic values of x with each value being a fuzzy
number defined on U ; G is a syntactic rule for generating the names of
values of x; and M is a semantic rule for associating with each value its
meaning.
For instance, the term speed interpreted as linguistic variable can be the
set T (speed), which is
T={slow,moderate, fast,very slow, more or less fast, slightly slow,..},
where each term in T (speed) is characterized by a fuzzy set in a universe
of discourse U=[0,100].
We might interpret
• slow as ”a speed below about 40mph”
• moderate as ”a speed close to 55mph”
• fast as ”a speed above about 70mph”
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Figure 3.21: Values of linguistic variable speed (Carlsson et al., 2004).
These terms, represented in Fig.3.21 , can be characterized as fuzzy sets
and their membership functions are
slow(v) =


1 if v ≤ 40
1− (v − 40)/15 if 40 ≤ v ≤ 55
0 otherwise
moderate(v) =
{
1− |(v − 55)|/15 if 40 ≤ v ≤ 70
0 otherwise
fast(v) =


1 if v ≥ 70
1− (70− v)/15 if 55 ≤ v ≤ 70
0 otherwise
In our approach, the level of agreement between experts about the con-
nection between a vertex and a leaf in the attack tree will be expressed by
linguistic labels (Very Low, Low, Medium, High, Very High) as shown in
Fig.3.23.
Before the description of the model we need some more basic definitions
from fuzzy set theory. First, a formal definition of a fuzzy set is provided.
Definition 2. Let X = x denote a collection of objects (points) denoted
generically by x. Then a fuzzy set A in X is a set of ordered pairs
A = (x, µA(x)), x ∈ X (3.1)
where µA(x) is termed the grade of membership of x in A, and µA : X →M
is a function from X to a space M called the membership space. When
M contains only two points, 0 and 1, A is non fuzzy and its membership
function becomes identical with the characteristic function of a crisp set.
This means that crisp sets belong to fuzzy sets. A fuzzy number is a convex
fuzzy set on the real line R such that
1. ∃x0 ∈ R, µA(x0) = 1
2. µA is piecewise continuous
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Figure 3.22: A fuzzy representation of the linguistic label ”medium”
(The convexity means that all the γ-level sets are convex.) Furthermore, we
call F the family of all fuzzy numbers.
A γ-level set of a fuzzy set A in Rm is defined by [A]γ = {x ∈ Rm :
A(x) ≥ γ} if γ > 0 and [A]γ = cl{x ∈ Rm : A(x) > γ} (the closure of the
support of A) if γ = 0. Let A be a fuzzy number. Then [A]γ is a closed
convex subset of R for all γ ∈ [0, 1]. We use the notations
a1(γ) = min[A]
γ , a2(γ) = max[A]
γ
for the left-hand side and right-hand side of the γ−cut, respectively.
Example 1. We calculate the value a1(γ) and a2(γ) of µmedium represented
in Fig.3.22
µmedium(x) =
{
4x− 1 0.25 ≤ x ≤ 0.5
−4x+ 3 0.5 ≤ x ≤ 0.75
then substituting γ in µmedium we have
a1(γ) =
3− γ
4
a2(γ) =
γ + 1
4
When we calculate the arithmetic operations on fuzzy sets (fuzzy num-
bers), we apply the rules of interval arithmetic. Let A and B be fuzzy num-
bers with the corresponding γ−cuts:[A]γ = [a1(γ), a2(γ)], [B]γ = [b1(γ), b2(γ)],
then the γ−cut of the fuzzy number A+B is the following:
[A+B]γ = [a1(γ) + b1(γ), a2(γ) + b2(γ)],
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Figure 3.23: Possible representation with triangular fuzzy numbers
and the γ−cut of the fuzzy number αA, where α > 0 :
[αA]γ = [αa1(γ), αa2(γ)].
Example 2. When we calculate the sum of two triangular fuzzy numbers A
and B the following result is obtained.
A = (a1, b1, c1)
B = (a2, b2, c2)
A+B = (a1 + a2, b1 + b2, c1 + c2)
Linguistic labels are used in the questionnaire and the labels can be
presented as fuzzy numbers as shown in Fig.3.23.
We suppose that the moderator can choose which nodes are parents (V)
(with descendant) and which ones are leaves (L) (without descendants, basic
attack components). We obtain the following two sets
L = {l1, ..., ls} , V = {v1, ..., vt} .
In the first questionnaire the experts have to express their opinion in lin-
guistic terms about statements like ”li ∈ L is required for vj ∈ V ”, for every
i = 1, ..., s, j = 1, ..., t.
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Then experts E = (e1, , eN ) are asked to determine their level of agree-
ment on this statement based on a linguistic scale with m terms for every
pair li, vj . The linguistic terms in the model are represented as fuzzy num-
bers. In other words we have a mapping
φ : T → F (3.2)
from the set of linguistic terms into the family of fuzzy numbers.
Example 3. One possible representation for a linguistic label is a triangular
fuzzy number:
A(u) =


1− a− u
α
if a− α ≤ u ≤ a
1− u− a
β
if a ≤ u ≤ a+ β
0 otherwise
From the opinion of the experts we obtain the frequencies of the different
classes. For the pair li, vj we have n
ij
1 , . . . , n
ij
m. If we denote by A1, . . . , Am
the fuzzy numbers corresponding to the linguistic labels, we can define a
new fuzzy number Aij as a ”weighted average”, with level sets:
[Aij ]
γ = [
1
N
(nij1 a
1
1(γ) + · · ·+ (nijmam1 (γ)),
1
N
(nij1 a
1
2(γ) + · · ·+ (nijmam2 (γ))],
where [ak1 , a
k
2 ] is the level set of Ak. This is clearly a fuzzy number with the
support in the interval [0, 1].
To obtain the connection degree for the pair li, vj , we calculate the f -
weighted possibilistic mean value of Aij, defined in Carlsson and Fuller
(2001).
Definition 3. The f -weighted possibilistic mean value of A ∈ F , with
[A]γ = [a1(γ), a2(γ)], γ ∈ [0, 1], is defined by ,
Ef (A) =
∫ 1
0
M(Uγ)f(γ)dγ =
∫ 1
0
a1(γ) + a2(γ)
2
f(γ)dγ, (3.3)
where Uγ is a uniform probability distribution on [A]
γ for all γ ∈ [0, 1].
Example 4. As an example one can calculate the f -weighted possibilistic
mean value of µmedium
Ef (µmedium) =
∫ 1
0
1+γ
4 +
3−γ
4
2
f(γ)dγ
f(γ) = 2γ
∫ 1
0
1
2
2γdγ =
∫ 1
0
γdγ =
1
2
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After we have obtained these defuzzified numbers as the estimation of
the connection strengths, we can determine for every attack component the
ranking of the other nodes and then we can construct the adjacency matrix
of the attack tree by connecting the leaves to the best ranked vertices.
Example 5. In the simplest case we can represent the linguistic labels as
fuzzy sets with the membership function:
A(u) =
{
1 if u = c
0 otherwise
If we have 5 categories, we use the set {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}. The weights of
the outcomes are the frequencies of the linguistic labels. If we observe the
weights n0, n0.25, n0.5, n0.75, n1, then Aij is just the characteristic function of
the value:
4∑
i=0
n0.25i∑4
j=0 n0.25j
0.25i,
that is simply the sample mean value of our data. And according to the used
defuzzification method, the obtained connection estimation is this sample
mean.
The final result of the interaction between auditors is the attack tree,
shown in Fig.3.24.
In the Attack tree design module, auditors can calculate which path of
the attack tree is the most probable, the easiest and the least rational, and
can view all the lines of reasoning that can help to understand whether to
start or not the investigation. A useful instrument to retrieve past cases
often used in information retrieval is cosine similarity. If we have two sets
S1 and S2 then M = |S1 ∩ S2| is the number of common items between S1
and S2. The cosine similarity between S1 and S2 can be defined as
cos(S1, S2) =
M√|S1||S2| .
In our case S1 is the attack tree shown in Fig.3.24, which we want
to compare to another attack tree, stored in the database, S2 shown in
Fig.3.25. The similarity measure can be found using the method described
in Nanopoulos and Manopoulos (2002).
The number of edges is 14 and 8 in S1 and S2, respectively. Comparing
the two attack trees, it can be seen that they have 5 edges in common:
(transfer money to a personal account, log in), (transfer money to a personal
account, hijacking bank system), (log in, guessing), (guessing, guess ID),
(guessing, guess password). This means that M = 5 and the cosine similarity
is:
cos(S1, S2) =
M√
|S1||S2|
=
5√
8× 14 ≈ 0.47
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Figure 3.24: The final Attack tree
Figure 3.25: Another attack tree stored in the data-base
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Consensual modelling of the attack tree
In Buoni and Fedrizzi (2012), an extension of FIDES is described. First,
assuming that the opinions of experts involved in the design of the attack
tree are represented by fuzzy preference relations, we introduce a dynamical
consensus model aiming at finding a shared representation of the attack tree.
Second, assuming that the leaf nodes of the attack tree are attributes with
fuzzy number values and that the attributes are interdependent, we show
how to propagate the values up the tree through an aggregation process using
Choquet integral. First the consensual modelling and then the aggregation
process will be described in detail.
The consensual modelling of the attack tree allows the experts to build
the attack tree according to their opinions. In the attack tree design the
moderator can choose which nodes are parents (V) and which ones are leaves
(L), obtaining two sets
L = {l1, ..., ls} , V = {v1, ..., vt}
The individual preferences are represented as fuzzy preferences
P = L× V.
If P = {p1, . . . , pm} is a set of alternative connections and E{e1, . . . , eN}
is the set of experts, then the fuzzy preference relation of expert e1, Ri is
given by its membership function µi : P × P → [0, 1] such that
µi(pk, pl) = 1 if pk is definitely preferred over pl
∈ (0.5, 1), ifpk is preferred over pl,
= 0.5 if there is indifference between pk and pl
∈ (0, 0.5), if pl is preferred over pk
= 0, if pl is definitely preferred over pk
where i = 1 . . . , N and k, l = 1 . . . ,M.
Each individual fuzzy preference relation Ri can be represented by a
matrix
[rikl], r
i
kl = µi(ak, al).
Each decision maker i = 1, ..., n is represented by a pair of connected
nodes, a primary node (dynamic) and a secondary node (static).
The n primary nodes form a fully connected sub network and each of
them encodes the individual opinion of a single decision maker, denoted by
ri.
The n secondary nodes encode the individual opinions originally declared
by the decision makers, denoted by si, and each of them is connected only
with a single primary node.
Here, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that there are only two al-
ternatives available (m = 2), which means that each individual preference
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Figure 3.26: Scaling function f and sigmoid function f ′.
relation Ri has only one degree of freedom, denoted by xi = r
i
12 Accordingly
the preference relation declared by expert ei will be denoted si.
The iterative process of opinion transformation corresponds to the gra-
dient dynamics of a cost function W , depending on both the present and
the original network configurations, as introduced in (Fedrizzi et al., 1999)
and (Fedrizzi et al., 2007).
The value of W combines a measure V of the overall dissensus in the
present network configuration and a measure U of the overall change from
the original network configuration.
The diffusive interaction between primary nodes i and j is mediated
by the interaction coefficient vij ∈ (0, 1) , whereas the inertial interaction
between primary node i and the associated node j is mediated by the inter-
action coefficient ui ∈ (0, 1),
vij = f
′((xi − xj)2) and ui = f ′((xi − sj)2)
The values of the interaction coefficients are given by the following
derivative of scaling function (see Fig.3.26).
The value vi as well as the weighting coefficient v]i ∈ (0, 1) depend non-
linearly on the standard Euclidean distance between the opinion xi and xj
vi =
∑
j 6=i vij
n− 1
x¯i =
∑
j 6=i vijxj∑
j 6=i vij
The individual disagreement cost V (i) is given by
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vi =
∑
j 6=i v(i, j)
n− 1
where V (ij) = f((xi − xj)2) and the individual opinion changing cost is
U(i) = f((xi − sj)2).
Summing over the various experts we obtain the collective disagreement
cost V = 14
∑
i V (i) and the inertial cost U =
1
2
∑
i U(i) ,where 1/4 and 1/2
are conventional multiplicative factors.
Then the full cost function is W = (1− λ)V + λU with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1
The consensual network dynamic acts on the individual preference xi
through the iterative process xi → x′ = xi − ǫ∂W∂xi based on the gradient
term
∂V
∂xi
= vi(xi − x¯i) .
We can analyse the dynamical effect of the components V and U sepa-
rately. The dissensus cost V induces a non linear process of diffusion based
on the gradient term
∂V
∂xi
= (xi − x¯i)
As a result, the iterative step of the non-linear diffusion mechanism cor-
responds to a convex combination (with sufficiently small ǫ) between the
opinion value xi and the weighted average x¯i of the remaining preference
values xj ,
x′i = (1− ǫVi)xi + ǫvix¯i
The inertial cost leads to a non-linear mechanism which opposes changes
from the original opinion value xi, by means of the gradient term
∂U
∂xi
= ui(xi − si)
The full dynamics associated with function W=(V+D)/2 acts iteratively
on each decision maker i through convex combinations of the opinion value
xi , the average opinion value x¯i, and the original opinion value si, in the
following way
x′i = (1− ǫ(vi + ui)xi) + ǫvix¯i + ǫuisi
At this point the expert ei is in dynamical equilibrium, in the sense that
x′ = xi, if the following equation holds
xi = (vix¯i + uisi)/(vi + ui)
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Choquet-based evaluation
In many applications of attack trees the main problem is to promulgate
information contained in leaves to other nodes, up the tree until it reaches
the root node. This process is carried out by aggregation operations occur-
ring at the ”and/or” nodes. There are different systems of aggregation that
can be suitable for different cases. An extensive overview of these methods
can be seen in Beliakov et al. (2007) and Grabish et al. (2009).
The most used one is the weighted average. The limitation of this method
is that it is a compensative method, which means that it is not possible to
appreciate the interactions among the attributes. The Ordered Weighted
Aggregation (OWA) method, introduced by Yager (1988) depends on the
order positions of the child nodes, but it does not consider the possible in-
teraction between the nodes. One way of solving this limitation of OWA
operators is to introduce the Choquet integral (Choquet, 1953), which can
take into account the interaction between nodes, ranging from redundancy
(negative interaction) to synergy (positive interaction). Choquet integral
is also mathematically well founded (Klement et al., 2010) and applied in
many problems in multi-criteria and multi-attribute decision models (Gra-
bish, 1996; Grabish and Labreuche, 2010).
The main scope we want to achieve by introducing the Choquet integral
is to combine the inputs in such a way that not only the importance of
individual inputs, but also the importance of the coalition is considered.
This means that an input, not relevant by itself, can become significant when
merged with some other inputs. It is easy to show how weighted arithmetic
and OWA operators are particular cases of Choquet integral with respect to
additive and symmetric capacities respectively.
Consider a finite set of elements N = {1, 2, 3, ..., n}. A (discrete) fuzzy
measure µ (also called capacity) defined on N is a set function µ : 2n → [0, 1]
satisfying:
1) µ(⊘) = 0, µ(N) = 1 (border conditions),
2) S ⊆ T =⇒ µ(S) 6 µ(T ),∀ S, T ⊆ N (monotonocity condition)
Given two coalitions S, T ⊆ N , with S ∩ T = ⊘, the fuzzy measure is
said to be additive if µ(S ∪ T ) = µ(S) + µ(T ) , sub-additive if µ(S ∪ T ) <
µ(S) + µ(T ) and super-additive if µ(S ∪ T ) > µ(S) + µ(T ) with respect to
the two coalitions S, T .
Definition 4. Let µ be a fuzzy measure on N. The discrete Choquet integral
of a function f : N −→ [0, 1] with respect to µ is defined by
∫
fdµ = Cµ(f(1), .., f(n)) =
n∑
i=1
[f((i))− f((i− 1))]µ(A(i))
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where (i) indicates a permutation on N so that f((1)) ≤ f((2)) ≤ . . . ≤
f((n)) and A(i) = {(i), ..., (n)}. Also f((0))=0.
From now on we call f(i) = xi so the Choquet integral of the vector
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ [0, 1]n with respect to the fuzzy measure µ is the following
Cµ(x1, . . . , xn) =
n∑
i=1
(x(i) − x(i−1))µ(A(i))
where xi ∈ (x1, ..., xn), x1 ≤ x2, . . . ,≤ xn,Ai = {(i), ..., (n)}, and x0 = 0.
The Choquet integral then is nothing else other than a linear combina-
tion of the marginal gains (differences) between the ordered criteria. An
alternative way of writing the Choquet integral is
Cµ(x1, . . . , xn) =
n∑
i=1
x(i)(µ(A(i))− µ(A(i+1)))
where A(n+1) = ⊘.
The Choquet integral satisfies different properties described in Grabish
(1996) , Marichal (1988) and Ghirardato (2000).
In this section, we will need the following essential properties (for all
x, x′ ∈ [0, 1]n)
xi ≤ x′i =⇒ Cµ(x1, x2 . . . , xn) ≤ Cµ(x′1, x′2, . . . , x′n)(Monotonicity)
xi ≤ x′i =⇒ Cµ(x1, x2 . . . , xn) < Cµ(x′1, x′2, . . . , x′n)(Strict Monotonicity)
min(x1, x2, . . . , xn) ≤ Cµ(x1, x2 . . . , xn) ≤ max(x1, x2, . . . , xn)
Choquet integral is continuous and if the fuzzy measure is additive, it
coincides with the weighted average, and if every subset with the same
cardinality has the same measure, it collapses into the OWA operator (Fodor
et al., 1995; Grabish, 1995a).
In the Choquet-based evaluation process the problem is to promulgate
the information up the tree over the nodes, taking into consideration the
interaction between them, which can be redundant (negative interaction) or
synergetic (positive interaction). The estimation of the attribute value is
performed adopting the possibility measure, representing the numeric im-
precision of attributes’ values using unimodal LR fuzzy numbers, which are
defined by
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A(x) =


L
(
a− x
a1
)
a− a1 ≤ x ≤ a,
R
(
x− a
a2
)
a ≤ x ≤ a+ a2
0 else,
where ∈ R is the peak of A , α = a− a1 ≤ 0 and β = a2 − a ≤ 0 are the
left and right spread, respectively, and L, R : [0, 1] → [0,1] are two strictly
continuous shape functions such that L(0)= R(0)= 1 and L(1)= R(1)= 0.
By extending the Choquet integral to a fuzzy domain several forms of
information can be handled at the same time like crisp data, interval values,
linguistic variables (Yang et al., 2005). The Choquet integral then is defined
for a measurable interval valued function (Aumann, 1965), and then it is ex-
tended to fuzzy integrand using alpha-cuts (Grabish, 1995b). We introduce
the following notations:
• I is the set of interval numbers (rectangular fuzzy numbers)
• N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a set of the elements
• F : N → I is an interval-valued function
• FL(i) and FR(i) are the left end point and the right end point of the
interval F (x), respectively
• F is the set of all unimodal LR-type fuzzy numbers
• [LAα,R Aα] is the alpha cut of the fuzzy number A
• Φ : N → F is a unimodal LR fuzzy valued function
• F , is the set of all the attack trees with unimodal LR fuzzy numbers
as leaves values
Given a measurable fuzzy-valued function Φ(i) on N and a fuzzy measure
µ on 2N , the Choquet integral of Φ(i) with respect to µ is defined as
∫
Φdµ =
⋃
0≤α≤1
α
∫
Φαdµ
Given a measurable interval-valued function Φ(i)α and the fuzzy measure
µ on 2N , the continuous Choquet integral of Φ(i)α with respect to µ is∫
Φαdµ =
[∫
ΦαLdµ,
∫
ΦαRdµ
]
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which becomes
∫
Φdµ
⋃
0≤α≤1
α =
[∫
ΦαLdµ,
∫
ΦαRdµ
]
Consider now a tree in F whose leaves’ values are unimodal LR fuzzy
numbers. Based on the fact that the Choquet integral of unimodal LR fuzzy
numbers is still an unimodal LR fuzzy number as it was proved in Bortot et
al (2011), the algorithm proceeds as described below:
1. The alpha cut of each unimodal LR fuzzy number in the leaves will be
considered using a suitable grid.
2. The procedure receives the extremes of the alpha-cut, and computes
the aggregated value for both the lower and the upper bounds. Increas-
ing the values of alpha in between [0,1], the two computed values, form
an interval included in the previous ones (for lower value of alpha).
3. Thus the obtained intervals form the alpha-cuts of the fuzzy root, i.e.
the required solution.
In this chapter FIDES and its components have been introduced and
described in detail. The main contribution of FIDES is the novelty of a
system that combines Think-map, Delphi method and attack-tree. Based
on the suggestions and feed-back obtained from the audit-team of the bank,
the system mirrors real world anti-fraud procedures performed by banking
experts.
FIDES improves the interaction between auditors and inspectors, short-
ening the time between the inspection and the final evaluation. The building
of the attack tree is mathematically well founded and rigorously defined step
by step.
Delphi method, used to create the attack tree, combines formal rigour
and respect for human reasoning and the decision-making process. Usually
hypotheses, introduced in decision-making processes, are based on the full
rationality of the agents and perfect information. In FIDES uncertainty and
lack of information, because of the intrinsic nature of fraud and anti-fraud
procedures, are the natural conditions for the auditors to work in. The
power of the system is to turn uncertainty into an opportunity to expand
the set of different/possible interpretations of fraud paths. Also in the risk
management phase, when the attack tree is created, the decision to choose
a certain path can follow non-rational reasoning. The least-probable path
can be chosen or the most expensive one, according to the intuition of the
experts and the circumstances of the moment.
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On the other hand, if the users are free to create unconventional decision
paths, the procedure they use instead to achieve a shared solution is very
well structured and methodical.
FIDES in other words combines the creativity of the decision-making
process with the rationality of the procedure used in creating knowledge.
FIDES is not only a DSS for fraud detection, but an instrument for creat-
ing knowledge that can be re-used in the future. In order for information
to be re-used, it must be processed and stored in a well structured and
semantically defined way.
In this sense a DSS like FIDES can be seen as an intermediary step in
the path towards creating an autonomous knowledge-based system in the
future.
3.5 SWOT analysis of FIDES
The SWOT analysis is one of the most popular tools to analyse strengths
and weaknesses of a system and to offer valid suggestions to improve it. In
this section a SWOT analysis will be carried out for FIDES.
Strengths
A strong success element of FIDES is that it has been built around the
needs auditors have collected and expressed; FIDES was developed according
to their suggestions and based on a continuous process of verification moving
between the literature and the bank world. FIDES can be used as an anti-
fraud system, but also in a proactive way to prevent future potential fraud;
once suspect behaviors are reported to the audit team similar schemes can
be detected. A third strength of FIDES is flexibility, since it can be used
in all the contexts where an interaction between external inspectors and a
central risk management unit plays a fundamental role.
Weaknesses (or Limitations)
There are some limitations of FIDES due to its complexity. One difficulty
will be in its implementation as different tools with specialized features
are problematic to integrate with each other. Another limitation is the
validation of the system. Since the frequency of internal fraud is very low
and sometimes up to 20 years may be needed to collect a few dozen relevant
cases, a validation process in the traditional positivistic sense is not possible.
Opportunities
A system such as FIDES would permit a bank to shorten the inspection
and reporting system time. Saving time is a key factor in fraud detection,
which allows auditors to develop a timely counter-strategy to block potential
fraudulent activities. There are substantial possibilities for improvement in
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the attack tree building procedure in FIDES. This can greatly improve the
detection process and consequently save time and money; thus FIDES has
a great future potential. Auditors could use it as a learning tool to study
old cases stored in the system and create an automatic detection system to
help their work.
Threats
The decision to adopt the system by banks (or other organisations) could
be an issue for the auditors since users are nowadays unwilling to use many
different tools to complete a single (even complex) task.
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Chapter 4
Fraud detection processes
In this chapter, a distinction is made between ICT and human-based fraud.
ICT-based fraud are based on hacking attacks and characterized normally
by high frequency and low damage.
Human-based fraud have low frequency with high damage and involve
the intervention of human actors (for instance, in faking documents man-
ually) and the main cause of their success is conflict of interests. Human
based fraud are perpetrated not necessarily because of greed, but for in-
stance to improve the reputation of the perpetrator (a bank director wants
to show better performance to obtain a promotion). ICT and human based
fraud can be combined, for instance when a hacker uses the support of a
bank employee to obtain information to finalize his/her fraudulent scheme.
ICT based and human based fraud will be described in paragraph 4.2 and
4.3, respectively. In paragraph 4.3, the role of this distinction is explained.
4.1 ICT based
ICT-based fraud deals with attacks perpetrated by hackers in order to obtain
information and/or to steal money. This phenomenon is growing thanks
to the development of e-commerce, on-line banking and credit card usage.
These methods use malware, Trojans or other schemes, aiming at cheating
the users and/or stealing their identities. In the following paragraphs a few
of these schemes will be discussed, focusing on e-commerce; the examples
are taken from the Teach-Ict website1.
In online auctions, once the buyer wins an auction, the amount of
the bid is paid, but sometimes the items are not delivered. This can also
happen in the case of an on-line store purchase. Another form of fraud is
the offer to work at home and make a fortune. Initially, customers of
this fake service are asked to pay a fee in order to receive a kit with all the
1http://www.teach-ict.com/gcse/theory/fraud/miniweb/index.htm
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information to start up the activity. When the payment is made, the kit
they receive consists of only advertisements material such as pamphlets.
Other forms of fraud involve the promise of a loan after the payment
of a fee.
Phishing is a fraud technique used by criminals to steal information
such as credit card and social security numbers, user IDs and passwords to
gain access to bank accounts. Criminals can set up a website that appears
to be a legitimate one, for instance of a bank or an insurance company and
capture user’s attention by sending an email with a link that apparently
points to the real website, but instead leads to the fake one. They ask the
victim to send sensitive information such as credit card numbers and security
access codes which can be used to withdraw money from the victim.
Key logging software is another fraud technique. Fraudsters send an
attachment in a form of a photograph, but once it is opened, software is
installed on the computer in order to register all the keys that have been
typed. Finally, a record with all the keystrokes is transferred to the hacker’s
computer. After receiving the data, the hacker starts to use the password
to log in to a website previously visited by the victim (for example, on-line
bank account).
Identity theft is the most common way to create fraud. Many of the
fraud schemes do not require the use of brute force to break into security
systems but aim to steal sensitive information from the victims employing
different ”creative” methods.
In UK, the estimated number of identity fraud victims is more than
100,000, at a cost of £1.3 billion annually.
The most common type of identity fraud is credit card fraud. 2
The simplest form of identity fraud indeed can take place at a restaurant,
when people forget the original copy of their credit card receipts, which
contains the credit card number. These copies can be used to make purchases
on the net. Personal information can be acquired in many ways: memorized
by clerks and waiters, removed from different bills, stolen from employee
files or a hospital record. Employers can be bribed to provide personal
information of their employees and clerks can put skimmers on credit card
machines in order to record personal data.
It is important to observe that in the ICT fraud, involving electronic
payments, there is also a strong human component. Identity theft is the
main goal of fraudsters’ activity in order to use the information to log into
the banking systems.
This aspect contradicts the traditional rhetoric of investments in security,
which states that the improvement in technology in terms of computational
power is the main focus. Investment in the latest security systems is some-
2http://money.howstuffworks.com/identity-theft1.htm
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thing that cannot be avoided, due to the fact that hackers can develop newer
and more sophisticated methods, but in order for institutions and private
companies to avoid wastage of resources the decision to invest in sophisti-
cated ICT countermeasures has to deal with the discussed trivial methods
that are largely applied in real world, otherwise the organisation may run
the risk of investing in the perception of security instead of security itself. In
the next paragraph human based fraud and its relation to ICT-based ones
will be discussed and investigated from the perspective of the architecture
of FIDES.
4.2 Human factors based fraud
In the previous paragraph, the strong human component in ICT-based fraud
have been demonstrated, since the easiest way to gain access to a payment
system is to acquire username and password by using different techniques.
The main difference between human and ICT-based fraud is the key-
factor: in human-based fraud it is conflict of interest. In the case of a cus-
tomer fraud in a bank, a director of a branch who has friendly relationships
with his/her customers is a likely scenario. Customers, who have limited
experience in finance or place too much trust in the director or the finance
expert of the bank may decide to instruct the ”expert” to invest the money
on the basis of the ”do what you think is right” principle. This excess of
trust, of course, implies that customers do not pay close attention to trans-
actions in their account, leaving the manager free to perpetrate his fraud
scheme. Another crucial difference is the scope of the fraud: in the case of
ICT-based fraud, the focus is personal enrichment or secret information as
industrial espionage, but for human based fraud it can be reputation, the
possibility of obtaining a promotion, or as the banality hypothesis suggests
just a short-cut to be competitive in the market. This can be the case also
in tax fraud, where specialised accountants or inside lawyers are handsomely
paid to find all the possible ways to, in the best case scenario, elude taxes
or, in the worst one, evade them. The real danger related to human based
fraud is the involvement of employees in criminal organisations. The rea-
sons for this involvement can be various: to obtain loan because of their
problematic situation; they are paid by criminals to act as informers and
Trojan horses inside that institution (bank, public office); they operate un-
der constant threat from the criminal organisations. This is the main reason
why more focus should be on human based fraud, not only for the economic
impact, but for detecting members of big criminal organisations and their
illegal business. These fraud schemes are often just the tip of the iceberg of
more complex activities.
In FIDES, electronic systems that are able to generate alarms in case of
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intrusion, can be used as sentinels in the Information Filtering Module. All
these alarms, which can be associated with suspicious behaviours reported
by whistle-blowers, have to be evaluated by inspectors, who have to decide
whether or not to start the evaluation process. Already in the filtering
phase, inspectors, being aware of the links between electronic attacks and the
human support that is needed to finalize them (faking documents, identity
theft), can use their experience to find connections between the digital and
behavioural side of fraud.
In this sense FIDES endorses the idea of technology as a support for
human decisions and not an instrument of truth and total control managed
by an autonomous system.
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Chapter 5
Fraud in other contexts
In this chapter fraud in other contexts will be introduced such as in the
insurance and the public sector. The first paragraph will be dedicated to
the Insurance industry. The second one will focus on fraud in the European
Union and public sector. In the third paragraph, money laundering is high-
lighted. Even though money laundering is not the main topic of this thesis,
it deserves a general view because of the strong relationship to fraud and its
importance in the banking sector. Finally, we will explore the potential of
FIDES in these different contexts.
5.1 Insurance industry
The Insurance industry is one of most critical sectors affected by fraud.
The Insurance industry includes different areas; California Department of
Insurance (2012) provides a list of the most common insurance areas and
typologies of fraud.
• Automobile Property. In car insurance there are several ways of
committing fraud. There is the possibility of faking damages in order
to obtain a bigger refund or inflating the damage by making a deal on
the bill with the body repairer. Another common technique is vehicle
arson (setting fire usually on an old vehicle in order to obtain from
the insurance a higher sum of money than one would get if the car
was sold in the market (Insurance fraud hotline, 2012)). This type of
fraud also poses a danger to the surrounding properties and people.
• Medical. It is hard to estimate the level of Healthcare fraud in USA.
Healthcare fraud expert and Harvard University Professor Malcolm
K.Sparrow estimates the loss as hundreds of billions of dollars per year
(Aldrich, 2010). The most common healthcare fraud schemes include:
inflated billing by any medical facility, doctor, dentist, chiropractor,
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laboratory, etc; falsified billing (pharmacist can falsify billing in order
to distribute drugs without medical prescription).
• Life. In this case the fraud involves identity fraud schemes, since the
aim is to give the false identity of a dead person or fake information
in the death report.
• Workers’ Compensation. This category includes situations where
employers commit illegal acts against employees (such as having unin-
sured employees). Misclassification of the worker typology in order
to obtain higher compensation from the insurance company is a typ-
ical example. Another example is to classify a roofer as a clerk; the
same goal can be achieved by misrepresenting the payroll showing an
under-reported wage or injuries history.
• Fire. This type of fraud includes all those attempts to burn down
commercial activities, private houses, in order to receive compensation.
Another way is to exaggerate the loss in the claim form.
• Property. Property fraud takes place when damage to a property is
fabricated in order to claim compensation. It can be done on private
houses or offices in order to obtain a refund. Fabricating theft, claiming
that the object was inside a property (car, house) is another scheme
adopted to obtain a refund from the insurance company.
• Healthcare. An example of healthcare fraud is identity theft when
identity is stolen in order to secure healthcare benefits. There are cases
where patients are recruited to request medical procedures without
necessarily using these services afterwards. Fraud can be perpetrated
also by pharmacies when they inflate or falsify bills or codes. Disability
is another area where fraud can be committed: patients continue to
receive benefits even after the temporary disability is over.
In insurance fraud, India represents an interesting case. It is one of
fastest growing economies amongst the BRIC countries and as a conse-
quence, insurance fraud is on the rise as well.
In the Ernest and Young report (Ernst & Young, 2011) authors point
out how the results and patterns are very similar to the ones observed in
the UK, in particular in the area of claims.
The survey, as shown in Figure 5.1 is based on 51 respondents includ-
ing CXO (Chief Executive Officers 29%) , agents (23%), internal audit &
head compliance officers (22%), MD/Director (16%) and middle manage-
ment (10%). 40% of the respondents declared that in the institution where
they work they do not have an anti-fraud department. 40% of the respon-
dents agreed that there has been a rising of insurance fraud during the last
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Figure 5.1: Profile of respondents (Ernst & Young, 2011)
Figure 5.2: Fraud risk exposure faced by insurance company (Ernst &
Young, 2011)
year. The survey identifies three broad fraud categories: policy holder and
claims fraud, intermediary fraud and internal fraud.
The first category includes fraud against the insurer by a policyholder
and/or other parties in the purchase and/or execution of an insurance prod-
uct. The second category includes the fraud perpetrated by intermediaries
against insurers and/or policyholders. The third category is the one where
employees in collusion with other employees commit fraud against the in-
surance company. The five risk areas of Insurance companies are shown in
Fig. 5.2.
The three major risk areas are the following ones: claims/surrender
(27%), Premium (21.2%) and Employee related (20.5 %). An example of
claim fraud is travel abroad for surgery without disclosing it; a premium
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Figure 5.3: Different types of fraud affecting insurance companies (Ernst &
Young, 2011)
related fraud is commission rebating. ”Rebating is defined as giving a cus-
tomer something of monetary value in exchange for making a purchase. This
is usually conceived of as cash discounts, but can include expensive gifts, free
trips or concert tickets, prizes, anything of significant value1”. According
to 50% of respondents in the Ernest and Young report, the areas that re-
quire more regulation are claims and surrender. 27% of respondents declared
that applications constitute the second largest risk exposure for fraud that
requires more regulation. In this area there is concern about money launder-
ing activities. The authors (Ernst & Young, 2011) suggest that institutions
should invest more in the Know Your Custumer (KYC) strategy. Some
of these recommendations include a centralized KYC database and the use
of intelligent systems to monitor and screen the negative list against third
party databases.
As shown in Fig.5.3, misselling (fraudulent misrepresentation of material
information) constitutes the most important cause of fraud for the respon-
dents. The second cause is collusion between parties in 29% of the cases and
fake documentation is the third one with 24% of the cases. Examples of fake
documentation fraud in the life insurance business include submitting fake
medical test reports and age proof falsified by agents. More than 80% of
the respondents estimates that fraud can increase the costs for the insurer
by 1% to 5%.
1http://www.ehow.com/about_6111979_insurance-rebating_.html
82
Many indicators in this report confirm that there is room for imple-
menting IS to support existing anti-fraud units; 40% of respondents indeed
claimed that they do not have a dedicated anti-fraud department in their
organisation; 43% of the respondents use manual red flags as a means to
detect fraud in their organisation and a systematic screening is done for less
than 25% of the key vendors and employees in their organisation. Once
again the survey indicates that the most used mechanism to detect fraud is
whistle-blowing followed by internal audit.
According to the report insurance fraud can be classified in two cate-
gories: hard and soft. Hard fraud occurs when people report a false injury
for an accident. Soft fraud occurs when people either lie to their insurance
companies or hide certain information for financial gain.
Insurance sectors can benefit from the ICT methodology techniques de-
scribed in chapter 2. Arson fraud on vehicles and houses are usually assigned
to experts who have to find clues in order to prove the fraudulent nature of
the fire. Since the evaluation process still lacks in scientific methodologies
a fuzzy reasoning experts system using objective criteria could help experts
calibrate their opinions and reach a common consensus. Inflated medical
bills can be detected using statistical methods based on outlier detection or
neural networks. Knowledge based systems can only be applied with high
maintenance cost and large amounts of data: these systems can provide
solutions for big companies with complex structures and resources.
5.2 Fraud in the European Union and public sec-
tor
The European institution responsible for protecting the European Union
from fraud, corruption and any other illegal activity is known as OLAF (Of-
fice europen de Lutte Antifraude). OLAF (2011) investigates EU members
and staff, protects the reputation of European institutions and supports the
EU in implementing anti-fraud prevention and detection procedures. OLAF
also conducts external investigations in Member States of the EU. The huge
amount of information about suspected cases, whistle-blowing and potential
fraud activities is managed by a web-based tool, the Fraud Notification Sys-
tem (FNS). Using the website of OLAF2 it is possible to report information
in 4 steps:
• Submit an initial questionnaire
• Attach document if possible
• Create a password-protected account
2
Available at http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/index_en.html
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Figure 5.4: Duration of assessment and instances of assessment and prelim-
inary review completed in each calendar year (OLAF, 2011)
Figure 5.5: Amounts recovered from closed financial follow ups in e milion
in each calendar year (OLAF, 2011)
• Communicate with an investigator via a ”blind” mailbox into which
both parties can drop off messages
In 88% of the cases most of the informants fall into 3 main categories:
the general public, the European Commission and member State authori-
ties. OLAF, once it verifies the trustworthiness and the fulfilment of certain
conditions, offers protection to whistle-blowers.
In the report authors underline the importance of anonymity in the
FNS and the cooperation between OLAF operators, national authorities
and Member States, which has to put in place good quality control instru-
ments and implement anti-fraud measures. The report specifies that OLAF
is an organisation driven by the ”learning by doing” principle. Based on this
principle, OLAF uses the experience of its experts to examine new cases in
the light of the mistakes and improvements of previous cases. In the first
phase of OLAF methodology, evaluators perform an initial scan of the re-
ports before recommending the most serious cases to the Director General,
who can decide to open the case or not.
Before the introduction of this methodology (2004), the average time for
the assessment of a case was 10.6 months (in 2002). By analysing Fig. 5.4
one can appreciate the benefits of the introduction of this procedure in 2006
and the following years. Years 2009 and 2010 show a significant increase,
but the numbers are still considerably lower than in 2002.
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In Fig. 5.5, the amounts recovered in different sectors in 2010 are listed:
the structural fund sector (e32.9 million), followed by agriculture (e11.9
million) and direct expenditure (10.6 e). Ongoing cases have resulted so far
in a further e351.2 million.
We report four fraud cases in EU as they appear in Open Europe (2008).
Belgian city spends e12 million on junkets and dinners: A secret
account containing non-declared funds of the Belgian city of Charleroi was
discovered in 2007. The account had been used to illegally put away EU
funds that the town had received - amounting to some e12 million. The
account was apparently used to fund a whole range of junkets and dinners.
For instance, a delegation of members of the ruling Socialist Party (PS) used
the money to go to Belarus on a hunting trip. The city’s Secretary, and
current President of the Walloon Parliament, Bernard Bermils Jos Happart
was among the travellers. Happart defended himself saying, ”If I’m invited,
I don’t ask where the money has come from”. Bizarrely, the party was also
handed an illegal $ 3,000 cash donation from the Embassy.
e50 million to ”ghost farmers” : The EU paid out approximately
50 million euros during the period 2001-2004 to farmers in southern Italy,
for buying and selling surpluses of citrus fruits under the EU’s Common
Agricultural Policy. However it was later revealed that the farmers, buyers
and even the fruit did not actually exist.
Bulgarian fraudsters steal e9.6 million of EU funds : Bulgar-
ian ”businessmen” Mario Nikolov and Ljudmil Stojkov, who have close ties
with the Bulgarian President, siphoned off e9.6 million from the EUs Agri-
cultural and Rural Development SAPARD program. Nikolov and Stojkov
used false documents on numerous occasions to import used meat processing
and packing machines, which they presented as brand new, in turn allowing
them to purchase the machines with SAPARD funds. Stoykov has also been
charged separately with money laundering.
MEPs ”misuse” £100m worth of staff allowances : Senior MEPs
and EU officials tried to hush up an internal audit that found severe problems
and endemic misuse of funds worth at least £98.4 million a year, more than
£125,000 for each of the 785 Euro-MPs. Many MEPs were found to be
diverting office payments to ’service providers’, which were supposed to be
accountants, professionals or companies delivering administrative services.
But in many cases the whole allowance was paid to a single individual or
MEP’s member of staff.
Another sensitive target for fraud is the public Sector. The cabinet Office
Counter Fraud (2011) report estimates the amount of fraud in the public
sector in UK to be £21 billion, that is 55% of the nation’s total fraud loss.
In October 2010, the Government established the Counter Fraud Task
Force. In January 2011, in order to support the Task force in fighting fraud,
the Cabinet Office created a network of Counter Fraud Champions (CFC)
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in every department. The Task Force has four priorities:
• Collaboration: all departments in the public sector must work to-
gether sharing information on fraudsters and perform data analysis.
• Assessment of Risk and measurement of losses: losses must be
reported via quarterly data summary.
• Prevention: prevention is a priority and where most of resources and
investment should go.
• Zero tolerance: the public sector does not follow the economic im-
perative and there is no acceptable level of fraud.
As shown in Fig.5.6 tax fraud is the area with the biggest loss, including
£7 billion from tax evasion, £3 billion from lost taxes in the hidden econ-
omy and £5 billion lost in criminal attacks. Another important loss is in
Procurement Fraud. Typically this kind of fraud consists of collusion be-
tween suppliers using falsified or duplicated receipts. Another £515m is lost
to grant fraud each year. In this case there are applications from fictitious
organisations or individuals for public funds. It includes cases where funds
are not used for the purpose of the application once they are obtained.
Amongst the recommendations and suggestions to improve fraud detec-
tion and prevention, authors mention the establishment of a repository of
fraud related information and supporting material. They also encourage
the promotion of an e-learning tool to train personnel and improve their
awareness of fraud.
Large organisations such as the EU and governmental institutions are
particularly suitable for implementing complex knowledge based systems,
since they are rich in human and economic resources and they have to deal
with heterogeneous data. Almost all the techniques could be applied in
organisations like OLAF or the EU by crossing different databases. Given
the huge amount of data in these organisations, there is high potential for
implementing a proactive approach to create case-based scenarios dealing
with different parameters. EU fraud cases or tax evasion in the public
sector can be detected using traditional statistical techniques, looking for
outliers deviating from the usual behaviours and analysing discrepancies
by matching different databases (owning a luxury car or a boat with low
personal income).
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Figure 5.6: Fraud in public sector in UK (The cabinet Office Counter Fraud,
2011)
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5.3 Money laundering
Money laundering is defined by the Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dic-
tionary3 as ”the crime of moving money that has been obtained illegally
through banks and other businesses to make it seem as if the money has
been obtained legally.” Money laundering business is the main instrument
of organised crime to legitimise their money coming mostly from drug and
arms trafficking, terrorism, racketeering and prostitution. The necessity of
laundering money is related to the danger of storing large amounts of cash.
The main difference between money laundering and fraud is the purpose of
the two activities: in fraud, the aim is to take advantage in economic terms
or improve your reputation; in money laundering the purpose is to hide
the origin of illicit business. Once the money is laundered, the launderer
can manage a perfectly genuine business. Revenues from this legal business
can be reinvested in the same business or they can be used to buy illegal
products and start the cycle again. To perform a money laundering scheme,
criminals frequently use fraud techniques as well. An example is identity
fraud, often used to hide identity in money laundering schemes.
OECD (2006) provides various example of identity fraud schemes used
in money laundering and tax evasion with a list of the most vulnerable
industries. Tax evasion is another example of fraud activity that can be
used to hide the origin of dirty money.
Spreutels and Grijseeels (2000) point out that the most significant differ-
ence between tax evasion and money laundering is that in tax evasion funds
are moved to a single location while in the case of money laundering funds
are moved to several offshore locations. The authors suggest that tax eva-
sion for money laundering purposes implies a higher level of sophistication
compared to traditional tax evasion. On the other hand people pay taxes on
legal activities to legitimate the origin of their income coming from illegal
activities.
This can be done by using the money to run a legal business, investing in
the real estate market, or simply adding the cash into the till cash machine
at the counter, pretending that it is part of business, (owning a restaurant
for instance), as suggested by (Brewer, 2007).
Money laundering processes can be divided into three main phases as
described in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF, 2005):
Placement. In the placement stage the launderer introduces his illegal
profits into the financial system (e.g. depositing the money with a bank or
an insurance company).
Layering. In the second stage the launderer separates the criminal
proceeds from their source by the creation of layers of transactions designed
3
Available at http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/
money-laundering
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to disguise the audit trail and provide the appearance of legitimacy. He/she
will process the funds in possibly several transactions through the financial
services sector by purchasing various financial instruments. The purpose of
the transactions is to break the (paper) trail between funds and their origin.
Integration. In the final stage of integration the criminal proceeds
are treated as legitimate. If layering has succeeded, integration places the
criminal proceeds back into the economy in such a way that they appear to
be legitimate funds or assets.
The following high risk areas are specified in FATF (2005) :
• Insurance Industry
• PEPs (politically exposed persons)
• Wire transfers (Complex wire transfer schemes). Currently, there are
a limited number of indicators to help identify potential terrorist wire
transfers.
• NPOs (non-profit organisations) ;
High risk products and services (Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, 2002)
• Electronic Banking
• Private Banking Relationships;
High-Risk Customers
• Non-bank Financial Institutions (NBFI)
• Non-governmental organisations (charitable organisations)
• Offshore corporations.
FATF members have noticed an increase in schemes involving gatekeep-
ers. Gatekeepers provide a range of services, such as providing advice,
preparing legal documentation and carrying out certain types of financial
transaction. One typical example, for instance, can be the purchase of real
estate.
In Reuter and Truman (2004) a list of the most common money laun-
dering techniques is provided:
• Smurfing: this involves breaking down cash deposits into amounts
below the reporting threshold of $ 10,000. Couriers (smurfs) are used
to make deposits in several banks.
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• Informal value transfer systems (hawalas): hawalas is an Arabic
word for a particular underground banking system, where the hawal-
adar can personally carry cash from country A to country B, taking
care of all the service, from placement to integration.
• Wire electronic funds transfers: funds can be transferred by smurf-
ing to a principal collecting account, often located abroad in an offshore
financial center.
• Legitimate business ownership: ”dirty” money can simply be
added to the revenues of legal (cash intensive) activities (bar, restau-
rants).
• Shell corporation: these are set up, usually offshore, complete with
bank accounts; money can reside there in the layering phase.
• Real estate transactions: properties can be bought and sold under
a false name or for a shell corporation.
• Overvaluing imports: if an imported product is overvalued, the
foreign exporter receives an inflated value for the product, and wealth
is shifted from the domestic importer to the foreign exporter.
• Undervaluing exports: the money launderer converts his illegal
money into products by purchasing products for cash at the market
price. The products are then exported to a foreign colluding importer
at below market prices. The foreign importer receives the undervalued
exports and resells them in the market at the real prices that reflect
their true value.
The success of these two last schemes is a consequence of lack of con-
trols by the governments in import-export activities.
• Casinos: chips are bought with cash. After a certain period, since
casinos have establishments in different countries, they can be moved
to other casinos and the customers can receive cash to purchase goods.
• Self-money laundering: the laundering of one’s own money.
Figure 5.7 represents the universe of transactions. By analysing the
scheme it is possible to appreciate the interaction between the illegal and the
legal world and the complexity of the problem. We can divide transactions
into four main groups:
• Legal/Usual: in everyday life we withdraw money, with a certain
frequency (once a week, for instance).
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Figure 5.7: Universe of transactions
• Legal/Unusual: sometimes the number of our withdrawals can be
unusual in terms of the amount or frequency, according to our usual
behaviour. In that case the bank can call to verify if we are still in
possession of the ATM card or credit card.
• Illegal/Usual: these are typical transactions and procedures that
banks can easily identify as illegal according to their experience.
• Illegal/Unusual: these ones are the most difficult to detect because
they are not typical or common or are still unknown.
The main problem with money laundering is that the transactions in-
volved can belong to all these four categories, creating a sort of grey zone
where legal and illegal activities are mixed, as a result of complicated schemes.
The money launderers’ activities consist of moving money from the legal to
the illegal world and what seems to be legal business actually hides an illegal
activity. It is almost impossible to detect these small transactions and at
the same time connect them with unusual behaviours. How can we define
”suspicious behaviour”? In practice the real challenge is not to separate
all the single transactions, but to find a meaningful path between transac-
tions and associate them with suspicious behaviour like a sudden change of
life style or typical money laundering red flags. Suspicious behaviours re-
lated to bank activities include: reluctance to provide personal information,
customers with multiple bank accounts, frequent deposit and withdrawals
without any business activity to justify these operations, activity within high
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risk areas and with non cooperative countries listed by FAFT4. A general
view on money laundering, a list of red flags and suspicious behaviours can
be found in the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council manual
(FFICE, 2010).
The OECD (2006) report shows how the real estate sector tax evasion
can hide money laundering schemes. Three ways of concealing ownership are
used: a) onshore acquisitions through off-shore companies and/or through
a complex structure of ownership; b) unreported acquisition of properties
overseas; and c) use of nominees. In the same report the role of fraud
detection schemes in uncovering ML schemes is specified, since there are
no specific techniques to identify the tax payer or money launderer in the
real estate sector. Different techniques, like risk analysis, risk profiling and
case selection are integrated with modern tools based on data mining and
statistical analysis.
5.4 FIDES in other contexts
In this chapter a typology of crimes related to fraud in Money Laundering is
introduced with fraud schemes in the European Union, Insurance and public
sector. All these different organisations base their anti-fraud strategy on the
analysis of reports, performed by an anti-fraud central unit. This unit has
to analyse the reports, set priorities, remove false alarms and take actions
on the basis of a report or suspects, filed by inspectors, agents, operators or
normal citizens. All these features suggest that FIDES can be implemented
to improve the interaction between agents, developing a case-based reasoning
approach in storing different cases in order to detect and prevent fraud.
OLAF authorities introduced the Fraud Notification System (FNS) to
submit information related to fraud cases, suspects and suspicious behaviours.
They underline the importance of anonymity in their system in a similar way
as it was emphasized in the description of FIDES. All the information col-
lected in the questionnaires is stored in a dedicated server and used as a
source of intelligence/evidence (OLAF, 2007). This data could be the basis
for OLAF evaluators to use as the input for FIDES. In this case the in-
teraction takes place between OLAF evaluators and the Director General.
On the basis of the information submitted in the FNS and acquired dur-
ing the personal investigations, the most dangerous cases can be taken into
consideration and the FIDES processes can be activated.
In the UK public sector the Cabinet Office encourages collaboration be-
tween departments and different sectors of public administration and insists
on investing in prevention by creating a repository for information and e-
4
Available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/4/0,3343,en_32250379_
32236992_33916420_1_1_1_1,00.html
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learning tools to improve employees awareness of fraud. These needs can be
accomplished by a MAS like FIDES since it has the capability to improve
the interaction between users and to build maps and attack trees, where
relevant information can be stored.
In money laundering, banks and money transfers companies have the
duty to fill in a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR), in case customers show
suspicious behaviour. In Fig. 5.8, the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) is
shown5, including part I and part II. In part I the fields are dedicated to
the personal data of the suspect. In part II the officer responsible for filling
out the report has to add information about the activity.
Particularly interesting is part VI of SAR, where there is a space to fill
with a text based description of the case. Members of the institutions have
to include all the information that was not requested in the previous section
of the report, but it can be useful to have a complete description of the case.
An automatic text retrieval of SAR documents and text summarization can
be used as input for FIDES to generate think-maps first and then attack
trees. In think-maps the red-flags and risk areas can be underlined in order
to support inspectors in building the attack tree.
Insurance companies have a report system based on hot-lines and on-line
reports. All these systems can be integrated in FIDES to create an attack
tree catalogue to support anti-fraud experts in fighting and preventing fraud.
The arson expert Lentini (Lentini, 2011) points out the importance of
determining the cause of fire and recognizing arson patterns. In the ’80s and
’90s fraud detection in connection with fire was performed based on ”anec-
dotal evidence at best and witchcraft at worst”. This caused the conviction
of many innocent people. Presently most of the fire investigators agree on
using scientific methods to determine fraud, but still nowadays some of them
neither understand nor follow the scientific method. FIDES in this context
could be used also not only as a fraud or case-based reasoning detection
system, but also as a learning tool for fire investigators. The cases stored in
the database as think-maps or attack trees could be used to train them and
expand their knowledge.
Millner and Duhl (2011) suggest that insurance investigators should use
search engines and social networks to gather information about claimants’
profiles. They report cases of people sharing information about their illegal
behaviours or their intention to commit fraud. The use of social networks
can be the new frontier for investigation. Fraud investigation can be sup-
ported by screening the status of people using social networks or forums
of discussion and all the information can be retrieved and represented in a
structured way in order to detect or prevent possible fraud.
5
Available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/10131012/FinCEN-Form-109
93
Figure 5.8: SARs part I and II
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Chapter 6
Summary, Conclusions,
Future research
This research started with money laundering, a very complex phenomenon
that is very difficult to detect, since money laundering goes back and forth
from legal to illegal business. The activity of smuggling is often perpetrated
by human actors who carry on their persons large sums of money in order
to open bank accounts abroad in tax havens.
These limitations encountered while studying this subject and the op-
portunity I had to meet the audit team of an important European bank led
me to change my research topic to fraud detection. Lessons learned from
studying the money laundering phenomenon, however, were invaluable in
understanding the gap that exists between the description of this subject
and the reality.
The reality of financial crime is often not as fascinating as cyber-thrillers
portray. Identity fraud is indeed the most common type of technique used
by fraudsters.
The instruments used for stealing personal information are not only
based on hacking systems such as Trojan horses or malware, but one can
also find less sophisticated ones.
Internal fraud in the banking sector, as in other kinds of institutions such
as insurance companies or governmental ones, is characterized by conflict of
interest.
In order to execute a fraudulent scheme one needs the complicity of the
management, trust of the co-workers and a good lawyer.
The distorted representation of fraud includes not only the prevalence of
electronic hacking systems over less sophisticated techniques, but also the
motivation that leads people to commit financial crimes.
An interpretation key for understanding this concept is the venality vs.
banality hypothesis introduced by Kim (2005). According to the venality
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hypothesis, which is commonly adopted in literature and in the business
world, fraudsters are driven by greed and they are aware of the conse-
quences of their actions. This interpretation drives organisations to limit
the countermeasures to a list of good intentions such as improving control
procedures. These good intentions ignore conflict of interest, or, analysing
it from a cynical point of view, they might be the product of it. Based on
the banality hypothesis the main reason that drives people to commit fraud
is the banal tendency to follow the boss’ orders. In an efficiency-oriented
society people have to adhere to the job description.
In most cases orders are executed without perceiving the reasons why
things are done, thus their level of integrity is not an issue at all for the
employee. In the venality hypothesis, there is a simplification of human
morality. In other words there is a common understanding about who the
”good” and the ”bad” employees are.
Based on the banality hypothesis, a good lawyer or a good accountant is
the one who helps the company achieve its goals and be more competitive
on the market.
The banality hypothesis is not simply a cynical way of studying fraud,
but a valid theoretical base for developing effective anti-fraud techniques.
The banality hypothesis suggests that rather than just having a list of good
intentions it would be more efficient to develop anti-fraud systems based on
anonymity and activate programs to protect whistle-blowers.
By adopting this principle, the audit team will benefit in developing
more efficient anti-fraud countermeasures. An audit team also has to be
able to improve the reporting systems and map these behaviours in a user-
friendly way in order to prevent fraud schemes. A major bank has many
branches even in different countries; this means that inspectors from differ-
ent countries describe and report their suspicions according to their cultural
background. Their description could be perceived by the audit-team in a
distorted way. The audit team of a bank requires a system able to unify
risk criteria and to adapt them to the context. This can be performed by
improving the interaction between inspectors and auditors in order to pro-
duce a shared representation of the fraud schemes and a common agreement
on the counter-strategy to adopt. The audit-team activity deals with the
information received and with the interpretation of the facts and suspicions.
The experience that auditors have accumulated during their careers, and
their ability to integrate missing information with similarities from past
cases, is essential in fraud detection.
FIDES is designed according to these premises: audit-team’s needs and
capabilities. Modelling these behavioural aspects, improving interaction be-
tween auditors and inspectors and creating a knowledge-based system to
retrieve information about past cases, are the main features of FIDES. Au-
ditors can benefit from using FIDES since they can improve the interaction
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with the inspectors and obtain semi-structured information to start their
evaluation process.
Inspectors can use the system as a platform to communicate with the
audit team and force themselves to improve the accuracy of their reports.
A multi-agent system such as FIDES can work in all those contexts where
there is need for interaction between a central anti-fraud unit and inspec-
tors/operators who have to report irregularities back to this main anti-fraud
unit.
Other sectors where FIDES can be applied include insurance compa-
nies, public organisations and governmental institutions, but also in other
risk management contexts: police, fire-fighters and medical personnel who
need to coordinate complex tasks in emergency situations such as terrorist
attacks, natural disasters or multiple car accidents.
6.1 Future research
The head of the risk management department of the bank I interviewed
expressed his ideas about the future of fraud and its detection. The most
important predictions concerning the future of fraud are the following:
• robberies will not be issues anymore for banks, since the security sys-
tems will be increasingly effective
• the use of advanced anti-hacking technology will easily block external
attacks
• fraud could increasingly become a necessity for employees as a conse-
quence of the financial crisis
• the connections of fraud activities with criminal organisations might
increase
Based on these predictions, we can claim that the potential of FIDES is
that of a system that can fight crime in general and not only fraud.
In the future, once the data-base is populated with a significant number
of fraud cases, auditors can produce a text description of the fraud cases
and then these interpretations could be matched with the information stored
in the data-base. Using this procedure, the different interpretations of the
auditors could be summarized quickly and the attack tree or a possible rough
version of it can be produced directly and refined in the Delphi process.
At this stage also the information retrieval features of the system will
be refined to support the evaluation process of the audit team. Retrieving
old cases to be compared with new ones can be useful also in discovering
new schemes related to old attacks. Fraud schemes can be perpetrated in a
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long window of time by the same author. In this case the system could alert
auditors about similarities, indicating that the same criminal is behind that
scheme and offering strong evidence to incriminate the fraudster.
In a similar way, the comparison of geographical attributes could provide
an indication that the same criminal organisation is operating in a certain
area.
In general, the matching process could suggest that the style of the
actual fraud scheme is similar to an old one offering a valid support for the
investigation. Retrieving the countermeasures or strategies adopted in the
past for similar cases could be useful to quickly develop a counter-strategy .
Inspectors could also benefit from retrieving the information to prune their
suspicions in the case they are analysing. In some cases the retrieved data
can reveal that a certain behaviour is just routine and not an element of a
potential fraud case. Inspectors could also check profiles of fraudsters stored
in the database to obtain useful information to write their reports.
Another important future improvement of FIDES would be its integra-
tion with different types of data-bases in order to edit criminal profiles.
In FIDES the Risk management phase consists of choosing the most
suitable path amongst the possible ones offered by the attack tree. The
choice of the path can be supported by different aggregation methods and
reasoning procedures. The choice and development of these methods could
be a crucial improvement to FIDES. The risk management phase can benefit
from valid and well-structured methods to obtain not only the shortest, but
also the least rational path and other types of combinations that auditors
perceive as important.
As suggested by Millner and Duhl (2011), the new frontier of fraud inves-
tigation lies in retrieving information from social networks. Hackers could
use social networks to share their deeds in their profiles or communicate us-
ing a cryptic language. The integration of FIDES with the Web and social
media is certainly a feature that can be developed in the future. The cre-
ation of a more accurate fraud ontology using a semantic search engine could
improve the quality of the information and expand the detection capabilities
of the system.
In the distant future we can hypothesize fraud detection systems driven
by virtual experts: virtual agents programmed with different personalities
or, to use a more specific term, with different ontologies. Virtual auditing
would be the term to define the environment where FIDES could operate in
the future. Virtual auditors could be programmed with different personal-
ities, experience of past fraud cases and different risk aversions in order to
perform the audit process simulating human capabilities and the decision-
making process.
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Abstract—According to KPMG figures, fraud represents a 
serious economical problem, which has been studied in 
different ways due to the fact that fraudsters are benefiting 
from the fast development of ICT and are developing their 
techniques. In this paper, after summarizing different fraud 
detection methods and tools proposed in the literature like 
meta-rules and tree-based detection, we will introduce a 
multi-agent system, called FIDES, which integrates the 
computational power of data mining tools and attack trees 
with experts' judgments negotiated through a Delphi-based 
system. Two scenarios are described: in the first one FIDES, 
supported by cause-effect diagrams, is used to classify alarms 
generated by the system to help the experts to focus on the 
real dangerous ones; in the second one FIDES is used in a 
proactive way in order to block or prevent human based 
frauds.  
 
Keywords-attack tree, decision support system, Delphi method, 
fraud detection, multi-agent systems.  
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the development of IC technologies has 
resulted in increased cases of frauds. Although the 
prevention measures adopted have also progressed, 
fraudsters have proved to have adapting capabilities by 
developing new strategies. In light of what is described in 
the KPMG´s material and statistics this paper review sets 
out to explain why systems based on the evaluation of 
experts could have better chance to detect fraudulent 
behavior than those ones based on search algorithm and 
automatic detection of transactions.  
According to Basel 2 Accord [15] banks are encouraged 
to develop sophisticated methodologies to calculate the 
operational risk, monitor the bank activities, reinforce 
internal control structure and auditing to preserve the 
integrity of the managerial processes. These systems include 
also the use of internal and external data, scenario analysis 
and control factors and an accurate reporting system based 
on key risk indicators. 
Someone may think that fraud is the results of complex 
operation driven by expert hackers using the state of the art 
of technology. In this case it would be more logical to orient 
detection and prevention to the development of algorithms 
based on sophisticated mathematical and statistical models. 
 
Figure 1. Types of fraud (percentage) [7]. 
 
The picture emerging from the KPMG survey [6; 7; 8] 
would rather suggest an approach based on the contribution 
of experts sharing their experience in the field and 
evaluating all the possible fraud strategies. One reason more 
to support this is that “fraudsters were mainly detected by 
whistle blowers or management reviews (accumulated 46 
percent)” [9]. Since most of the frauds are caused by 
humans, as shown in Fig.1, and detected by whistle blowers, 
the scenario we think about is the one where a team of fraud 
experts (they can be senior managers or members of an 
audit team) through a brainstorming process can suggest 
how to choose the suitable fraud detection techniques and 
figure out their implementation in a multi-agent system 
(MAS) architecture. 
One of the most effective approaches to manage experts’ 
judgment is Delphi method, “an iterative process to collect 
and distill the anonymous judgment of experts” [13]. The 
choice of this approach is justified by the fact that Delphi is 
a good system of forcing experts to analyze a phenomenon 
and come up to conclusions which would be extremely hard 
2 
 
to reach if we had to take into account of their opinions 
separately. 
Delphi method was used the first time in the 50s for a 
U.S. sponsored military project. The most important 
features of Delphi are anonymity and feedback. This means 
that it can be considered as a controlled debate. The typical 
Delphi process is based on questionnaires driven by a 
moderator. The role of the moderator is to distribute and 
analyze the questionnaires forcing the experts after each 
round to improve the accuracy and quality of their answers. 
The novelty of our work consists in the introduction of 
FIDES (Fraud Interactive Decision Expert System), a MAS 
based on a Delphi DSS (Decision Support System), 
designed to support an auditing committee in fraud 
detection.  The MAS, described in section 3, has three main 
components: Data Filtering, Modeling Choice and Design 
and the Detection module. The output generated by Delphi 
is a generalized attack tree, which will be the main detection 
instrument, particularly useful since it is a schematic 
representation of experts’ judgments. 
 
II. DETECTION TOOLS  
In this section we will describe the main detection tools 
based on meta-rules and tree-based architectures.  
A. Anomaly detection tools 
In this group of methods we can include those ones able 
to generate alarms on the basis of recognition of anomalies, 
unusual behavior and paths. These tools are particularly 
useful to manage massive amount of data and reduce 
quickly the searching space. Bedford’s and Zipf´s laws can 
be considered as kind of a meta-rule. These rules can be 
positioned as sentinels like a first wall defense of the 
systems, a sort of pre-filtering mechanism. Bedford’s law 
states that “the distribution of the first significant digits of 
numbers drawn from a wide variety of random distributions 
will have (asymptotically) a certain form.” 
Huang et al. [4] offer an interesting approach based on 
Zipf’s Law. The basic idea of Zipf's Law is that “the product 
of frequency of the use of a word, f, and the rank order, r, is 
approximately constant”. This means that a small number of 
keywords can characterize a document’s content. The same 
principle can be used with fraud detection. The assumptions 
the authors do is that, in a given dataset, if any patterns 
´frequency doesn’t follow the Zipf´s law, then it might 
imply that there are some anomalies existing.  
Zipf Analysis is very suitable for detecting attacks that 
have frequent sequential patterns. For future research they 
suggest an evaluation of the fraud detection performance of 
Zipf´s law by comparing Zipf analysis with other clustering 
algorithms, like K-means, Kohonen and Digital Analysis. 
Bolton and Hand [1] make an important distinction 
between fraud prevention and fraud detection.  
Fraud prevention includes several measures used to stop 
fraud from occurring in the first place. Examples of these 
measures can be personal identification numbers, security 
payment systems and SIM cards for mobile phones. 
On the other hand, fraud detection involves identifying 
fraud as quickly as possible once it has been perpetrated and 
this is the main focus of this paper. Among supervised 
methods we mention the traditional statistical classification 
ones [3; 11], but also more powerful ones like neural 
networks [2; 12; 16]. 
Knowledge based systems as well have been used to classify 
and detect suspicious transactions. The limit of these 
systems is that they work very well when the behaviors 
cover a well structured domain, but it is well known that  
most of business activities are unstructured. In such 
situations, where we have interdependent and also noisy and 
incomplete data, neural networks can excel [5]. 
B. Tree-based detection modelling 
Trees are effective tools to systematically classify the 
components of a fraudulent attack to any given system. The 
graphical tree representation is appealing to users, flexible 
enough to be equipped with several types of information and 
easy to be automated.  
Amongst tree-based detection modeling, we consider 
attack tree the most suitable and appropriate for the purpose 
of this paper. 
The term attack tree was introduced by Schneier [14] to 
systematically categorize the different ways in which a 
system can be attacked, and then extended in [10]. He 
describes an attack tree as an instrument to “provide a 
formal, methodical way of describing the security of 
systems, based on varying attacks. Basically, you represent 
attacks against a system in a tree structure, with the goal as 
the root node and different ways of achieving that goal as 
leaf nodes” [14]. 
“And” and “or” operators, in the classical framework of 
attack tree, relate the subtask of a node. An “and” operator 
is used when all the features must be present to perform a 
particular task and when at least one of them is necessary it 
will be chosen an “or” operator. 
Using this approach it is possible to analyze the 
contribution of the any attribute to the achievement the goal 
that is to finalize the attack. Another important feature is the 
opportunity to calculate the cost of an attack as a function of 
the cost of subtasks. At the same time it is possible to find 
out the path with highest probability of success or studying 
the least expensive ways chosen by the fraudsters to perform 
an attack.  
Yager [17] introduces the use of OWA nodes in 
describing the required number of children nodes for 
success of the parent nodes. The idea expressed is that the 
contribution of the children to the success of the parents is 
determined by a linguistic quantifier Q expressing the 
proportion (linguistically characterized) of subtasks needed 
for the parent node to be accomplished. 
 If we consider an OWA node that ha
subtasks are directly responsible of the 
parent. Q is a monotonic linguistic quant
concepts like “as most” or “at least half”. 
 
III. FIDES (FRAUD INTERACTIVE DETE
SYSTEM) 
This section introduces a MAS called F
an auditing committee in the fraud detection
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Figure 2. FIDES architecture 
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representation of the path followed by the fraudster or the 
possible consequence (his/her goal) of certain suspect 
behaviors which could hide an operation in progress or 
his/her intention to carry it out. 
In this sense this is the proactive scenario. In the first 
one experts has to filter and interpret the alarms, in the 
second one using abductive reasoning they try to prevent or 
block an operation which can’t be seen through the data, 
because it is human driven. 
Experts can meet physically or virtually using a decision 
support system tool that might be installed for instance on 
their mobile phone. This would be considered a crisis 
management scenario, where experts can interact and take 
decisions quickly. The system can be used by the members 
of a bank committee or different authorities involved in a 
crisis management context as police, firefighters and 
medical personnel that needs to coordinate complex tasks in 
emergency situation as a computer hacking attack, a 
terroristic attack, a natural disaster or a multiple car 
accident. The infrastructure of the system will be based on 
the Internet Protocol (IP), in order to use the state of the art 
of mobile technology (GSM and GPRS, 3G, WLAN) and 
perform different tasks. The system will follow an observe-
decide-act cycle which means that each action can trigger a 
new one, creating a chain of events which can be visualized 
in order to understand all the links and focus on the main 
targets. The system can work as a distributed approach 
interconnecting different actors, but this doesn’t prevent 
from having a central command station able to communicate 
and send orders to the different actors.  
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Several methods have been applied in fraud detection. 
Anomaly detection tools showed their power to generate 
alarms in relation to past behaviors, but they can’t do so 
much with respect to new behaviors or frauds perpetrated by 
humans, which are the majority according to KPMG’s 
figures. In this case systems based on experts’ judgments 
can be more effective. A MAS called FIDES is introduced 
to integrate the computational power of OR and AI tools 
with the experts’ experience.  
The management system used to extract expert’s tacit 
knowledge is the Delphi method. The output of Delphi is an 
attack tree that can be used to detect illegal operations after 
they have been perpetrated or stored in a library in a 
proactive way. 
On the basis of this MAS future research will be directed 
towards the development of FIDES, in particular in adapting 
the system to a bank auditing committee’s features and 
needs. Typical knowledge management issues as group 
consensus achievement, semantic problems, GDSS (group 
decision support systems), risk management, group 
emotional intelligence, information retrieval and the 
definition of linguistic variables using fuzzy logic, can all be 
future research topics.  
A mobile phone application for crisis management 
situations could also be designed. This would be the Mobile 
Module of FIDES. The scenario we think about is the one 
where experts have to take a quick decision under an 
imminent attack or when a suspect operation is happening 
and they can’t physically meet in the office or they can’t 
have access to their pc. 
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A Delphi-based approach to fraud 
detection using attack trees and fuzzy 
numbers 
Alessandro Buoni, Mario Fedrizzi, Jozsef Mezei 
Abstract — . The fraud surveys carried out in the last five years by leading international consulting companies 
demonstrate that fraud is an increasing phenomenon depending most of all on behavioral aspects. Therefore, 
when addressing fraud detection processes the adoption of traditional statistical techniques comes out to be 
not as adequate as those based on the evaluations of experts working in a multiagent framework. In this paper 
we introduce a multiagent system called Fraud Interactive Decision Expert System (FIDES), which puts more 
emphasis on the evaluation of behavioral aspects of fraud detection according to the judgments expressed by 
two groups of experts, inspectors and auditors respectively. FIDES combines think-maps, attack trees and 
fuzzy numbers under a Delphi-based team work support system and offers to the users a suitable way to 
better understand and manage fraud schemes.  
Index Terms — Fraud detection, Think-maps, Attack trees, Delphi method, Fuzzy numbers 
 
 
——————————   u   —————————— 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
David J. Hand [14] points out how 
institutions in persecuting fraud follow the 
economic imperative, meaning it doesn’t 
worth spending $200m to stop $20m fraud. 
Participants in his study estimate that U.S. 
organizations lose 5% of their annual 
revenues to fraud. This means, applied to 
2006 U.S. GDP, approximately $652 billion in 
fraud losses. According to [16], there is a 
prominent increase of fraud by individuals. 
Company managers, employees and 
customers together have been responsible for 
£300m of fraud in 2008, three times the value 
of year 2007.  
In [15] it is shown that the most effective 
countermeasures for fraud are those ones 
developed by internal audit using clues given 
by employee whistleblowers as shown in 
Fig.1. The survey has been conducted on 
executives of U.S companies who answered 
the following question:	  Through which source 
do you believe your organization would be 
most likely to uncover fraud or misconduct? 
The embarrassment of admitting  to mainly 
follow an economic imperative in persecuting 
fraud is coherent with the choice of preferring 
internal resources on external ones, but this is 
not only the main reason. It is also related to 
the awareness that an internal audit team has 
a better knowledge of their organization, the 
weakness of internal procedures and the 
personnel.  
 
 % 
Internal Audit 47 
Employee whistleblowers 20 
Line managers 13 
External Auditors 9 
Customers or suppliers 4 
Government regulators or law 
enforcement 
3 
Other means 2 
Fig.1 Fraud countermeasures [15]. 
 
According to the Advanced Measurement 
Approaches (AMA), introduced in Basel II 
accord [2], banks are encouraged to develop 
sophisticated methodologies to calculate the 
operational risk, monitor the bank activities, 
reinforce internal control structure and 
auditing to preserve the integrity of the 
managerial processes. These systems include 
also the use of internal and external data, 
scenario analysis and control factors and an 
accurate reporting system based on key risk 
indicators. 
In the banking sector there is a prevalence 
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of human fraud. One of the causes 
encouraging internal fraud is conflict of 
interests, which limits the effectiveness of the 
control procedures. 
Frauds are perpetrated not only for greed 
but also for career, as a way that managers 
use to augment their reputation, for instance 
faking their achievements and showing the 
improvements in their life style (cars, 
watches). Many frauds are also the results of 
the abuse of trust given by their customers. 
These people typically establish a friendly 
relationship with their investment consultant 
entrusting them their money blindly. 
Commonly, the biggest problem of an audit 
team is to interpret and summarize all these 
behavioral aspects in order to come up with 
effective solutions to prevent fraud before they 
happen or to detect quickly the type of fraud 
when perpetrated. To this end, audit teams 
collect information about past behaviors in 
order to provide a formal representation of the 
most common typologies of fraud. This way, a 
repository of domain expert represented by 
standardized fraudulent attacks can be 
created and reused for, e.g., playing "what-if" 
games with potential countermeasures or 
identifying the nature of new attacks. 
Since before addressing the design of our 
system we had the chance to meet several 
experts in charge of diverse risk management 
activities inside one of the largest European 
banking group, our work has been inspired by 
the information collected during the meetings. 
One of the main challenges for banks is to 
unify risk criteria in the different countries 
where their branches are located, perform a 
realistic temporal analysis and establish 
cause/effect relationship in a rather short time 
combining objective information with the 
subjective judgments expressed by experts. 
Auditors, who are the fraud experts, can 
use their experience to remove false alarms, 
but also to detect those crimes which cannot 
be detected electronically because they are 
the results of untraceable human behaviors 
most often perpetrated inside the departments 
of the bank. The evaluation process of 
auditors in fraud detection has been 
examined, e. g., by Bazerman et al. [1] and by 
Grazioli et al. [12], exploiting the reasons of 
their success and failure, and studying the 
impact of ambiguity, analyzing a quite 
extended sample of case studies. 
Several authors have demonstrated that a 
multiagent approach is particularly suitable to 
address fraud detection when behavioral 
aspects play a key role, see for instance Chou 
et al. [5], Wang et al. [24], and Zhang et al. 
[25]. 
We believe that the multiagent system we 
are going to introduce in this paper, combining 
think-maps, attack trees, and fuzzy numbers 
under a Delphi-based team work support 
system, do offer to the agents involved 
(inspectors and auditors) an innovative and 
suitable way to better understand and 
manage fraud schemes.  
The multiagent architecture of the Fraud 
Interactive Decision Expert System (FIDES) 
[3] will permit them to open up and share their 
knowledge and then link all the clues in a 
coherent scheme. The learning by doing 
approach of think-maps is a good means for 
inspectors to formally represent their 
knowledge linguistically expressed, to 
reconsider their opinions and correct their 
statements in the light of the comments 
received by their colleagues. 
The paper has been organized as follows. 
In the second section we introduce the main 
components of FIDES, i.e. think-maps, attack 
trees and Delphi method. In the third section 
we describe the fuzzy mechanism that is used 
for representing and aggregating the linguistic 
information provided by the experts of the 
audit team when addressing the design of the 
attack tree. In the fourth section the whole 
structure of the system is figured out 
combined with the description of a work 
session. In the last paragraph some 
conclusions are drawn and future line of 
research are sketched out. 
2 THINK-MAPS, ATTACK TREES, DELPHI 
METHOD 
Scope of this paragraph is to provide a 
synthetic description of the main components 
of FIDES, focusing the description on those 
features characterizing the collection and 
representation of knowledge involved in the 
analysis and detection of fraudsters’ attacks. 
2.1 Think-maps 
The concept of mind mapping was introduced 
for first by Tony Buzan in 1974 [4]. The idea 
was to organize keywords into a radiant 
structure that looks like a tree seen from 
above [26]. A radiant structure permits to put 
in the middle of the paper the central idea 
(goal) and through a brainstorming process 
add around it the branches of the map. Novak 
and Cañas developed the idea of concept 
maps (see [19]), which they defined as 
"graphical tools for organizing and 
representing knowledge". 
Oxman introduces the idea of think-maps  
IASK TL2010 CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 
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([20]), which means that conceptual mapping 
of designing ideas can be constructed in 
larger structures where it is possible to 
organized knowledge acquired by the learner 
and make it explicit. The software they 
develop to create these maps is called "Web- 
Pad". 
The theoretical basis of think-maps is 
constructivism. Constructivist theories of 
learning state that the learner in not a passive 
recipient of knowledge, but it has an active 
role in creating knowledge, based on the 
"learning by doing" approach. Learners 
construct their knowledge based on their 
experience and relationship with concepts. 
Think-maps have a formal representation 
called ICF (Issue-Concept-Form), which acts 
as "a structuring ontology for the construction 
of conceptual networks of design 
concepts"([20]). To show the process we will 
adapt a case of study ([18]), under the 
hypothesis that this operation could be 
anticipated by suspicious behaviours, which 
are common to other internal fraud cases 
([6]). 
In our case inspectors will use Web-Pad 
(Fig.3) to comment suspicious behaviours 
and/or activities they observed or information 
acquired by whistleblowers or insert their 
reports in order to share them with all the 
other colleagues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Web-Pad interface ([20]). 
 
Since the software works in a real time 
discussion environment their comments will 
appear in the text box named "Description" as 
a common chat discussion shape. At this 
stage inspectors will have the possibility to 
arrange the text in order to have a clear 
description of the case. 
Inspectors at this point will start to 
underline keywords, as shown in Fig.3, which 
will be associated to 2 main labels "suspicious 
behaviours" and "action", which are related to 
one or more suspected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The keywords selection. 
 
At the end of this process the think-map 
shown in Fig.4 is obtained. In the map we can 
see the main labels, which have been used to 
visualize a fraud operation. In the cloud 
callouts are represented the activities related 
to "suspicious behaviour", label previously 
created with Web-Pad, associated to three 
different suspected persons. There is a clerk, 
or a hacker or a customer who has the habit 
to play with the self-service payment pc of the 
bank. In the middle of the figure we have the 
suspected and on the bottom the fraudulent 
action, which is the amount of money missing 
in a specific bank account. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The keywords selection. 
 
Having this think-map as a descriptive 
model, inspectors will start to create nodes, 
which will be sent to the auditors to be 
connected through the Delphi process to build 
<System Messages> 
The clerk is always staying overtime at 
work. She often refuses to take coffe 
breaks, but the work is not proceeding. I 
have also noticedin this last two months, 
a  
Always working overtime 
Money stolen  from the bank account 
#abc 
Description 
Action 
WebPAD 
home 
CBR search 
messages 
Suspicious behaviours 
data search 
browse 
exit 
new open save save as delete 
The clerk is always staying overtime at work. She 
often refuses to take coffee breaks, but the work is not 
proceeding. I have also noticed in this two months, a 
big change in her lifestyle. She is dressing new clothes 
and wearing an expansive bag. She also changed her 
car. 
Money missing from  
the bank account #abc 
Clerk 
Customer 
Hacker 
Always working 
overtime, 
reclutance to take 
breaks, sudden 
change of lifestyle 
 
Playing with 
the selfservice 
payment pc 
Spam in the 
mailbox, 
pop ups 
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the attack tree. Web-Pad basically works on 
two levels. A graphic level where think-maps 
can be visualized and a text level where 
different operations can be stored and 
retrieved for the future, supporting the 
inspectors when they have to build the think-
map. For instance inspectors could be 
interested to have a list of the cases 
associated to a particular behaviour and so 
on. In the data retrieval mode the system can 
bring up precedents that inspectors consider 
similar, according to their subjective 
judgement. Users can express the level of 
similarity between two different cases as a 
number between 0 and 1. Once the database 
is populated with a significant number of 
cases, it will be possible to retrieve and 
visualize them in descendant order, according 
to their level of similarity, ready to be 
examined. 
2.2 Attack	  tree 
The attack tree, introduced by Schneier ([23]) 
is a tree-based diagram to "systematically 
categorize the different ways in which a 
system can be attacked". 
Nodes are the elementary attacks and the 
root node is the goal of the attack. Children of 
a node are refinements of this goal, while 
leaves are attacks which cannot be further on 
refined. The process of creating an attack tree 
starts identifying the possible attack goals, 
where each goal forms a separate tree, but 
there is also the possibility that different trees 
share nodes and subtrees.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. An example of attack tree ([23]). 
 
Accordingly, modeling an attack tree is a 
matter of associating a logical AND and a 
logical OR with each node, and therefore 
encouraging a structured representation of 
events and of the ways they are connected.  
This supports the discovering of the most 
likely avenues of approach for an attack 
making easier the deployment of the most 
effective countermeasures. 
Even though the Schneier's attack trees 
(illustrated in Fig.5) have been considered 
from their first appearance a convenient tool 
to systematically categorize the different 
modes in which an attack can be carried out, 
nonetheless their network structured has been 
criticized for its simplicity e for the lack of well 
sounded theoretical foundations. 
Mauw and Oostdijk ([17]) arguing that 
Schneier's approach to attack trees is 
semantically not well sounded, provide a 
generalization based on the observation that 
an attack tree describes an attack suite and 
that a node can be connected to a multi-set of 
nodes (bundle) and may contain several 
bundles. But, since our paper is more focused 
on the way on which the team of experts carry 
out, in a Delphi-based context, the consensual 
construction of the tree, than on the 
complexity of its structure, the nature of the 
tree is irrelevant and therefore we will adopt 
the Schneier's approach. 
2.3 Delphi	  method	  	  
Delphi method, introduced for the first time in 
the 50s for a U.S. sponsored military project 
([13]), is a systematic, interactive and iterative 
method which relies on a team of experts, 
aiming at discussing and structuring the 
solution of a given problem. The experts are 
asked to answer questionnaires in two or 
more rounds, and after each round a 
moderator provides an anonymous summary 
of the experts' analysis from the previous 
round as well as some explanations of their 
judgments. The moderator encourages 
experts to reuse their earlier opinions in light 
of the outcomes of the analysis provided by 
the other experts of the team. The process is 
stopped according to a pre-defined criterion 
and some average measure of the outcomes 
of the final round determine the output of the 
process. 
Rowe and Right suggest four key features 
for a good design of Delphi [21]: 
1. Anonymity of Delphi experts: allows the 
experts to freely express their opinions 
without undue social pressures to conform 
from others in the team. Decisions are 
evaluated on their merit, rather than who has 
proposed the idea. 
2. Iteration: allows the experts to refine 
$= Cost of attack and 
Listen to 
Conversation 
$20K 
 
Get Target To 
State Combo 
$40K 
 
Find Written 
Combo 
$75K 
 
Get Combo 
From Target 
$20K 
 
Threaten 
$60K 
 
Blackmail 
$100K 
 
Eavesdrop 
$60K 
 
Bribe 
$20K 
 
Open Safe 
$10K 
 
Pick Lock 
$30K 
 
Learn Combo 
$20K  
 
Cut Open Safe 
$10K 
 
Install 
Improperly 
$100K 
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their views in light of the progress of the 
team's work from round to round. 
3. Controlled feedback: informs the experts 
of the other experts' perspectives, and 
provides the opportunity for Delphi experts to 
clarify or change their views. 
4. Statistical aggregation of team response: 
allows for a quantitative analysis and 
interpretation of output information. 
 
In our system, Delphi will be used as a 
method to connect different nodes delivered 
by the inspectors. The role of the moderator 
will be to ask the experts their opinion about 
strength of the links connecting different 
nodes. 
The aggregation process will be described 
in details in section 3. In the end of the Delphi 
process, the output will be an attack tree. 
3 THE FUZZY MECHANISM 
The audit team performs the Delphi process 
aiming to select the nodes and connect them 
in order to design the attack tree. In the first 
phase the inspectors determine the possible 
nodes of the attack tree with the help of the 
think-map. Then the moderator will ask the 
experts about the possible connection of the 
nodes, and aggregate the results to obtain the 
attack tree. In this paragraph will describe the 
fuzzy mechanism which helps the experts to 
form the attack tree. In the literature, a 
number of different fuzzy approaches to the 
analysis of negotiation processes in 
multiagent decision making have been 
proposed, and for an extended overview the 
interested reader could see, e.g., [9] and [11]. 
Before the description of the model we need 
some basic definitions from fuzzy set theory. 
 
Definition 1. Let X = x denote a collection of 
objects (points) denoted generically by x. 
Then a fuzzy set A in X is a set of ordered 
pairs 
 
XxxxA A ∈= )),(,( µ   (1)  
 
where )(xAµ  is termed the grade of 
membership of x in A, and MXA →:µ is 
a function from X to a space M called the 
membership space. When M contains only 
two points, 0 and 1, A is non fuzzy and its 
membership function becomes identical 
with the characteristic function of a crisp 
set. This means that crisp sets belong to 
fuzzy sets. A fuzzy number is a convex 
fuzzy set on the real line such that 
 
1. ∈∃ 0x A, 1)( 0 =xAµ , 
2. Aµ is piecewise continuous. 
 
(The convexity means that all the γ -level 
sets are convex. Furthermore, we call F the 
family of all fuzzy numbers). 
A γ -level set of a fuzzy set A is defined by 
[ ] ∈= xA {γ A: })( γµ ≥xA  if γ > 0 and 
[ ] ∈= xclA {γ A: })( γµ >xA  (the closure of 
the support of A) if γ = 0. Let A be a fuzzy 
number. Then [ ]γA  is a closed convex subset 
of R for all [ ]1,0∈γ . We use the notations 
[ ] [ ]γγ γγ AaAa max)(,min)( 21 == 	  
for the left-hand side and right-hand side of 
the γ -cut, respectively. 
When we calculate the arithmetic 
operations on fuzzy sets (fuzzy numbers), we 
apply the rules of interval arithmetic. Let A 
and B be fuzzy numbers with the 
corresponding γ -cuts: [ ] [ ])(),( 21 γγ
γ aaA = , 
[ ] [ ])(),( 21 γγ
γ bbB =  then theγ -cut of the 
fuzzy number A + B is the following: 
 
[ ] [ ],)()(),()( 2211 γγγγ
γ babaBA ++=+
  
and theγ -cut of the fuzzy number Aα , where 
:0>α   
[ ] [ ].)(),( 21 γαγαα
γ aaA =  
We will use linguistic labels in the 
questionnaire and we represent the labels as 
fuzzy numbers. We suppose that the 
moderator can choose which nodes are 
parents (V) (with descendant) and which ones 
are leaves (L) (without descendants, basic 
attack components). We obtain two sets: 
{ } { }ts vvVllL ,...,,,..., 11 == . 
In the first questionnaire the experts have 
to express their opinion in linguistic terms 
about statements like “ Lli ∈  is required for 
Vv j ∈ ”, for every .,...,1,,...,1 tjsi ==  
Then experts { }NeeE ,...,1= are asked to 
determine their level of agreement on the 
statements based on a linguistic scale with m 
terms for every pair ( )ji vl , . The linguistic 
terms in the model are represented as fuzzy 
numbers. In other words we have a mapping 
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FT →Φ :  
 
from the set of linguistic terms into the family 
of fuzzy numbers. 
 
 
Fig.6. Possible representation with triangular fuzzy 
numbers	  
Example 1. One possible representation for a 
linguistic label is a triangular fuzzy number: 
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
+≤≤
−
−
≤≤−
−
−
=
.0
1
,1
)(
otherwise
auaau
auaua
uA β
β
α
α
 
 
From the opinion of the experts we obtain 
the frequencies of the different classes. For 
the pair ( )ji vl ,  we have ijmij nn ,...,1  If we 
denote by mAA ,...,1  the fuzzy numbers 
corresponding to the linguistic labels, we can 
define a new fuzzy number ijA as a "weighted 
average", with level sets: 
[ ] ⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
= ∑∑
==
m
k
mij
k
m
k
mij
kij anN
an
N
A
1
2
1
1 ),(
1),(1 γγγ
 
where [ ]kk aa 21 ,  is the level set of kA . This is 
clearly a fuzzy number with the support in the 
interval [ ]1,0 . 
To obtain the connection degree for the 
pair ( )ji vl , , we calculate the f-weighted 
possibilistic mean value of ijA , defined in [10]. 
 
Definition 2. The f-weighted possibilistic 
mean value of ∈A F, with γ -level 
sets [ ] [ ])(),( 21 γγ
γ aaA = , [ ]1,0∈γ , is 
defined by: 
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where γU  is a uniform probability 
distribution on [ ]γA  for all [ ]1,0∈γ . 
 
After we have obtained these defuzzified 
numbers as the estimation of the connection 
strengths, we can determine for every attack 
component the ranking of the other nodes, 
then we can construct the adjacency matrix of 
the attack tree by connecting the leaves to the 
best ranked vertices.	  	  
Example 2. In the simplest case we can 
represent the linguistic labels as a fuzzy set 
with the membership function 
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If we have 5 categories, we use the set 
{ }1,75.0,5.0,25.0,0 . The weighs of the 
outcomes are the frequencies of the 
linguistic labels. If we observe the weights 
,,,,, 175.05.025.00 nnnnn then ijA is just the 
characteristic function of the value  
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what is simply the sample mean value of 
our data. And according to the used 
defuzzification method, the obtained 
connection estimation is this sample mean. 
4 THE ARCHITECTURE OF FIDES 
In this section we will describe the 
architecture of FIDES (Fig.7), showing how 
the main components are interrelated and the 
role played by the inspectors and auditors, the 
experts which have to decode the alarms 
generated by software agents and to detect 
and describe the suspicious human behaviors 
(see, e.g. Sanchez et al. [22] and Edge et al. 
[7]). 
FIDES indeed, has been built on the base of 
the suggestions we collected interviewing the 
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managers of risk management department of 
a leading European bank and thus the 
multiagent system has been designed 
according to their opinions. In a fraud 
detection process an audit team have to deal 
with numerical data and alarms, produced by 
software agents, but also documents, reports 
and information gathered by different actors 
(managers, whistleblowers, anonymous 
informers) and then summarized by 
inspectors. Therefore, the key factor in 
detecting fraud behaviors is to improve the 
interaction between inspectors and auditors. 
Alarms, generated by software agents 
and/or suspicious behaviors noticed 
personally by inspectors are filtered using the 
Web-Pad software. The Information Filtering 
Module is nothing else that a preliminary 
session where inspectors can decide which 
alarms and behaviors to take into 
considerations to perform all the process. 
Once the case has been well detailed as 
shown in Fig.2, inspectors start to underline 
the keywords in order to create the think-map 
as described in paragraph 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: The architecture of the system. 
This is the Attack Components Detection 
Module whose output is the creation of nodes 
to be sent to the auditors. 
Since think-map represents a hypothesis of 
correspondence between behavior, suspected 
fraudsters and fraudulent actions, inspectors 
create nodes to try to offer an explanation of 
how this conceptual framework can be 
associated to concrete actions performed by 
the fraudster.  
Nodes are elementary attacks expressed 
by labels which define all the possible steps of 
the fraudulent action. 
At this stage auditors activate the Delphi 
Module, driven by the moderator, as 
explained in paragraph 3, to the end of 
connecting the nodes to form the attack tree, 
taking into account the strength of the links 
between nodes. In the Attack Tree Design 
Module, experts can estimate the risk and 
develop the strategy to persecute the 
fraudster. The estimation process can be 
performed calculating the most probable or 
the least expensive path. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Final attack tree. 
 
Continuing with the example described in 
paragraph 2.1, in Fig.8 is shown the final 
attack tree as result of Delphi process where 
auditors connect the nodes delivered by the 
inspectors. In this example the goal of the 
attacker is to transfer money to his/her 
personal account. The tree shows different 
ways he/she can achieve this goal. The 
easiest but the least successful path is to 
guess ID and password. The most difficult one 
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is to hijack the bank system. The other paths 
show identity thief sub-attacks based on 
malicious software installation or the use 
cameras installed at ATMs. 
5 CONCLUSION 
The most of the fraud surveys carried out in 
the last five years by leading international 
consulting companies have shown that 
behavioral aspects play a central role, and 
therefore the biggest problem to be addressed 
by inspectors and auditors is to interpret the 
signals and summarize the information 
coming from several, sometimes conflicting, 
sources. The successful solution of this kind 
of problems depends to a large extent by a 
proper combination of critical analysis, 
knowledge-based actions, whistleblowers' 
messages interpretation, involving groups of 
interacting experts. This paper describes the 
FIDES system intended for the management 
of fraud detection situations where inspectors 
and auditors are collaborating at distance 
according to a two phase detection process. 
Think-map and Delphi method can offer to the 
inspectors and auditors respectively an 
effective environment to explicit their 
knowledge, select the most likely fraud attack 
components, and finally structuring them in an 
attack tree. Attack tree-based representation 
of fraudulent processes has the advantage of 
offering a clear visualization of the attack 
which permits to the auditors to highlight the 
most probable attack paths. 
Future work will be focused on two aspects. 
Firstly, after introducing the cost or impact of 
an attack starting from a set of attributes 
attached to the nodes of the attack tree, the 
consensus reaching process of the group of 
audit experts will be studied taking care as 
well of the representation of the uncertainty 
involved. Secondly, assuming that the 
formally expressed representation of the 
information related to the attacks (attack 
trees) is stored in references sources 
(catalogue of attack trees), an intelligent 
searching module will be introduced in FIDES 
for retrieving information from the catalogue. 
To wit, our aim is to introduce an ontology-
based description of the attack trees to 
provide a formal basis for sharing knowledge 
and for reusing it during the attack tree design 
process. 
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1 Introduction 
Hand (2007) points out how institutions in persecuting fraud follow the economic 
imperative, meaning it does not worth spending $200 m to stop $20 m fraud. Participants 
in his study estimate that US organisations lose 5% of their annual revenues to fraud. 
This means, applied to 2006 US GDP, approximately $652 billion in fraud losses. 
According to KPMG (KPMG Forensic fraud Barometer, 2009), there is a prominent 
increase in fraud by individuals. Company managers, employees and customers  
together have been responsible for £300 m of fraud in 2008, three times the value of the 
year 2007. 
In KPMG, Fraud Survey (2009) is shown that the most effective countermeasures  
for fraud are those ones developed by internal audit using clues given by employee 
whistleblowers as shown in Table 1. The survey has been conducted on executives  
of US companies who answered the following question: Through which source do you 
believe your organisation would be most likely to uncover fraud or misconduct? 
Table 1 Fraud countermeasures 
Internal audit 47% 
Employee whistleblowers 20% 
Line managers 13% 
External auditors 9% 
Customers or suppliers 4% 
Government regulators or law enforcement 3% 
Other means 2% 
Source: KPMG Forensic fraud barometer (2009) 
The embarrassment of admitting to mainly follow an economic imperative in persecuting 
fraud is coherent with the choice of preferring internal resources on external ones,  
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but this is not only the main reason. It is also related to the awareness that an internal 
audit team has a better knowledge of their organisation, the weakness of internal 
procedures and the personnel. 
According to the Advanced Measurement Approaches (AMAs), introduced in  
Basel II accord (Basel Committee, 2006), banks are encouraged to develop sophisticated 
methodologies to calculate the operational risk, monitor the bank activities and reinforce 
internal control structure and auditing to preserve the integrity of the managerial 
processes. These systems include also the use of internal and external data, scenario 
analysis and control factors and an accurate reporting system based on key risk 
indicators. 
In the banking sector, there is a prevalence of human fraud. One of the causes 
encouraging internal fraud is conflict of interests, which limits the effectiveness of the 
control procedures. 
Commonly, the biggest problem of an audit team is to interpret and summarise all 
these behavioural aspects to come up with effective solutions to prevent fraud before they 
happen or to detect quickly the type of fraud when perpetrated. To this end, audit teams 
collect information about past behaviours to provide a formal representation of the most 
common typologies of fraud. This way, a repository of domain expert represented by 
standardised fraudulent attacks can be created and reused for, e.g., playing ‘what–if’ 
games with potential countermeasures or identifying the nature of new attacks. 
Auditors, who are the fraud experts, can use their experience not only to remove false 
alarms, but also to detect those crimes that cannot be detected electronically because they 
are the results of untraceable human behaviours most often perpetrated inside the 
departments of the bank. The evaluation process of auditors in fraud detection has been 
examined, e.g., by Bazerman et al. (2002) and Grazioli et al. (2006), exploiting the 
reasons of their success and failure, and studying the impact of ambiguity, analysing a 
quite extended sample of case studies. 
Several authors have demonstrated that a multi-agent approach is particularly suitable 
to address fraud detection when behavioural aspects play a key role, see for instance 
Chou et al. (2007), Wang et al. (2008) and Zhang et al. (2008). 
We believe that the multi-agent system we are going to introduce in this paper, 
combining think-maps, attack trees and fuzzy numbers under a Delphi-based team work 
support system, do offer to the agents involved (inspectors and auditors) an innovative 
and suitable way to better understand and manage fraud schemes. 
The multi-agent architecture of the FIDES (Buoni, 2010) will permit them to open up 
and share their knowledge and then link all the clues in a coherent scheme. The learning 
by doing approach of think-maps is a good means for inspectors to formally represent 
their knowledge linguistically expressed, to reconsider their opinions and correct their 
statements in the light of the comments received by their colleagues. 
The paper has been organised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the main 
components of FIDES, i.e., think-maps, attack trees and Delphi method. In Section 3,  
we describe the fuzzy mechanism that is used for representing and aggregating the 
linguistic information provided by the experts of the audit team when addressing the 
design of the attack tree. In Section 4, the whole structure of the system is figured out 
combined with the description of a work session. In the last section, some conclusions are 
drawn and future lines of research are sketched out. 
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2 Think-maps, attack trees, Delphi method 
The scope of this section is to provide a synthetic description of the main components of 
FIDES, focusing the description on those features characterising the collection  
and representation of knowledge involved in the analysis and detection of fraudsters’ 
attacks. 
2.1 Think-maps 
The concept of mind mapping was introduced for first by Buzan (1974). The idea was to 
organise keywords into a radiant structure that looks like a tree seen from above 
(Åhlberg, 2007). A radiant structure permits to put in the middle of the paper the central 
idea (goal) and through a brainstorming process add around it the branches of the map. 
Novak and Cañas developed the idea of concept maps (see Novak and Cañas, 2006), 
which they defined as “graphical tools for organising and representing knowledge”. 
Oxman (2004) introduces the idea of think-maps, which means that conceptual 
mapping of designing ideas can be constructed in larger structures where it is possible to 
organise knowledge acquired by the learner and make it explicit. The software they 
develop to create these maps is called ‘Web-Pad’. The theoretical basis of think-maps is 
constructivism. Constructivist theories of learning state that the learner is not a passive 
recipient of knowledge, but it has an active role in creating knowledge, based on the 
“learning by doing” approach. 
Learners construct their knowledge based on their experience and relationship with 
concepts. Think-maps have a formal representation called ICF (Issue-Concept-Form), 
which acts as “a structuring ontology for the construction of conceptual networks of 
design concepts” (Oxman, 2004). 
Internal fraud cases can be anticipated by particularly suspicious behaviours like 
working overtime, reluctance to take breaks and sudden change of lifestyle. In this 
section, we will describe a case to show the process and how inspectors would model it. 
In our case, inspectors will use Web-Pad (Figure 1) to comment suspicious 
behaviours or activities they observed or information acquired by whistleblowers or 
insert their reports to share them with all the other colleagues. Since the software works 
in a real-time discussion environment, their comments will appear in the text box named 
‘Description’ as a common chat discussion shape. At this stage, inspectors will have the 
possibility to arrange the text to have a clear description of the case. 
At this point, inspectors will start to underline keywords as it can be seen in the 
following example: 
“The customer comes often to the bank. He first walks around, then he asks 
irrelevant questions to the information desk clerk. After that he plays with  
the self-service payment pc, checking around if there is someone observing 
him.” 
Then, keywords, which are considered important to interpret the case, will be associated 
to two main labels ‘suspicious behaviours’ and ‘action’, which are related to one or more 
suspected. 
At the end of this process, the think-map shown in Figure 2 is obtained. In the map,  
we can see the main labels, which have been used to visualise a fraud operation.  
The cloud callouts represent the activities related to ‘suspicious behaviour’, whose label 
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was previously created with Web-Pad, associated to three different suspected persons. 
There is a customer who has the habit to play with the self-service payment pc  
of the bank. In the middle of the figure, we have the suspected and on the bottom  
the fraudulent action, which is the amount of money missing in a specific bank  
account. 
Figure 1 Web-Pad interface 
 
Source: Oxman (2004) 
Figure 2 The think-map 
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Having this think-map as a descriptive model, inspectors will start to create nodes, which 
will be sent to the auditors to be connected through the Delphi process to build the attack 
tree. Web-Pad basically works on two levels: a graphic level where think-maps can be 
visualised and a text level where different operations can be stored and retrieved for the 
future, supporting the inspectors when they have to build the think-map. 
For instance, inspectors could be interested to have a list of the cases associated  
to a particular behaviour and so on. In the data retrieval mode, the system can  
bring up precedents that inspectors consider similar, according to their subjective 
judgement. 
Users can express the level of similarity between two different cases as a number 
between 0 and 1. Once the database is populated with a significant number of cases,  
it will be possible to retrieve and visualise them in descendant order, according to their 
level of similarity, ready to be examined. 
2.2 Attack tree 
The attack tree, introduced by Schneier (1999), is a tree-based diagram to “systematically 
categorise the different ways in which a system can be attacked”. Nodes are the 
elementary attacks and the root node is the goal of the attack. Children of a node are 
refinements of this goal, whereas leaves are attacks, which cannot be further on refined. 
The process of creating an attack tree starts by identifying the possible attack goals, 
where each goal forms a separate tree, but there is also the possibility that different trees 
share nodes and subtrees. 
Accordingly, modelling an attack tree is a matter of associating a logical AND and  
a logical OR with each node, and therefore encouraging a structured representation  
of events and of the ways they are connected. 
This supports the discovering of the most likely avenues of approach for an attack 
making easier the deployment of the most effective countermeasures. Even though 
Schneier’s attack trees (illustrated in Figure 3) have been considered from their first 
appearance, a convenient tool to systematically categorise the different modes in which 
an attack can be carried out, nonetheless their network structure has been criticised for its 
simplicity and for the lack of well-sounded theoretical foundations. 
Mauw and Oostdijk (2005), arguing that Schneier’s approach to attack trees is 
semantically not well sounded, provide a generalisation based on the observation that an 
attack tree describes an attack suite and that a node can be connected to a multi-set of 
nodes (bundle) and may contain several bundles. 
But, since our paper is more focused on the way on which the team of experts carry 
out, in a Delphi-based context, the consensual construction of the tree, than on the 
complexity of its structure, the nature of the tree is irrelevant and therefore we will adopt 
Schneier’s approach. 
Niitsoo (2010) also points out how it is important to develop attack tree models  
that take into consideration not only whether the attack is possible or not, which cannot 
tell so much about not only the likelihood of the attack, but also incentives and 
possibilities available to the fraudster to try to analyse his or her behaviour. 
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Figure 3 An example of attack tree 
 
Source: Schneier (1999) 
2.3 Delphi method 
Delphi method, introduced for the first time in the 1950s for a US-sponsored military 
project (Gordon, 1994), is a systematic, interactive and iterative method, which relies  
on a team of experts, aiming at discussing and structuring the solution of a given 
problem. The experts are asked to answer questionnaires in two or more rounds, and after 
each round a moderator provides an anonymous summary of the experts’ analysis from 
the previous round as well as some explanations of their judgements. The moderator 
encourages experts to reuse their earlier opinions in light of the outcomes of the analysis 
provided by the other experts of the team. The process is stopped according to a  
pre-defined criterion and some average measures of the outcomes of the final round 
determine the output of the process. 
Delphi method has also been used recently in many different fields of research like 
R&D to explore the barrier factors to the adoption of mobile service (Steinert, 2009), 
security evaluation of embedded systems (Zhang et al., 2008), road safety (Ma et al., 
2011) and clinical nursing (McElhinney, 2010). 
Rowe and Wright (1999) suggest four key features for a good design of Delphi: 
• Anonymity of Delphi experts: Allows the experts to freely express their opinions 
without undue social pressures to conform from others in the team. Decisions are 
evaluated on their merit, rather than who has proposed the idea. 
• Iteration: Allows the experts to refine their views in light of the progress of the 
team’s work from round to round. 
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• Controlled feedback: Informs the experts of the other experts’ perspectives, and 
provides the opportunity for Delphi experts to clarify or change their views. 
• Statistical aggregation of team response: Allows for a quantitative analysis and 
interpretation of output information. 
In our system, Delphi will be used as a method for finding the agreement on the 
connections between different nodes figured out by the inspectors. The role of the 
moderator will be to ask the experts their opinion about strength of the links connecting 
different nodes. 
The aggregation process will be described in detail in Section 3. In the end of the 
Delphi process, the output will be an attack tree. 
3 The fuzzy mechanism 
The audit team performs the Delphi process aiming to select the nodes and connect them 
to design the attack tree. In the first phase, the inspectors determine the possible nodes of 
the attack tree with the help of the think-map. Then, the moderator will ask the experts 
about the possible connection of the nodes, and aggregate the results to obtain  
the attack tree. In this section, we will describe the fuzzy mechanism, which helps the 
experts to form the attack tree. In the literature, a number of different fuzzy approaches to 
the analysis of negotiation processes in multi-agent decision making have been proposed, 
and for an extended overview the interested reader could see, e.g., Carlsson et al. (2004) 
and Fedrizzi et al. (1997). Before the description of the model, we need some basic 
definitions from fuzzy set theory. 
Definition 1 (A fuzzy number (Dubois and Prade, 1978)): Let X = x denote a collection 
of objects (points) denoted generically by x. Then, a fuzzy set A in X is a set of ordered 
pairs 
A = (x, µA(x)),    x ∈ X (1) 
where µA(x) is termed the grade of membership of x in A, and µA: X → M is a function 
from X to a space M called the membership space. When M contains only two points,  
0 and 1, A is non-fuzzy and its membership function becomes identical with the 
characteristic function of a crisp set. This means that crisp sets belong to fuzzy sets.  
A fuzzy number is a convex fuzzy set on the real line such that 
1 ∃x0 ∈ A, µA(x0) = 1, 
2 µA is piecewise continuous. 
(The convexity means that all the γ-level sets are convex. Furthermore, we call F the 
family of all fuzzy numbers). 
A γ-level set of a fuzzy set A is defined by [A]γ = {x ∈ A: µA(x) ≥ γ} if γ > 0 and 
[A]γ = cl{x ∈ A: µA(x) > γ} (the closure of the support of A) if γ = 0. Let A be a fuzzy 
number. Then, [A]γ is a closed convex subset of R for all γ ∈ [0,1]. 
We use the notations 
a1(γ) = min[A]γ, a2(γ) = max[A]γ 
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for the left-hand side and right-hand side of the γ-cut, respectively. When we calculate 
the arithmetic operations on fuzzy sets (fuzzy numbers), we apply the rules of  
interval arithmetic. Let A and B be fuzzy numbers with the corresponding γ-cuts: 
[A]γ = [a1(γ), a2(γ)], [B]γ = [b1(γ), b2(γ)], then theγ-cut of the fuzzy number A + B is the 
following: 
[A + B]γ = [a1(γ) + b1(γ), a2(γ) + b2(γ)], 
and the γ-cut of the fuzzy number αA, where α > 0: [αA]γ = [αa1(γ),αa2(γ)]. 
We will use linguistic labels in the questionnaire and we represent the labels as fuzzy 
numbers (see Figure 4 for a possible representation). We suppose that the moderator  
can choose which nodes are parents (V) (with descendant) and which ones are leaves (L) 
(without descendants, basic attack components). We obtain two sets: 
L = {l1, …, ls}, V = {v1, …, vt}. 
Figure 4 Possible representation with triangular fuzzy numbers 
 
In the first questionnaire, the experts have to express their opinion in linguistic  
terms about statements like “li ∈ L is required for vj ∈ V”, for every i = 1, …, s, 
j = 1, …, t. 
Then, experts E = {e1, …, eN} are asked to determine their level of agreement on the 
statements based on a linguistic scale with m terms for every pair (li, vj). 
The linguistic terms in the model are represented as fuzzy numbers. In other words, 
we have a mapping Φ: T → F from the set of linguistic terms into the family of fuzzy 
numbers. 
Example 1: One possible representation for a linguistic label is a triangular fuzzy 
number: 
1 ,
( ) 1 .
0 otherwise.
a u a u a
u aA u a u a
α
α
ββ
−
− − ≤ ≤
−
= − ≤ ≤ +
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From the opinion of the experts, we obtain the frequencies of the different classes. 
For the pair (li, vj), we have 1 , , .
ij ij
mn n…  If we denote by A1, …, Am the fuzzy numbers 
corresponding to the linguistic labels, we can define a new fuzzy number Aij as a 
‘weighted average’, with level sets: 
1 2
1 1
1 1( ), ( ) ,
m m
ij m ij m
ij k k
k k
A n a n a
N N
γ γ γ
= =
   =     ∑ ∑  
where 1 2[ , ]
k ka a  is the level set of Ak. This is clearly a fuzzy number with the support in 
the interval [0,1]. 
To obtain the connection degree for the pair (li, vj), we calculate the f-weighted 
possibilistic mean value of Aij, defined in Carlsson and Fuller (2001). 
Definition 2: The f-weighted possibilistic mean value of A ∈ F, with γ-level sets 
[A]γ = [a1(γ), a2(γ)], γ ∈ [0,1], is defined by: 
1 1 1 2
0 0
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) d ( ) d
2f
a aE A M U f fγ
γ γγ γ γ γ+= =∫ ∫  (2) 
where Uγ is a uniform probability distribution on [A]γ for all γ ∈ [0,1]. 
After we have obtained these defuzzified numbers as the estimation of the connection 
strengths, we can determine for every attack component the ranking of the other nodes, 
then we can construct the adjacency matrix of the attack tree by connecting the leaves to 
the best ranked vertices. 
Example 2: In the simplest case, we can represent the linguistic labels as a fuzzy set with 
the membership function 
1
( ) .
0 otherwise
u c
A u
=
=   
If we have five categories, we use the set {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}. The weights  
of the outcomes are the frequencies of the linguistic labels. If we observe the weights  
n0, n0.25, n0.5, n0.75, n1, then Aij is just the characteristic function of the value 
4
0.25*4
00.25*0
1 *0.25 ,i
iij
n i
n =
=
∑∑  
what is simply the sample mean value of our data. And, according to the used 
defuzzification method, the obtained connection estimation is this sample mean. 
4 The architecture of FIDES 
In this section, we will describe the architecture of FIDES (Figure 5), showing how the 
main components are interrelated and the role played by the inspectors and auditors, the 
experts, who have to decode the alarms generated by software agents and to detect and 
describe the suspicious human behaviours (see, e.g., Sanchez et al., 2009; Edge et al., 
2007). 
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Figure 5 The architecture of the system 
 
FIDES, indeed, has been built on the base of the suggestions we collected interviewing 
the managers of risk management department of a leading European bank and thus the 
multi-agent system has been designed according to their opinions. 
In a fraud detection process, an audit team has to deal with not only numerical data 
and alarms, produced by software agents, but also documents, reports and information 
gathered by different actors (managers, whistleblowers and anonymous informers) and 
then summarised by inspectors. 
Therefore, the key factor in detecting fraud behaviours is to improve the interaction 
between inspectors and auditors. Alarms, generated by software agents or suspicious 
behaviours noticed personally by inspectors, are filtered using the Web-Pad software.  
The Information Filtering Module is nothing else that a preliminary session where 
inspectors can decide which alarms and behaviours to take into considerations to perform 
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all the process. Once the case has been well detailed as shown in Figure 1, inspectors  
start to underline the keywords to create the think-map as described in  
Section 2. 
This is the Attack Components Detection Module whose output is the set of nodes to 
be sent to the auditors. 
Since think-map represents a hypothesis of correspondence between behaviour, 
suspected fraudsters and fraudulent actions, inspectors create nodes to try to offer an 
explanation of how this conceptual framework can be associated to concrete actions 
performed by the fraudster. Nodes are elementary attacks expressed by labels, which 
define all the possible steps of the fraudulent action. 
At this stage, auditors activate the Delphi Module, driven by the moderator, as 
explained in Section 3, to the end of connecting the nodes to form the attack tree, taking 
into account the strength of the links between nodes. In the Attack Tree Design Module, 
experts can estimate the risk and develop the strategy to persecute the fraudster. The 
estimation process can be performed calculating the most probable or the least expensive 
path. 
Continuing with the example described in Section 2.1, in Figure 6 is shown the final 
attack tree as a result of Delphi process where auditors connect the nodes delivered by the 
inspectors. In this example, the goal of the attacker is to transfer money to his or her 
personal account. The tree shows different ways he or she can achieve this goal. The 
easiest but the least successful path is to guess ID and password. The most difficult one is 
to hijack the bank system. The other paths show identity thief sub-attacks based on 
malicious software installation or the use of cameras installed at ATMs. 
Figure 6 Final attack tree 
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To select the most probable path, in the risk evaluation phase, experts can have the 
opportunity to compare the actual attack tree with the ones created in the past and use  
the information that could be useful to develop a counterstrategy for the new attack.  
Our assumption is that the identified attack of similar trees can be useful in finding the 
real path in the present tree. Moreover, by comparing the background of the cases we can 
obtain useful information for example the possible amount of fraud, the fraudster or his 
or her strategy. A typical situation could be that the same person is performing the same 
attack, which can be discovered by identifying similar attack trees in a specific range of 
time. 
An attack tree represents the set of potential fraud schemes. After we constructed  
the tree, we would like to determine the real attack, which takes place in the present.  
To do this, we need a database containing all the attack trees constructed in the past, then 
comparing the newly created tree with the ones in the database and based on the similar 
trees and their outcomes, we will be able to choose the most probable attack. 
A graph (in our special case a tree) can be represented by its adjacency matrix.  
The adjacency matrix can be used to find the similarity value between attack trees but  
the problem is that a tree with n vertices has n – 1 edges so the matrix is very sparse. 
Moreover, since we need comparable matrices for determining the similarity, we have to 
consider the matrix with all the possible keywords for every tree, and if the number of 
keywords is k, even in the best case we will have approximately k(k – 2) number of 0s in 
the matrix. Our aim is to find trees with similar sets of edges. It is important to note that 
every vertex of the attack tree (like every decision tree) can be associated with the 
distance value from the root node. Thanks to the structure of the attack tree, we are able 
to represent the edges of the tree as ordered pairs where the first element is the vertex 
with smaller distance from the root (the goal of the attack). The set of these pairs is 
different for two attack trees and if we know this set we can construct the tree. Then, we 
find the similarity of these sets (the number of pairs in a set is equal to the number of 
vertices in the tree minus 1). 
To obtain the similarity of two sets, we will employ an index, which is frequently 
used in information retrieval, the cosine similarity. Before the definition of the index, we 
need to introduce a notation: if we have two sets, S1 and S2 then M = |S1 ∩ S2| is the 
number of common items between S1 and S2. The cosine similarity of two sets can be 
defined as 
1 2
1 2
cos( , ) MS S
S S
=  (3) 
where |Si| is the number of items in Si. In our case, the sets consist of the edges of the 
trees, so if a tree has n vertices, then the corresponding set will contain n – 1 elements. 
Finding this similarity measure can be done effectively for example by using the method 
described in Nanopoulos and Manolopoulos (2002). 
Example 3: If we look at the two constructed attack trees in Figure 6 (S1) and Figure 7 
(S2), we can calculate the similarity by using the formula (3). 
The number of edges is 14 and 8 in S1 and S2, respectively. If we compare the sets, we 
can see that the two trees have 5 edges in common: (transfer money to a personal 
account, log in), (transfer money to a personal account, hijacking bank system),  
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(log in, guessing), (guessing, guess ID), (guessing, guess password). This means that 
M = 5, and the cosine similarity: 
1 2
1 2
5cos( , ) 0.47.
8 14
MS S
S S
= = ≈
×
 
Figure 7 Possible attack tree from the database 
 
5 Conclusions 
Most of the fraud surveys published in the last five years by leading international 
consulting companies have shown that behavioural aspects play a central role, and 
therefore the biggest problem to be addressed by auditors and inspectors is to interpret the 
signals and summarise the information coming from several, sometimes conflicting, 
sources. The successful solution of this kind of problems depends to a large extent on a 
proper combination of critical analysis, knowledge-based actions, whistleblowers' 
messages interpretation, involving groups of interacting experts. 
Since before addressing the design of our system, we had the chance to meet  
several experts in charge of diverse risk management activities inside one of the largest 
European banking groups, our work has been inspired by the information collected 
during the meetings. Banks have a huge amount of data and experience concerning fraud  
cases, but they do not use it in an efficient way, since most of the knowledge is 
unstructured. One of the main challenges of the bank is to unify fraud risk assessment 
processes in the different countries where its branches are located, perform a  
realistic temporal analysis and establish cause/effect relationship in a rather short  
time combining objective information with the subjective judgements expressed by 
experts. 
Treasuring the knowledge and the opinions collected during the meetings, we 
designed the multi-agent system FIDES, intended for the management of fraud detection 
situations where inspectors and auditors are collaborating according to a two-phase 
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detection process. In the first phase, think-maps and Delphi method offer to the 
inspectors and auditors, respectively, an effective environment to explicit their 
knowledge, select the most likely fraud attack components, and finally structuring  
them in an attack tree. In the second phase, the attack tree structure is definitively  
settled introducing a representation of uncertainty involved based on fuzzy numbers. 
Attack tree-based representation of fraudulent processes has the advantage of offering a 
clear visualisation of the attack, which permits to the auditors to highlight the most 
probable attack paths, after introducing the cost or impact of an attack starting from a set 
of attributes attached to the nodes of the attack tree. 
On the basis of the suggestions and comments collected during the work sessions 
with the members of the audit team of the bank, we started to develop a first prototype of 
FIDES. The prototype is limited to two modules, i.e., the Attack Components Detection 
and Delphi ones. A test has been conducted with the collaboration of the inspectors of the 
bank to verify the usability and understand the limitations of the system. During the 
experiments, a list of different cases was presented as a short description and possible 
consequences (typically a loss from a bank account) will be provided to the users 
(inspectors) to create think-maps and then nodes as described in the previous section. 
A second group of experts will carry out the process of linking the nodes, aiming at 
designing the final attack tree. The group process will be driven by a moderator,  
selected among the members of the same group, according to the Delphi method,  
and the consensual dynamics based on software implemented in Fedrizzi et al.  
(2008). 
After we have sent few screenshots of the first draft of the prototype, we asked the 
users to give us a short feedback highlighting positive and negative aspects about what 
they observed and suggest further developments. The first reaction was a positive 
evaluation of the improvement of the interaction dynamics between inspectors and 
auditors. Another feature, which has been appreciated, is the anonymity, which allowed 
the users to operate with more freedom, without the pressure of performing a wrong 
evaluation of the case. 
Regarding negative aspects, users pointed out possible problems in the interpretation 
of the fraud cases once the system was used by people with different cultural 
backgrounds and languages, a problem arising due to the international profile of the 
banking group. A limitation would be the possibility to manage big fraud operation on 
international scale, where different auditors and inspectors from different contexts might 
find difficulties in understanding each other. In particular in building the think-map, the 
perception and interpretation of the facts might encounter problems on a semantic level, 
like underestimate or overestimate the same behaviour or action performed in different 
contexts. 
Concerning future improvements of FIDES, first of all, assuming that the formally 
expressed representation of the information related to the attacks (attack trees) is stored in 
references sources (catalogue of attack trees), an intelligent searching module will be 
introduced for retrieving information from the catalogue. To wit, our aim is to propose an 
ontology-based description of the attack trees to provide a formal basis for sharing 
knowledge and for reusing it during the attack tree design process. 
Another possible improvement would be a mobile version of FIDES, particularly 
useful when inspections are carried out in the different branches of the bank spread to a 
large geographic area, and aiming at homogenising the information coming from 
different information sources. 
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